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8CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
In the U.K. local authorities are responsible for the 
provision of a wide range of services, are large employers of 
labour and account for about a fifth of gross domestic fixed 
capital formation. As can be seen from Table (1.1) they have 
also been responsible for a considerable proportion of 
public sector investment and since 1968 have invested more 
than the public corporations. Most of this investment has 
been devoted to the provision of housing and educational services; 
and it is the volume of capital-expenditure that is the primary 
determinant of the extent of local authority borrowing. Table 
(1.1) shows that since I960 approximately seventy per cent 
of capital expenditure has been financed by borrowing. The 
remainder is met either by capital grants from the central 
government or from local authority current revenues.
Borrowing places the burden on future ratepayers because of 
need to service the existing volume of debt. In Table (1.2) 
it can be seen that as a proportion of total current expenditure 
the payment of interest on debt has risen from about 17 per 
cent of total current expenditure in the early I960 s to over 
21 per cent in 197O. It declined for the next two years only 
to start rising again recently. An important influence on this 
proportion is the level of interest rates. How quickly a rise 
in interest rates will increase debt interest as a proportion 
of current expenditure will depend upon the size of the new 
borrowing requirement and on the average term to maturity of the 
existing debt. The longer the period that has to elapse before
Table (1.1) The capital expenditure and borrowing of local authorities; and capital expenditure of other sectors 1961-74
Gross domestic Fixed 
Capital Formation 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 197O 1971 1972 1973 1974
1) Personal sector
!2) Companies
|3) Public Corporations
Central Government
852 817 867 928 989 997 1117 1237 1147 1161 1722 235O 2436 2212
2026 2053 2019 2482 2680 2726 2711 3071 3577 3976 4O39 4424 5888 7132
905 933 1024 1187 1293 1453 1661 1619 1482 1673 1857 1776 2O29 2678
219 216 227 284 301 335 395 458 486 576 6O1 643 773 937
Local Authorities 702 814 883 1112 1185 1345 1568 1712 1757 1851 I960 2236 2755 3321
Total 4704 4833 5O20 5993 6448 6856 7452 8O97 8449 9237 1O,179 11,429 13871 1628O
Row (5) as % of 
total 14.92 16.84 17.59 22.15 18.38 19.62 21.O4 21.14 2Q3O 20.04 19.26 19.56 19.86 20.4O
Net local authority 
borrowing 475 565 607 738 1O15 944 1079 1171 1151 1249 1399 1396 2369 3342
Source: National Income and Expenditure; Financial Statistics; H.M.S.O.
oTable (1.2) Local Authority current expenditure and debt interest 1961-74
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 197O 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Total current expenditure 1931 2127 2322 2526 2875 3245 3641 4009 4423 5O32 5582 6356 738O 91
45
interest 335 364 342 445 522 6OO 671 791 93O 1O68 11O4 1164 14O3 1
860
17.35 17.11 16.88 17.62 18.16 18.49 18.43 19.73 21.O3 21.22 19.78 18.31 18.51 
Source: Financial Statistics, H.M.S.O.
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much of the existing debt must be renewed the longer it will take 
for a rise in interest rates to be reflected in the total' 
debt interest that has to be met out of current revenues.
To put it in its proper perspective borrowing is just one of the 
means by which local authorities seek to make provision for 
recurring capital and current expenditure. Since the war there 
have been major developments in the techniques of revenue 
raising and in the administration of local finances. Local 
government has been reorganisied very recently and major 
changes in the methods of local finance are expected as a result 
.of the deliberations of the Layfield Committee. 2 This 
however, is not concerned with the wider issues of local 
government finance or with the problems of financial management. 
It is instead an attempt to explore in detail the relationship 
between local authority borrowing and the exercise of monetary 
policy.
Local authority borrowing has been linked with monetary policy 
for a number of reasons. In the first place, on most of the
occasions since the war local authority, borrowing...has been
the subject 
of public debate the discussion has turned invariably on the
consequences that the pattern of borrowing has had for monetary 
policy. The existing literature, however, has been concerned 
with the institutional and operational side and is almost 
completely descriptive. At present there appears to be no 
published analytical or empirical study of local authority 
borrowing.
The second reason emerges from the possibility that borrowing 
behaviour can be understood as a type of monetarv
12
Tobin and Brainard (1967) have argued that "monetary theory 
broadly conceived is simply the theory of portfolio manage- 
ment by economic units: households, businesses, financial 
institutions and governments. . . . Like other branches of
economic theory, monetary theory has both a microeconomic and a
macro- 
economic side. Monetary microeconomics concerns the balance
sheet or portfolio choices of individual units. . . . The choices 
are constrained by the wealth of the unit and by its opportunities 
to buy and sell assets and to incur and retire debt. Within
these constraints, the choices are affected by the objectives,
4 expectations and uncertainties of the unit."
Finally, since local authorities are large net issuers of 
financial assets, the ways in which they choose to borrow 
both by the source from which they acquire funds and the type 
of debt instrument they supply may have wide ramifications for 
financial flows. Because the monetary authorities must work 
through the medium of the financial system in order to affect 
the level of economic activity a better understanding of how 
parts of it might react to changes in the monetary climate is 
useful for policy making. This is especially so when local 
authorities are concerned because not only do they account 
for a large proportion of capital investment, as has been noted, 
they are also an important component of the public sector and 
their actions affect the ways in which the public sector borrowing 
requirement is financed and therefore can have a very direct 
bearing on monetary policy. There is the additional implication 
that a formal analysis of local authority borrowing will allow 
this area of the monetary system to be integrated more fully 
into large-scale econometric models so that policy makers can 
be more aware of how, for example, a rise in interest rates
13
will alter the demands that local authorities make on the tem- 
porary money markets, affect the supply of negotiable bonds
or change the amounts that local authorities borrow from the
5 Public Works Loan Board and thereby from the Exchequer.
The conception of monetary policy underpinning this essay is 
very broad. It is a widespread belief that before 1971 the 
Bank of England did not have a monetary policy in the sense of 
making control of the money supply a policy target. On the 
other hand, the Bank has been intimately concerned with the 
management of the national debt, with the placement of new 
debt issued to finance budget deficits, with the structure 
and volatility of interest rates, and with the problems created 
by short-term capital flows. In chapter 2 it will be seen 
that the borrowing of local authorities has touched the exercise 
of monetary policy at all these points.
It is assumed in this study that the volume of capital expenditure 
and the extent of local authority borrowing are unresponsive 
to variations in the rate of interest. Since, feheM* the demands 
that local authorities make in total on the capital and money 
markets and the P.W.L.B. are insensitive to the changes in the 
costs of borrowing some other means of central control is 
required to ensure that the allocation of resources is in 
line with government policy. In consequence the primary means 
of control has been fiscal.
Borrowing by local authorities has almost always been the 
subject of close central control and this has enabled Govern- 
ments to control not only the total of local authority capital
spending.
14
but also to ensure that the purpose of the expenditure was 
in accordance with government policy. The main instrument 
of control has been the loan sanction. This is a consent 
obtained from a sanctioning authority, usually the Department of 
the Environment, to raise a loan. Until recently any capital
project which was to be financed by borrowing required a specific
7 
loan sanction. But today block sanctions are often issued
for what are called key sector projects, such as housing/ 
education and principal roads, which reduces the need for 
detailed administration while allowing the local authority 
the maximum discretion to assess local needs and determine 
priorities. At the same time the central government's ability 
to monitor the total level and main trends of capital expenditure 
is hopefully to be improved while reducing the detailed control 
of individual projects.
Once in the light of projections about future demands on resources 
the volume of local authority capital expenditure has been 
determined the borrowing requirement is fixed and must be met 
either by borrowing from the Public Works Loans Board or the 
capital and money markets. And it is this that provides the start- 
ing point for this study.
Chapter 2 brings together much of the literature that has been 
published on local authority borrowing since the war and even 
before. The various policy changes that have been made, par- 
ticularly those of 1955 and 1963, are considered, and the 
reasoning behind them subjected to scrutiny. In chapter 3 
a number of models of local authority borrowing are developed 
and their merits tested against the data in chapter 4. The
15
success of the 1963 measures is also evaluated within the 
framework provided by the models of chapter 3. In chapter 5 
the bearing of local authority borrov/ing on the exercise of 
monetary policy is dealt with more explicitly in the light of 
the findings of chapters 3 and 4. Finally, in chapter 6 some 
conclusions are drawn and some of the possibilities for
work, considered..
CHAPTER TWO 16 
MONETARY POLICY AND LOCAL AUTHORITY BORROWING
A Historical Account
The aim of this chapter is to look closely at the form local authority borrow- 
ing has taken and the arrangements that have surrounded it mainly between 
1945 and the present. Special emphasis will be placed on the various ways 
in which it has complicated the exercise of monetary policy. This is not, of 
course, the only feature of the way in which local authority borrowing and 
monetary policy are interrelated since many of the actions of local authorities 
themselves have been influenced by the techniques the monetary authorities 
have used and the view that they have taken of the role played by the market 
in central government debt in the working of the financial system. This two- 
way relationship provides the main area of interest. Many subsidiary issues 
will be taken up in the discussion but there will be no attempt to provide a 
comprehensive account of the numerous issues raised by local authority 
capital finance or by monetary policy. If the account which follows has a 
unifying theme it is that when interest rates are subject to a more or less 
cyclical variation it is natural that local authorities should attempt to mini- 
mise the charge on local revenues by varying the maturity structure of their 
debt and the sources from which they borrow. This objective, however, has 
come into conflict with the monetary authorities in their attempts to pursue 
national objectives. It is to the consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding this conflict to which the discussion now turns.
2:1 Local Authority Borrowing Before 1945
The situation prevailing immediately after the war can be understood 
better if some brief remarks are made on the state of affairs both 
before and during the war. Ever since local authorities have had 
occasion to borrow, subject to the approval of the central government, 
they have done so in the open market. An additional source of funds 
was provided from 1817 by the Public Works Loan Board (P.W.L.B.) 
appointed to make loans so as to help alleviate the distress caused 
by the ending of the Napoleonic Wars and the unemployment that
resulted. The scope of the Board and the purposes for which it could
2 
make loans were modified during the nineteenth century .
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A reform, near the end of the century, provided a clear
presentiment of what was to occur in the post 1945 era.
In 1895 interest rates charged by the Board relative to those
obtainable in the open market were very high. Since under
3 
an Act of 1875 premature repayment of loans was allowed,
local authorities found it advantageous to borrow in the open 
market and use the proceeds to repay loans previously obtained 
from the Board. The Exchequer, however, was in no position 
to repay its loans; in consequence so as to prevent any loss to 
public funds, the Treasury altered the rules governing repayments. 
In IS00, moreover, market interest rates moved well above those 
charged on loans made by the P.W.L.B. with the consequence
that applications for loans became so heavy that the funds voted
4 by Parliament were insufficient to meet them. It was decided,
therefore, to restrict the granting of loans so as to exclude 
altogether the larger authorities and all local authority undertakings 
which would be self-financing because of their commercial nature. 
These were, perhaps, the first occasions on which the natural 
desire of local authorities to minimise the cost of their borrowing 
came into conflict with the objectives of the monetary authorities; 
and the result was an alteration in the arrangements and rules to 
the benefit of the central government.
During the inter-war period local authorities began to assume new 
responsibilities many of which had to be financed by borrowing . 
There also occurred concurrently, a debate about whether or not 
capital expenditure should be financed out of current revenue. 
This in part reflected a concern for the increasing total indebtedness 
of local authorities but also the possibility during an era of falling 
prices that the real burden of the debt would make some local 
authorities insolvent. The numerous rules governing the manner in 
which local authorities obtained sanction to borrow and then raised
c
the finance were revised and modernised in 1933 and this has
provided the framework of rules within which they have financed
7 
capital expenditure until very recently .
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With the- outbreak of war in 1939 borrowing by local authorities 
became subject to the Defence Regulations concerning capital
o
issues . Capital expenditure, understandably, fell to low levels 
under the system of wartime control. Towards the end of the war 
the Treasury in a memorandum referred to the heavy demands which 
the needs of the central government, local authorities and industry 
would make on the money market. So as to co-ordinate this
borrowing the Local Authorities Loans Act of 1945 prohibited local
9 
authorities from borrowing except from the P.W.L.B. . The
prohibition was to cease after five years unless Parliament directed 
other wise.
2:2 The Immediate Post-War Period
In the first few years after the war the system of controls and the 
fact that local authorities were restricted, almost entirely, to 
borrowing from the P.W.L.B., plus the abeyance in which the use 
of monetary policy was held, produced few difficulties. The 
central government borrowed in the open market and funds were 
channelled to local authorities at rates of interest determined by the 
government's own credit. These rates of interest, however, become 
a matter of contention because of the government's belief that since 
the war had been successfully financed on low interest rates it 
was appropriate to finance the peace-time recovery in a similar 
manner. Until 1948 this policy of 'cheap money'/as it became 
known, was pursued and P.W.L.B. rates were fixed at 1^ per cent 
for loans of less than five years duration, 2 per cent for 5 to 15 
years and at 2-| per cent for over 15 years.
Although local authorities were able to obtain funds at very 
favourable rates all of their requirements were not met by the Board 
as can be seen from Table 2:1. In the first full financial year after 
the war only 64 per cent of their requirements were so obtained 
because there occurred a major redeployment of internal funds built 
up during the war.
19
TABLE 2:1 LOCAL AUTHORITY BORROWING : 1946 - I960
Year
1946-1947
1947-1948
1948-1949
1949-1950
1950-1951
1951-1952
1952-1953
1953-1954
1954-1955
1955-1956
1956-1957
1957-1958
1958-1959
1959-1960
Source: I.M
Total Loans Raised
(includes internal
borrowing)
£mn
149.9
266.9
2.87.3
307.5
340.4
397.9
473.9
494.9
491.4
511.9
501.0
470.7
463.7
511.5
.T.A. (1957) and P.W.L.B.
Loans Raised
From P.W.L.B.
£mn
95.4
214.2
215.1
247.3
280.7
337.7
366.4
272.9
340.3
311.9
109.2
105.2
36.7
39.9
Annual Reports .
% of
Total
64
80
75
80
82
85
77
55
69
61
22
22
8
8
These funds were mainly for housing repairs which were not carried 
out until after the war and then only over a period of time. The 
amount of internal borrowing carried out was also increased by the 
rapid growth in superannuation funds after the war and by the general 
power granted by the Local Authorities Loans Act, 1945, to use all 
internal funds; previously only certain specified funds could be usecf. 
Even by 1951-52 when borrowing from the Board reached its height, 
expressed as a percentage of total loans raised, 15 per cent was 
still being obtained from other sources.
LOa
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The 'cheap money 1 policy ran into considerable difficulties and
its demise is usually associated with the resignation of Hugh Dalton
as Chancellor of the Exchequer in November 1947. His immediate
successor, Sir Stafford Cripps, duly reaffirmed his belief in a
policy of 'cheap money', but, according to Dow actually wrote
its epilogue a few months later by issuing Transport Stock at
3 per cent and by raising all P.W.L.B. rates by half a per cent.
In announcing the new rates the Chancellor declared that "the
rates of interest charged to local authorities are fixed from time
to time to correspond broadly with government borrowing rates for
12
comparable periods" . The problem became a question of how broad
was broad because although interest rates on long-dated government 
bonds rose well above three per cent during 1948 and 1949, P.W.L.B. 
rates remained the same. The effect of this reluctance to re-align 
interest rates charged to local authorities with those on government 
debt was that local authorities were the recipients of a thinly 
concealed subsidy. Some steps were taken to reduce it after the 
Conservatives came to power in the winter of 1951. In response 
to the foreign exchange situation Bank Rate was raised from 2 to 
2| per cent on the 8th of November. Two days later P.W.L.B. 
rates were raised one half of a per cent for loans for more than 
five years. Although this did not of itself remove the subsidy 
since long-rates were still moving steadily upwards it is considered 
as being part of the hew monetary policy 1 which was an attempt 
to reinstate, in part, the cardinal virtues of monetary restraint after
almost a decade in which monetary policy as an effective regulator
13 
of economic activity was out of favour .
P.W.L.B. rates were increased again in February 1952, by three- 
quarters of a per cent on loans up to 15 years, and by one per 
cent on loans for more than 15 years. This increase was seen at
the time as a confirmation of the new Chancellor's determination to
14 
rule out concealed subsidies . Although Bank Rate rose again in
March 1952 to 4 per cent, P.W.L.B. rates remained the same and 
did not change again until October 1953 when they were reduced 
marginally after Bank Rate fell to 3-| per cent.
21
One aspect of the 'new monetary policy 1 which had been given 
particular emphasis by the authorities was that the clearing banks 
should watch very closely the ratio of advances and investments 
to deposits. The legacy of the war and its aftermath had left 
banks and financial institutions with a large volume of short-term 
Government paper which put them beyond the reach of normal 
restrictive measures. The task, furthermore, of post-war 
reconstruction fell heavily on the public sector and as it was not 
possible to finance this expenditure through taxation the Government 
was obliged to become an habitual net borrower. This borrowing 
requirement, in as far as it could not be met by the sale of long- 
term debt, further swelled the volume of treasury bills held by the
clearing banks. As a result of this, and the fact that the banks had
14a 
also.been 'requested 1 to steady their lending, the liquidity ratio
rose to 35.9 per cent in July, 1952, from a level of 32 per cent in 
the previous November, and 31.6 per cent just at the close of the 
1951-52 financial year. The Economist in commenting on this state 
of affairs, suggested that if the policy of credit restraint was to 
remain effective it was necessary to take steps to reduce the 
Exchequer deficit, particularly the scale of lending to the local 
authorities, as well as trying to fund debt more, instead of 
borrowing short from the banks .
The Local Authorities Loans Act of 1945, as explained above, was 
to lapse after five years unless Parliament directed otherwise. 
After the period expired the powers of the Act were extended on a 
annual basis for another two years. From the beginning of 1953 local 
authorities were allowed to borrow if they wished in the open market. 
This change was in line with the wider policy of dismantling the 
various controls which were inherited from the war and used 
extensively during the period of reconstruction. It met, however, 
with considerable opposition in some quarters, not because of the 
measure in itself but because of what it seemed to presage.
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It was feared that it merely paved the way to a point at which 
local authorities would be obliged to borrow in the open market
1 FJ
without much recourse to the P.W.L.B. The Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury emphasised that this was not the policy of the 
government which expected that for the majority of local authorities 
the normal sources of capital would remain unchanged. In support 
of this claim it was pointed out that along with the bpse of the 
statutory prohibition the limit on advances from the P.W.L.B. had 
been raised from £950mn to £l,050mn. A move which "...suggests
...there is no intention for the present at least to induce local
17 
authorities to seek their finances through market or banking channels ,
Opinion for and against the change turned in part upon disagreement 
about the efficacy of the interest rate mechanism as an arm of 
monetary policy and also upon the political argument as to how large 
the public sector ought to be. There was a suspicion on the part 
of those who questioned the point of the change that the eventual 
objective was to bring pressure on the volume of local authority 
capital expenditure, especially on housing. This appeared to be 
confirmed by comment in the financial press which took it for granted
that this was the eventual aim and believed the government had not
18 gone far enough . The view was also expressed that the monetary
authorities could effectively encourage local authorities to reduce
their demands on the Exchequer by fixing P.W.L.B. interest rates
19 
at levels sufficient to provide an incentive .
Those local authorities who chose to go into the open market were
empowered to borrow, under the 1933 Act, mainly by issue of
90 21 22 
stock , by mortgage and by bank overdraft or short-term deposit 
The government seemed to expect that any open-market borrowing 
that occurred would be by the issue of stock by large local 
authorities. Birmingham was the first authority to go into the stock 
market, in April 1953, followed by Liverpool in May.
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P.W.L.B. rates, however, had remained unchanged since February 
of 1952 and although market rates had declined by the middle of 
1953 it was apparently cheaper, once the costs of underwriting had 
been taken into account, to borrow from the Board. The two local 
authorities chose the open market because of the expectation that 
opportunities would present themselves within the optional redemption 
period of the loans to refinance them on more favourable terms.
Refinancing was not possible with loans from the P.W.L.B. because
23 
they were always earmarked to a particular loan sanction . The
loan sanction for housing, for which the funds were required, was 
issued for sixty years. Long-term interest rates it was felt were 
above the normal rate and there was the reasonable expectation, 
based on the past pattern of rates, that they would fall.
The requirement that loans made by the P.W.L.B. were to be ear- 
marked to a loan sanction granted for a specific capital project was 
criticised as early as 1952 and was under official discussion between 
the Treasury and the local authority associations from the middle of 
1954. As a result it was agreed that, as from September 1954, a
loan could be raised from the Board for a shorter period than that of
24 
the relevant departmental sanction
During the remainder of 1953 and into 1954 the steady rise in gilt- 
edged prices allowed some local authorities to raise quite large sums 
in the stock market although in total they were only a small part of 
all local authority external borrowing most of which was still from 
the Board. A more significant development was the increasing resort 
of local authorities to the use of mortgage loans arranged by stock 
exchange brokers who channelled funds from institutional clients to 
local authority clients. The first signs of a specialised market were 
also emerging marrying local authorities to building societies, savings 
banks, insurance and pension funds, and industrial firms among others
24
The main advantages of this form of borrowing lay not in its 
cheapness but in its convenience. Local authorities also began 
to return to the pre-war practice of borrowing short, but with two 
lines of defence against the deposits being called in suddenly. 
They could either turn to the banks by the use of overdraft 
facilities or fall back on the P.W.L.B. as a lender of last resort.
Any original misgivings about the nature of the change made in 
1952 and the way the monetary authorities would interpret it were 
assuaged by the subsequent events. No attempt was made to use
P.W.L.B. rates as an instrument to drive local authorities into
25
the open market . The flexibility provided by mortgage loans and
short term deposits was much to the liking of local authorities safe 
in the knowledge that the P.W.L.B. would always provide funds if 
they were unobtainable elsewhere.
2:3 Local Authorities Are Excluded From The P.W.L.B.
The arrangements after 1952 although they were probably to the 
advantage of local authorities were considered by some to have not 
gone far enough; they were also not without their problems for the 
monetary authorities. The result was that in the Budget of October 
1955, it was announced that the Board in future, before it granted 
any loans, was to put all applicants on inquiry as to their ability 
to raise the capital on their own credit, either in the stock market 
or in the mortgage market. Housing subsidies were also removed, 
except for slum clearance, new towns and overspill areas; along 
with a request that capital expenditure in 1956 to 1957 be kept to 
a level not in excess of the amount spent in the preceeding 
financial year.
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The reasons for the shift in policy cannot be fully understood
9 fi 
without some knowledge of the events leading up to the Budget
The new monetary policy introduced into November, 1951, placed 
emphasis on Bank Rate and on loans made by banks. A credit 
squeeze had been imposed throughout 1952 and into 1953 when 
its relaxation was signalled by a cut in Bank Rate in September, 
and a further cut in May 1954. The economy began to pick up 
again in the second half of 1954 and by the beginning of 1955 
it was booming. Already by the last two quarters of 1954 there 
were signs of a gathering investment revival and a deterioration 
in the gold and dollar reserves. In January 1955 Bank Rate was 
increased. Despite this measure pressure continued on the official 
sterling-dollar exchange rate and Bank Rate was increased again 
in February. At the same time restrictions on hire purchase, which 
had been lifted in the previous September, were reimposed. This 
was part of a package of measures meant to reduce the pressure 
of demand and ease the strain on the reserves. Despite the rise 
in Bank Rate and a reduction in the available supply of treasury 
bills the banks were still able to finance a large increase in 
advances by the sale of short-dated government stock. The apparent 
failure to restrain advances by reducing the liquidity of the clearing 
banks led the authorities to make a request to the banks for a
"positive and significant reduction in their advances over the next
27few months" . Hand in hand with a restrictive monetary policy,
however, fiscal policy was expansive with a reduction in taxation 
and an increase in the budget deficit announced in the April 1955 
budget.
It was also made known in the Budget statement that it had been 
estimated that the local authorities would become less dependent 
on the P.W.L.B. , borrowing about £320mn in the coming financial 
year as compared with £353mn in the preceding year.
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The effect of monetary and fiscal policies pulling in opposite 
directions failed to check, understandably, the level of demand 
particularly for investment goods and imports. Fears of inflation 
depressed gilt-edged prices during the summer and, so as not to 
encourage local authorities to use the P.W.L.B. overmuch, rates 
were raised four times between March and September. Whether 
because the falling gilt-edged market could not absorb local 
authority stock issues or because the rise in P.W.L.B. rates was 
insufficient, there was a considerable switch towards the Board and 
by October local authorities had borrowed £223mn from it, £83mn 
more than in the equivalent period in the previous financial year.
The strain which this put on the borrowing requirement of the 
Exchequer was given by the Chancellor as one of the reasons why 
along with direct measures to contain local authority capital 
expenditure he intended to expose local authorities to the pressure 
of interest rates. The increased borrowing from the Board had raised 
the amount of floating debt and thus impeded the operation of a 
restrictive credit policy. A second reason given by the Chancellor 
was that the open tap provided by the Board meant local authorities 
had less incentive to consider, when capital commitments wsre 
incurred, how the money to meet them was to be found. Their 
financial responsibility, it was felt, was eroded by being able to 
obtain capital at rates of interest reflecting the credit of the 
government. Any advances,, therefore, which the Board were to make 
would be at rates of interest reflecting not government credit, but 
the credit of local authorities of good standing in the market for 
loans.
Some indication of the extent to which local authorities switched 
to the P.W.L.B. in 1955 can be obtained from Table 2:2. After 
borrowing £18mn in 1954 in the stock market nothing was raised in 
the first three quarters of 1955.
TABLE 2:2
New Capital Issues By Local Authorities
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£mn £mn
1953 1st Qtr
2nd
3rd
4th
5.9 
6.8 
6.8
1957 1st Qtr 14.4 
2nd 4.7 
3rd 
4th 6.6
1954
1955
1956
1st Qtr
2nd
3rd
4th
1st Qtr
2nd
3rd
4th
1st Qtr
2nd
3rd
4th
4.
6.
o
5.
 
 
 
8.
7.
14.
3.
28.
9
4
0
0
8
0
6
7
6
1958 1st Qtr 17.3
2nd 14.1
3rd 8.9
4th 11.8
1959 1st Qtr 6.6
2nd 19.8
3rd -0.3
4th 7.6
1969 1st Qtr 12.7
2nd 3.0
3rd 10.7
4th 19.5
Source:
Monthly Digest of Statistics
A number of issues are raised by the reasoning behind the decision 
to force local authorities into the open market. The argument that 
local authorities by switching to the Board increase the amount of 
floating debt available to the banking system depends crucially upon 
the policy of the monetary authorities.
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If because of a policy committed to maintaining the even keel of 
the gilt-edged market the banks are able to sell short-dated stocks 
so as to maintain an increase in their advances, a reduction in the 
floating debt is unlikely to have much impact on the volume of 
credit. The belief that the volume of treasury bills was the key 
to the determination of the level of deposits of the banking system 
came under attack in the 1960s and it is better to postpone a 
detailed consideration until monetary policy is discussed more fully 
in a subsequent chapter. This belief, however, provided some 
justification because it was felt that if the Exchequer could unburden 
itself of the task of financing 40-45 per cent of public sector 
capital expenditure, the ability of the monetary authorities to control 
the money supply would be enhanced.
The argument that local authorities should not be free of the 
deflationary pressure of a restrictionary monetary policy was based 
in part on the belief that local authorities would curtail their capital 
expenditure in response to rising interest rates as the higher burden 
of servicing the debt weighed on the local revenues. The implication 
was that capital programmes especially for housing and education 
which are largely a reflection of central government policies and 
require the loan sanction of the relevant ministry, would be jettisoned 
because of prohibitive interest rates. A situation could arise, so it 
was suggested at the time, in which a capital project, that had the 
full backing of the central government, and for which loan sanction 
had been granted, could be cancelled or postponed because of high 
interest rates brought about by a restrictive monetary policy.
The decision to make the P.W.L.B. effectively a 'lender of last 
resort 1 was received with some surprise in local government circles; 
the reaction, however, was mollified at first by uncertainty about 
how strictly the new conditions would be interpreted. The Chancellor 
in his budget statement, had indicated that no local authority would 
be denied the right of access to the Board, only that applicants 
would be put on inquiry.
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This may have contributed to the belief that local authorities 
would only have to prove sincerity of effort in trying to raise
loans in the open market before they would be able to fall back
28
on the Board . The interpretation put upon it, however, was
much stricter as can be seen from Table 2:1 , In the first financial 
year of the new arrangements only 22 per cent of total loans raised 
were from the Board; by 1958-59 it was down to 8 per cent.
This rapid fall-off in borrowings from the Board meant alternative 
sources had to be tapped very quickly. These took a variety of 
forms. In the first three quarters of 1956 few public issues were 
possible because of heavy sales of government stock and a prolonged 
fall in gilt-edged prices. An added reason may have been that the 
Bank of England, mindful of the large issues of government stock, 
was reluctant to allow many local government issues to come forward. 
In the absence of many stock issues local authorities were obliged to 
place greater reliance on sales of mortgages. They were assisted 
in this by the granting of Treasury consent for local authorities to 
borrow by mortgage for periods, of less than seven years; something 
which had been denied them under successive Control of Borrowing 
Orders since the beginning of the war. A new market, or rather a 
continuation of that which had been emerging between 1952 and 1956, 
evolved which channelled funds from many institutional lenders who 
found the rates more attractive than could be obtained in quoted 
securities. These loans were often only for a few years as local 
authorities were most reluctant to commit themselves to long term 
loans at rates of interest they believed to be too high.
Rose (1957) in a careful analysis of the capital market during 1955 
and 1956 pointed to the reluctance of local authorities to fund while 
interest rates were high while large institutional investors were 
unwilling to lend short unless the return was well in excess of that 
on long-term loans. Because of these differing preferences, Rose 
considered that this would have tended to depress the volume of 
local authority borrowing, since by and large local authorities were 
unwilling to pay the rates Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
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required, but for the fact that short-term mortgages, partly 
as a result of the effect of surtax were very attractive to 
private individuals. Roughly £150mn was raised by the middle 
of 1956; a large part of which was for relatively short periods of
under ten years at rates of interest higher than those payable on
29 long-term loans
Another significant development in the pattern of local authority 
borrowing was the even larger volume of business done in the 
temporary money market for periods up to a year. "Institutional 
money, temporary liquid surpluses of industrial companies, some 
bank money, quite substantial temporary deposits of foreign funds
and much of the temporary surpluses of the local authorities
30 themselves go into this volatile market" . The funds which were
attracted into this market may well have gone otherwise into the 
treasury bill market, been held as a bank deposit or deposited with 
a Building Society. The net inflow into Building Societies did drop 
off during 1956 but this normally happens whenever market rates move 
above the inelastic rates of the Building Societies. The lack of 
data makes it impossible to judge how much local authority temporary 
borrowing occurred at the expense of central government sales of 
treasury bills to the non-bank private sector.
The poor state of the stock market and the tight control which the 
Bank of England exercised over any stock issues local authorities 
wished to place resulted in the emergence of a queue of would-be 
borrowers which meant that those at the end were having to wait 
months and even years before being able to issue stock. Many of 
those who were in the queue may only have been keeping their 
options open so that when their turn came a choice whether or not 
to proceed, could be made in the light of the prevailing market.
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The queue became so long, notwithstanding the possibility that 
many in it would eventually not take advantage of the option to 
issue stock, that the Bank, in May 1957, attempted to pare it 
down to manageable lengths by the prohibition of any issues of 
less than £3mn. This had the obvious effect of excluding all 
small and many medium sized authorities from the stock market 
and left them with the only alternatives of borrowing by mortgage 
or on a temporary basis.
It has already been mentioned that one of the reasons given for 
ushering local authorities into the open market in 1955 was a need 
to reduce the borrowing requirement of the central government. 
Within six months, however, the nationalised industries stepped 
into the place vacated by the local authorities and began to 
receive all their funds for capital purposes from the Exchequer. 
The total borrowing needs of the nationalised industries were in 
excess of those of local authorities with the consequence that 
below-the-line expenditure actually increased. The monetary 
authorities may have been unwilling to countenance the higher 
interest rates which would have been the consequence of both 
the local authorities and the nationalised industries competing in 
the capital and money markets.
A very widespread view held in local authority circles during, the 
first eight years of the new arrangements was that "...the P.W.L.B
does not follow the market in its rates but that, on the contrary,
31 it tends to establish the market rate" . This accusation was
studiously denied by the Board claiming that it received instructions 
from the Treasury about which rates to charge and that they only 
reflected market rates. The question of which is cause and which 
effect can be answered in part by a direct comparison of the rates 
that the Board charged and those paid on mortgages.
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The poverty of data, however, makes this very difficult for most 
of the period; the conclusions, therefore, that can be drawn must 
be tentative. The Radcliffe Report, paragraph 597, plots the local 
authority mortgage rate on loans for one to ten years against the 
P.W.L.B. rate on loans for up to five years. The P.W.L.B. rate
rl . , . _5rose in January 1956 to 5^ per cent and to 5~ per cent in March.
o
The mortgage rate rose during January and February dipped slightly 
in March and then continued to rise throughout the rest of the year; 
fell sharply at the beginning of 1957 and then started to rise again. 
The P.W.L.B. rate was reduced in June 1956 to 5j per cent and 
remained unchanged until July 1957 when it was increased to 5| per 
cent. This rise occurred only after mortgage rates had been rising 
for four months.
On the 19 September 1957, Bank Rate was increased to seven per 
cent in response to a sterling crisis. A week later the P.W.L.B. 
rate was raised to per cent. The mortgage rate rose rapidly 
after the Bank Rate rise but did not exceed the P.W.L.B. rate for 
another month when the rate peaked, fell during December below 
the P.W.L.B. rate, and continued to fall during January 1958. 
The P.W.L.B. rate was not reduced until the end of February and 
then to 6i per cent. The mortgage rate continued to fall during 
1958, moving below the P.W.L.B. which^was then reduced in July 
to 5f per cent. No figures can be cited for 1959 and 1960 because 
the Radcliffe Report's chart ends in 1958. For the three years, 
1956-1958, however, there is little indication that the Board acted 
as a market leader. Only the large increase in September 1959 
was out of step with the market N As far as it is possible to draw 
inferences from such a survey, it appears that the Board, in most 
instances, followed rather than led the market.
Table 2:3 lists interest rates in 1961 and 1952 (data is unavailable 
for 1959 and 1960). Though the two rates may not be strictly 
comparable, the Table gives little support to the local authority 
belief. On June 3rd 1961, when the P.W.L.B. rate was raised 
to 6| per cent it appears that it may have lead the mortgage rate;
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TABLE 2:3 INTEREST RATES ON LOCAL AUTHORITY DEBT:
MONTHLY : 1961-62
1961 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Tr 1
J Li*
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Mortgage 
Rate*
6.19
6.19
6.31
6.31
6.31
6,50
7.13
7.13
7.13
6.88
6.81
6.81
P.W.L.B. Mortgate 
Rate** Rate*
6.25 1962 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
6.50 Jun
Jui
7.00 Aug
Sept
Oct
6.75 Nov
Dec
6.81
6.81
6.75
6.75
6.75
6.75
6.69
6.56
6.25
5.77
5.88
5.77
P.W.L.B 
Rate**
6.75
ii
ii
il
II
II
II
6.63
6.50
6.25
5.88
ii
* On loans for over ten years.
** On loans for fifteen to thirty years.
Source:
Financial Statistics
but the increase in August follows the rise in mortgage rate, and 
the fall in November again follows the mortgage rate. In 1962 a 
similar pattern of movement prevails, the P.W.L.B. rate is led 
down in August and again in September, October and November. 
In the four year period studied, only on one occasion in September 
1957 is there a strong indication that the Board's rate led the 
market. Some evidence points to the possibility of that having 
occured once more in June 1961, but it is less clear-cut. At all 
other times when P.W.L.B. rates were altered, they followed the
market. Of course it is possible that the two years not considered
32 tell a different story
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2:4 The Radcliffe Report: Its Implications For Local Authority Borrowing
In response to controversy about the efficacy of monetary policy 
and the nature of the financial system, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer appointed a Committee in May 1957, under the chairman- 
ship of Lord Radcliffe "to inquire into the working of the monetary
3? 34 
and credit system, and to make recommendations" ". The Report
was of great importance to the theory of monetary policy, both as 
a reflection of views current at the time and as a stimulus to 
further discussion. The major issues that the Report considered 
and the numerous recommendations it made fall outside of the scope 
of this work. Only the questions it raised about local authority 
borrowing and the recommendations it made are dealt with here; 
these recommendations, however, are of necessity coloured by the 
general tone of the Report and its view of monetary theory and 
policy.
The Report came down in favour of centralizing all local authority 
borrowing through the P.W.L.B.; it was recommended that "the 
Exchequer should stand ready to provide long-term capital through 
the Public Works Loan Board, at the current gilt-edged rate (attime 
of borrowing) for the relevant maturity, to any local authority that
is not able or does not want to raise the money it requires in the
35 
market on its own credit at a comparable rate" . Three reasons
were adduced in support. First, because the sums borrowed are so 
large, the exercise of monetary policy would be best served by their 
timing being completely at the discretion of the monetary authorities. 
"Secondly, the fragmentation implied by independent borrowing involves 
unnecessary cost, in that the lower marketability of small issues 
has to be paid for in a yield differential which, if they borrowed from 
the Exchequer... could be avoided". Thirdly, most of the capital 
expenditure of local authorities is in furtherance of central government 
social legislation, some of it is mandatory, and all of it is subject 
to close supervision through the mechanism of the loan sanction.
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The Committee did give some acknowledgement to the argument that 
local authorities had been able to attract some local capital that 
would not otherwise have been channelled into the finance of the 
public sector; but did not think it sufficient to outweigh the 
advantages of centralised borrowing. Local authorities, it was 
pointed out, had been borrowing from much more than local sources 
and offering rates of return much higher than those offered by the 
central government. In particular "...they have been piling up 
short-term debt in a way that is clear contrary to the funding policy 
of the monetary authorities". Two reasons for this increase in 
temporary debt were identified. Local authorities, it was felt, were 
reluctant to borrow long-term at rates of interest considered to be 
abnormally high. Secondly, a queue of would-be borrowers was 
maintained by the Bank of England ".. .with the knowledge that it 
was causing a rapid accumulation of highly-liquid short-term local 
authority debt".
The Committee's reasoning is not completely clear on this point. It 
appears that they were suggesting that local authorities were 
accumulating short-term debt in the anticipation that they would be 
able to fund it by the issue of stock. But in an earlier part of the 
Report (para 93) it was claimed that local authorities were forced to 
turn extensively to the mortgage market; making "a virtue of this 
necessity, since they reckoned that interest rates were abnormally 
high, and went in for extensive short-terra borrowing in the expectation 
of being able to fund their borrowing when long-term rates were lower" 
It is not obvious whether this short-term borrowing refers to mortgages 
or to temporary debt. There was a widespread belief in local 
government circles that mortgage funds were hard to come by and 
that this made short-term borrowing unavoidable. Strictly speaking, 
however, sufficient funds were unavailable at rates of interest local 
authorities considered 'reasonable'. The argument that local 
authorities borrowed short because long-term funds were not available 
reduces to the simple argument that long-term interest rates were 
reckoned too high and likely to fall in the future, and therefore
local authorities borrowed short in anticipation of being able in the 
future to fund.
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The prime reason, then, for short-term borrowing lay in expectations 
that were held about the future course of interest rates. Interest 
rates had been around three per cent in 1955 but had risen almost 
continuously during the next three years only declining a little in 
1958. Before 1955 they had been 'low' for twenty years and so 
there existed strong expectations, and not only in local government 
circles, that the normal long-term interest rate was about three per 
cent, Expectations were only slowly revised upwards as the trend 
of interest rates moved upwards.
The only justification that the Committee were able to see for the 
virtual connivance of the monetary authorities in the developm nt of 
the local authority temporary money market was that "...the alternative 
(given their view of the appetite of the long-term gilt-edged market) 
was an increase in treasury bills which would have made the banks 
more liquid in the technical sense" (para.598). Because they 
attached such importance to the regulation of bank liquidity, the 
Committee was willing to acknowledge this to be broadly correct 
"if only a very short period were in question" . In the long run the 
demand for short-term deposits by local authorities must, because 
of the inter-dependencies of the various capital and money markets, 
work back and impede the actions of the monetary authorities in the 
central market which the restrictions on long-term issues were meant to
*
protect. This argument could be extended, although the Committee 
did not do so, to encompass all forms of local authority borrowing, 
but particularly short-term borrowing, since the aim was to reduce 
the borrowing requirement of the central government; but if local 
authorities, because of the higher rate of return offered, were able 
to attract funds which would otherwise have gone into gilt-edged 
stock and even into treasury bills, the monetary authorities would
o c
be obliged to sell more treasury bills to the banks
Official reaction to the Committee's recommendations on the subject 
of local authority borrowing was not encouraging.
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It was announced that no change would be made in the existing
37
system . The Chancellor considered in some detail the analogy
which the Committee had made between local authorities and the 
nationalised industries, who a few months after local authorities 
went into the open market were made completely dependent on the 
Exchequer for capital finance. It was emphasised, however, that 
there were strong differences; in particular that the nationalised 
industries before 1956 had made large and infrequent issues of 
Treasury guaranteed stock which to preserve an orderly market had 
to be treated as if they were government stock, purchased on their 
day of issue by the authorities and sold gradually. The large size 
and the infrequency of nationalised industries stock issues made it 
necessary to bring them completely under the control of the monetary 
authorities.
In a later part of the debate on the Radcliffe Report, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury dealt with the problems created by the 
increase in the proportion of local authority short-term debt. He 
said that "it is a fact that local authorities benefit.. .because they 
are paying a lower rate on these short-term moneys than they would 
be paying if they were borrowing on long-term from either the market 
or the Public Works Loan Board. It is, to some measure at least, 
because local authorities choose to borrow short that their short-term
O Q
debt is high" . A simple comparison of long-term and short- 
term interest rates may give the above answer, but what is relevant 
to the cost of borrowing is the pattern of interest rates over the 
period for which funds are required, not whether the short-term 
interest rate is above or below the long term rate. If interest rates, 
both short and long, rise then it will turn out that in fact it would 
be cheaper to have paid the normally higher long-term rate in the 
first place. It is what is expected to be the future course of interest 
rates that determines whether or not short-term borrowing is considered 
cheaper.
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There is one final point that should be made about the 
recommendations made by the Radcliffe Committee. It was 
proposed that a local authority, for the reasons adduced, should 
have completely free access to the facilities of the P.W.L.B., 
if it : '...is not able or does not want to raise the money it 
requires in the market..." Because the rate of interest governing 
loans from the Board was to reflect current gilt-edged rates, other 
things being equal, local authorities would choose to borrow from 
the Board rather than in the market. There is one important 
exception to this rule. If current interest raijs are high and local 
authorities expect them to fall they /ill be loath to commit them- 
selves to long-term loans from the E >ard at high rates of interest. 
Local authorities, depending upon how long they expect the high 
rates to prevail, might borrow for much shorter periods, such as 
one to ten years or even on a temporary basis, provided that the 
Board would be willing to supply loans for such short periods. 
If, however, the Board only supplied loans on a long-term basis, 
local authorities would have to seek short-term finance in the open 
market until rates fell; upon which they would fund by borrowing 
long-term from the P.W.L.B. This, needless to say, would introduce 
a degree of instability in the workings of the Board and make
Exchequer financing difficult in the same way as it did during 1955
39 
and even as early as 1895 and 1900
In addition to the Radcliffe Report, the various memoranda submitted 
by interested parties were published in two separate volumes. They 
appeared a year after the Report, and as the initial furore had 
subsided met with comparative indifference. From the point of view, 
however, of monetary policy and local authority borrowing those 
submitted by the two local authority associations and by the L.C.C., 
are more interesting than the Report itself.
40 The Memoranda were submitted in response to a request from the
Committee which, among other things, asked what monetary measures 
of the central government had impinged on the actions of the local 
authorities, and how effective had they been.
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The Association of Municipal Corporations (A.M.C.) emphasised 
variations in interest rates as being the most significant monetary 
measure from the point of view of its members. They felt 
to affect the capital spending of local authorities by changing the 
resulting local revenue charge. But the demand for funds was 
inelastic with respect to the interest rate because a large proportion 
of the loan debt of municipal corporations were in respect of 
expenditure on housing and education services. The restrictions 
on access to the P.W.L.B., and the limitation of stock issues to 
a minimum of £3mn were also mentioned along with government 
requests to curb capital expenditure backed up with the use of the 
loan sanction, although this later measure is more properly fiscal 
than monetary. In general it was the considered opinion of the 
A.M.C. that monetary measures may have done something to restrict 
the rate of new capital expenditure, even so, the central government 
already had an effective means of restricting capital investment by 
the refusal of a loan sanction.
The County Councils Association was more certain that monetary 
measures had had little if any effect on the capital spending of 
its members; citing in support a survey conducted in August 1957 
which showed that out of 61 County Councils, 53 reported that no 
schemes had been abandoned or deferred ^ because of high interest 
rates and the effect on the remaining 8 was small. The restrictions 
on advances of the banks were also considered as a monetary 
measure and 51 County Councils reported no change in the arrangement 
for meeting short-term requirements as a result of restrictions of 
bank advances.
The London County Council was more sure that monetary measures 
were having or beginning to have some consequences for its capital 
expenditure. One step taken to reduce the burden of high interest 
rates was to raise in 1957-1958 from £500,000 to £2,500,000 the 
amount of capital expenditure defrayed from current rate income.
There were further attempts to limit the need to borrow by reducing 
the amount earmarked for loans to house purchasers.
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In addition to these steps the L.C.C.claimed that "...borrowing
difficulties are now causing the Council to consider some postpone-
41 
ment of capital works... ".
42 The lack of agreement on whether or not local authorities capital
expenditure was sensitive to interest rates did not prevent
D.S. Lees (1961) in a criticism of the submissions to the Committee
from asserting that "...by varying the level of interest rates, the
43 government can regulate the tempo of local investment ". Local
house building is highly sensitive, it was claimed, to changes in 
rates of interest; and the requirement that local authorities seek
funds in the open market made them more watchful over capital
44 
expenditure
2:5 The White Paper Of 1963: Local Authorities Get Limited Access 
To The P.W.L.B. _________________________
Although the central government was reluctant to countenance any 
reform in the arrangements for local authority borrowing, the 
underlying factors that had given the Radcliffe Committee cause for 
concern persisted; and in particular the rate of increase of
temporary borrowing. Table 2:4 shows some figures for types
45 of debt which were obtained by Treasury survey for 1955, 1958,
Ik.
1959, 1969 and 1961. Temporary debt which had stood at 4 per cent 
of total loan debt, had risen by £342mn to 9 per cent in 1958, by 
1959 to 11 per cent, and then to 12 per cent in 1960 and 15 per cent 
in 19 61. There also occurred at the same time a marked decline in 
local authorities' reliance on the stock market and the P.W.L.B. 
as sources of funds, while mortgage debt grew rapidly, although not 
by as much as temporary debt.
These developments aroused criticism of the government's policy in 
other quarters. H. Cowen (1960) recorded that there was "...a
widespread suspicion that local authority finance (was) a badly
46,, 
slipping clutch in the national financial machinery
TABLE 2:4 (a) 
COMPOSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY LOAN DEBT AT 31ST MARCH
EMillion 1955 % Due for re- 
payment in 
1 yr or less
P.W.L.B. 2728 64
Other Mortgages 596 14
Temporary Borrowing 170 4
Other Borrowing (incl. 
from internal funds) 333 8
Stocks 424 10
Total 4251
1
32
170
35
8
245 
(6%)
1958
3081
973
488
455
501
5498
%
56
18
9
8
9
TABLE
In 1 yr 
or less
1
86
488
34
28
638 
(12%)
2:4 (b)
MATURITY STRUCTURE OF
1959 In 1 yr 1960 % In 1 yr 1961 % In 1 yr 
or less or less or less
3051 52
114.5 20
646 11
496 8
520 9
5859
TEMPORARY
2 2964 48
167 1353 22
646 756 12
38 537 9
16 556 9
868 6167 
(15%)
DEBT
1 2919 45
252 1441 22
756 1009 15
66 584 9
67 606 9
1082 6557 
(18%)
3
295
1009
52
16
1405 
(21%)
£ Million Total At Call or 7 Days' Notice 7 Days To 3 Months 3 Months To 12 Months Revenue Balances 
Temporary Used For 
Capital Purposes
1955
1958
1959
1960
1961
170
488
646
756
1009
104
275
312
371
508
23
84
123
120
188
7
63
121
157
163
37
66
90
108
150
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The high levels of temporary borrowing found in 1960 and 1961 did 
much to alter the official view and in the summer of 1962 
discussions began between the Treasury and local authority 
representatives to work out ways in which temporary borrowing 
could be kept within manageable limits. Official disquiet, belated 
though it was, did not spring solely from a fear that the pattern 
of local authority borrowing was financially imprudent. It was felt, 
in addition, that it posed a threat to any attempt to squeeze spending. 
The clearing banks had been quick to point out that during the recent 
squeeze, in the second half of 1961, when they had cut local 
authority overdrafts, local authorities were able to make good the 
loss with funds acquired in the money markets. It was not made 
clear, however, what kind of reform would ensure that local 
authorities, who had an interest-inelastic demand for capital finance, 
did not switch from the use of bank overdrafts to the money markets 
v/hen circumstances compelled them to do so. The various reforms 
that were mooted at the time revolved around the idea that some upper 
limit should be placed on temporary borrowing; but this in itself 
would not prevent the sort of switching that the clearing banks had 
in mind; only a total prohibition on temporary borrowing would achieve 
that.
It was widely believed that in whatever -way temporary borrowing was
47 to be limited it would have to be part of a package deal that would
help to widen the market for local authority debt and enable local 
authorities to meet part of their capital needs by borrowing from 
the Exchequer which meant the reopening of the P.W.L.B. to all 
local authorities. This was the official view also as can be seen 
from the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Mansion House speech of 
1962 in which he recognised "...that if temporary debt is to be kept
within reasonable bounds, we must make it easier for the authorities
48 to meet part of their capital needs by borrowing from the Exchequer 1 ^
The notion that a necessary condition for moderation in temporary 
borrowing was a greater access to Exchequer funds, was based on
a widespread belief that a separate factor determining the volume
43
of temporary borrowing was the 'availability' of long-term funds 
and the 'narrowness 1 of the mortgage market. The imperfections 
of the capital markets meant that local authorities who borrowed 
by mortgage may have had to pay a small premium reflecting the 
inflexibility of the mortgage as a borrowing instrument. Access 
to the P.W.L.B. might then provide loans at a lower interest 
rate; but the problem could also have been solved in part by the 
use of more flexible borrowing instruments which would have 
enlarged the market for local authority debt by appealing to a 
greater range of investors. There is no real guarantee, hov^aver, 
that the new set of interest rates in partially segmented markets, 
reflecting the shifts in the supply and demand for funds, would 
be any more favourable to the local authority sector.
This brings the argument back to the point made in Section 2:4. 
The reason why local authorities had recourse to the short-term 
market was not because funds were not available on a long-term 
basis - there must have been some interest rate which would have 
attracted the funds - but that most local authorities took the view that 
interest rates were likely to fall and therefore borrowed short, hoping 
to fund at a more favourable rate. Rates rose further, however, 
and the higher they went the more local authorities were convinced 
that they would fall.
If this climate of expectations prevailed, exacerbated perhaps by a 
further rise in interest rates, access to the P.W.L.B. would not 
of itself be sufficient to halt another rise in the proportion of 
temporary debt. That is why an actual limitation on the rate of 
growth of temporary borrowing was deemed necessary. Many expected 
that this would be achieved by the extension of the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act of 1947 to England and Wales. In Scotland there 
was ceiling of 15 per cent of total loan debt which temporary debt 
could not exceed.
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The proposals to reform the arrangements for local authority borrowing
49 were made known in a White Paper published in October 1963.
They fell into two main parts. The first placed restrictions on 
temporary borrowing. It was prescribed that:-
(a) Temporary borrowing for each authority for up to three months 
should not exceed 15 per cent of its outstanding loan debt or, 
if highe", its capital expenditure in the preceding twelve months.
(b) Temporary borrowing for up to months should not exceed 
20 per cent of outstanding loan debt or, if higher, one and a
r  ^"\
third times capital expenditure in the preceding twelve months. 
Since the temporary debt of many local authorities was 
in excess of the limits, these authorities were to be allowed 
four years in which to make a progressive reduction.
The second part reopened the P.W.L.B. to all local authorities but 
not to the extent prevailing before 1956. Local authorities were 
ultimately to be permitted to obtain up to 50 per cent of their annual 
long term finance from the P.W.L.B. This was to be made available 
at gilt-edged rates with a small addition to cover costs. The 
arrangements, however, were not to be introduced immediately because 
otherwise the impact on the borrowing requirement of the central 
government would seriously complicate monetary management. In the 
first year of the new arrangements local authorities were to be allowed 
to meet up to 20 per cent of their long-term borrowing needs from the 
Board. Thereafter the aim would be increase the percentage by 10
per cent each year until the 50 per cent maximum was reached after
" 51 four years.
The White Paper also set out the official case for control of local 
authority borrowing. Three reasons were adduced. First, local 
authority short-term borrowing had on occasions forced temporary borrow 
ing rates up to high levels which failed, however, to check the 
demand since the only alternative had been long-term borrowing at 
even higher rates.
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"This has meant that their borrowing has...been less affected 
by changes in Bank Rate. Thus the development of a local authority 
temporary borrowing market has meant the growth of a large volume 
of short-term debt that is insensitive to interest rate policy." This 
was a cause for concern because of the importance the government 
attached in its management of the public sector debt to the proportion 
that is held short-term. "Given the ease with which liquid assets 
can be turned into cash without loss, the greater the stock of liquid 
assets the more difficult it becomes...to influence spending, especially- 
spending on capital account."
Second, in the interest of monetary management there may be a need 
from time to time for the government to reduce the short-term element 
in its borrowing. The pattern of local authority borrowing cannot be 
allowed to hinder the achievement of this objective and therefore the 
ratio of short-term to long-term borrowing by local authorities must 
not be determined solely by relative costs of short-term and long-term 
borrowing and, therefore, some regard has to be paid to national 
considerations.
Thirdly, local authority temporary borrowing may cause an ebb and flow 
of short-term international capital which has a direct impact on the 
reserves. "It is particularly important that the Government should be
^
able to influence interest rates in a field to which foreign funds have 
been substantially attracted..."
The monetary authorities' arguments can be assessed on two levels. 
First, whether they are an accurate description of the ways in which 
local authority borrowing complicated monetary policy; and secondly, 
whether the reforms that the White Paper outlined would serve to 
overcome these complications.
Radcliffe argument that local authority short-term debt is a 
of 'near-money' which can be turned into cash without loss so 
holders are insulated from the impact of a credit squeeze, is a
common view of monetary policy, although its detailed nature is not
of concern here.
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All the same it is not clear that if local authorities were to forsake 
short-term borrowing this would necessarily reduce the volume of 
liquid assets in the system by itself. Short-term interest rates would 
fall, to a degree dependent upon the relative scale of local authority 
short-term borrowing, portfolios would be readjusted and funds would 
flow into the various substitutes for local authority short-term debt, 
such as building society deposits, bank deposits, finance house 
deposits, and even treasury bills. The increased supply of .long-term
*-,____._._
debt would tend to raise long-term interest rates and attract funds. 
The eventual volume of liquid assets in existence would depend upon 
the various elasticities of substitution of one asset for another and 
upon the structure of interest rates.
The measures proposed to reduce the stock of liquid assets, or at 
least their rate of increase, were unlikely to be successful. Although 
the limits on temporary borrowing might have been effective on their 
own, the access to the P.W.L.B. would increase the Exchequer 
borrowing requirement and, if the gilt-edged market could not be 
tapped, increase the volume of treasury bills which were not only a 
liquid asset but also considered to be an important component of the 
reserve assets of the clearing banks.
The second justification for the reforms was given a slightly different
52 interpretation in a speech by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury
who anticipated the points made in the White Paper. He suggested 
that local authority temporary borrowing interfered with monetary 
policy because it provided a highly liquid asset which was held in 
non-bank portfolios as an alternative to treasury bills. This obliged 
the monetary authorities to sell more treasury bills to the banks than 
was conducive to a successful monetary policy.
This certainly puts the argument in a clearer light. "But there seems 
to be a fallacy here. The reopening of the Exchequer to local 
authorities will not in itself affect the volume of treasury bills in
bank hands.
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True, non-bank holders may again hold more treasury bills rather
than local authority deposits. But in this measure the local authorities
will presumably need to get alternative finance from the Treasury -
which will ordinarily involve more treasury bills in total. And funding
^3 
sales by the government will be no easier than now.""
Whether or not these criticisms made by The Economist are valid 
depends upon: first, in what circumstances local authorities would 
find themselves prevented from borrowing short-term because of the 
ceiling and second, if faced with this constraint local authorities 
would increase their borrowing from the P.W.L.B. If a restrictionary 
monetary policy forces interest rates up local authorities in the 
expectation that rates will fail may increase their short-term borrowing. 
Whether or not they are able to do this over and above the twenty 
per cent of new debt will depend on whether or not they had maintained 
some slack in their ratio of short-term to long-term debt. If they have 
done so then short-term borrowing can increase, If the ceiling is 
eventually met the question them becomes do they borrow more from 
the P.W.L.B. which will increase the Exchequer borrowing requirement. 
This possibility is unlikely because the P.W.L.B. in a majority of 
circumstances cannot lend for periods of less than ten years; and 
local authorities may prefer to borrow for medium-term periods, of one 
to five years, rather than commit themselves to long-term loans from 
the P.W.L.B. at high rates of interest.
It seems probable then, though the final answer is an empirical one 
concerned with the substitutability of various forms of local authority 
debt, that if local authority borrowing is restrained in the ways 
proposed it need not result in a greater call being made on the 
P.W.L.B.
A related, though quite separate, issue is concerned with the factors 
that determined temporary borrowing before 1964 and were likely to 
determine it after. In the discussion of the Radcliffe Report and the
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events leading up to it particular emphasis was given to the role 
of expectations about the future course of interest rates. If t is 
is a correct interpretation of local authority behaviour, something which 
will be considered in greater detail in subsequent chapters, then it is 
possible that in the long-run the proportion of their debt local 
authorities held on a temporary basis might have moderated as they 
revised their expectations upwards. In the period after 1956 
expectations about interest rates may have been very inelastic after 
thirty years of 'low' interest rates. Only a sustained period of 
higher and rising interest rates could revise these expectations and 
encourage local authorities to manage their debt in a different 
economic climate.
This of course is a judgement of hindsight and does not mean that 
if local authorities came to expect the trend of long-term interest 
.rates to be rising this would preclude short-term borrowing - although 
there might be a strong bias in favour of funding - because they would 
still wish to use short-term borrowing as a means of overcoming the 
short-run fluctuations in the upward trend.
The third, and last, argument in the White Paper concerned short- 
term international capital flows. This subject will be examined more 
closely in section 2:6 below, and also in chapter 5. One small 
point, nevertheless, will be made here. A quote was given above 
from the White Paper which made it clear that the monetary authorities 
believed it important that they should be able to influence the rates 
of interest in the local authority money market because of the key 
role it played in causing inflows and outflows of capital. It is 
certainly a legitimate aim of the authorities to control capital flows 
by varying Bank Rate. What is not obvious is how the measures in 
the White Paper were likely to achieve this aim or at least make it 
easier to achieve. Any measures to place an upper limit on the 
proportion of short-term debt held by local authorities were not 
likely to increase the substitutability of treasury bills for local authorit 
short-term deposits in the portfolios of either domestic or foreign 
residents, tie the two interest rates closer together, or make changes
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in the local authority rate more sensitive to changes in Bank Rate.
In addition to the various reforms contained in the White Paper, out 
of the discussions which took place between the Treasury and local 
authority representatives there emerged the decision to allow the 
issue of 'over the counter 1 or 'local' bonds. These bonds because
of their easier registration and transfer expected to be used in
54 place of the now practically out-moded mortgage.
In February 1964, two months before the new regulations came into 
force, Manchester Corporation used powers under a Local Act to issue 
bonds , for which a daily market with 'same 5 day transferability 
was created in London. The power to issue such bonds was extended 
to all local authorities in England and Wales on the 8th July when 
regulations made under the Local Government (Financial Provisions) 
Act> IS63, came into force. The monetary authorities took the view 
that a large volume of negotiable bonds , which because of being a 
more attractive investment commanded a lower rate of interest and 
it was evident that many authorities wished to issue them , might 
disturb the gilt-edged market in short-term stocks. Accordingly, in 
order to preserve orderly markets, an amended General Consent under 
the Control of Borrowing Order, 1958, was brought into force which 
required the timing and terms of negotiable bonds issued to be agreed
r 
with the monetary authorities.
Negotiable bonds were designed to appeal mainly to the Discount 
Houses. This created some official unease because, although the 
Bank of England declined to accept them as security for loans to the 
discount market, it was possible that the clearing banks might take 
them as collateral for call money lent to the discount market. This 
would tend to increase the liquidity of the banking system, which 
was not to the liking of the monetary authorities. The Bank of Englanc 
informed the clearing banks, therefore, that it would not look kindly 
on the new bonds being used on a large scale as collateral; and to 
reinforce this it was made known that the official view of the
50
r c -,
tolerable size of the market was of the magnitude of £30 to £40mru 
There was the added fear that the emergence of the negotiable bond 
would result in the appearance of a new market in one-year bonds 
on the edge of the temporary money market which had only recently 
been restrained. To prevent this getting out of hand, in marshalling 
the queue of borrowers/ some preference was to be given to those 
prepared to issue bonds with maturities longer than one year.
As a result of the reforms which took place in 1963 local authorities 
were able, in addition to mortgages and stock, to borrow by 
negotiable and local bonds as well as gaining greater access to 
the P.W.L.8. Another addition was made to their armoury of borrowing 
instruments in the shape of the revenue bill which was a short-term 
negotiable document acknowledging a loan to be issued normally for 
a term of three months. It was announced by the monetary authorities 
that it would be acceptable for rediscount at the Bank of England and 
as collateral for call money lent to the discount houses by the 
clearing banks. There was a willingness to treat revenue bills in 
this way, as compared with the discouragement offered negotiable 
bonds, because not too many local authorities would be able to issue 
them; they were to be self-liquidating since they were to be issued 
in anticipation of revenue from grants and rates, and to ensure that
this occurred for sixty days in the year a^ local authority had to have
57 
no bills on issue. This stipulation, however, was dropped in 1969.
2:6 The "Parallel" Money Markets, The Euro-Dollar Market And Local 
Authority Borrowing.__________________________________
The various changes which occured in the structure of the financial 
system during the late 1950s and the 1960s and which have continued 
up to the present mean that the monetary authorities have had to alter 
both the scope of their measures so as to encompass new areas of 
the financial system and their techniques as some measures were 
found wanting or were considered inappropriate to the new circumstance: 
or as new techniques were developed.
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The need to adapt to the consequences of local authority borrowing 
is one example of this tendency. The pattern of local authority 
borrowing, however, is only one aspect of a much more significant
development: the emergence a network of money markets sometimes
59 
called the 'parallel 1 money markets, which were distinct, at least
in the early stages, from the traditional discount market that lay at 
the heart of the orthodox system of monetary control. Moreover, this 
development was closely linked to the evolution of an international 
market in dollars, and subsequently in other currencies, known as 
tfie Euro-dollar market.
It is not of direct concern here for what reasons the Euro-dollar 
market appeared; this is better explained in Bell (1973), Clendenning 
(1970) and Einzig (1964), but it is of interest to note that as early 
as 1956 temporary deposits of foreign funds were being lodged with 
local authorities channelled to "them through an embryonic money 
market. Most observers, while not agreeing over the causes, 
place the origins of the Euro-dollar market in 1957 or 1958. The 
Merchant Banks and the Overseas and Foreign Banks based in London 
played a pivotal role in its development by accepting foreign currency 
deposits usually denominated in dollars and lending them on; or, if 
the interest rate differential justified it, switching them into sterling 
and lending the proceeds to borrowers in.the U.K. In the early years 
the borrowers were primarily hire purchase finance houses and local 
authorities. Local authorities because of their better credit probably 
took the major part, The statistical series for this period are 
incomplete but some idea of the relationship between lending to local 
authorities and switching from foreign currencies into sterling by these 
banks can be gleaned from figure 2:1. Changes in the net position 
of banks in foreign currencies measures switching into sterling. The 
only drawback is that the figures refer to all banks in the U.K. 
This matter is discussed more fully in chapter 5. Moreover, the 
figures for lending to local authorities for 1955 to 1961 are on a six- 
monthly basis. Nevertheless a reasonably clear relationship is 
obvious although it begins to deteriorate in the mid-sixties.
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Apart from funds that originated from abroad large sums were drawn 
into the local authority temporary money market from domestic sources 
such as industrial and commercial companies, financial institutions 
and the private individuals. Banks also lent on a temporary basis 
funds other than those that had been obtained from switching foreign 
currency into sterling. The clearing banks, however, only lent to 
local authorities on a short-term basis by overdraft the level of which 
was usually established by argreement with the banks. The non- 
clearing banks, on the other hand, were more flexible in their short- 
term lending because unlike the clearing banks they were not subject 
to minimum cash or liquid assets ratios. The main reason why they 
were not lay in the fact that most of the overseas and foreign banks 
were considered to have sufficient backing from their head offices 
abroad; in addition, both they and the merchant banks make advances 
which were mostly for longer terms than a clearing bank would offer. 
Since these banks were not subject to a standard liquidity ratio they 
chose to use as liquid assets not traditional readily marketable assets 
such as cash, bills and money at call but higher yielding deposits 
with local authorities. The structure of their assets changed as new 
money markets emerged, particularly the inter-bank market, but 
certainly in the later 1950s and early 1960s the major form of liquid
asset held by them remained deposits in the local authority money
, _63 
market
The Merchant Banks and the Foreign and Overseas Banks received 
a new lease of life from the evolution of the Euro-dollar market. 
The restrictions on the use of sterling to finance foreign trade after 
the sterling crisis of 1957 gave them an incentive to employ dollars 
in replacement. Much of the rapid rise in their deposits after 1958 
occurred in foreign currencies. Since a very large proportion of 
these deposits were on-lent to borrowers abroad there was no impact 
on monetary conditions within the U.K. Only to the extent to which 
these foreign deposits were switched into sterling and employed 
domestically were there any consequences for the structure of 
interest rates and for the money supply.
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The detailed consideration of these important issues is left to 
chapters 5 and 6; nevertheless since a large part of the sums 
which were switched ended up on deposit with local authorities this 
had some clear implications for the monetary authorities approach to 
the problems raised by short-term capital flows. Traditional monetary 
policy, particularly under the Gold Standard, relied upon variations in 
Bank Rale to stem or encourage flows of short-term capital. Variations 
in Bank Rate were supposed to alter the attractiveness of treasury 
bills in response.
The development of the local authority temporary money market 
provided foreign residents and also the non-clearing banks with a 
higher yielding asset than treasury bills; and which although not 
quite as liquid was practically as secure as central government bills. 
Consequently the treasury bill was dislodged from its traditional 
position as the linchpin of all financial markets and in particular 
from its position of dominance in the framework of international short- 
capital movements. The monetary authorities became aware of this 
in 1960 when because of inflows of short-term capital it became 
necessary to lower Bank Rate twice. Much of the inflow it was 
recognised was not into treasury bills but into the alternative short- 
term assets available in London. By 1962 it was being suggested
elsewhere that "...rates on deposits with local authorities rank among
64   the key rates in the international money market ". This was given
official acknowledgement in 1964 when it was stated that "...although 
the treasury bill comparison continues to have considerable significance 
especially for official holders, the growth of the Euro-dollar market
has increased the relative importance attached to the dollar deposit -
. 65,, local authority interest rates comparison
One question that can be asked concerns whether or not the decision 
to force local authorities into the open market after 1955 resulted in 
the diversion of capital flows from the traditional channels to the 
local authority market and thereby weakened the control the monetary 
authorities could exercise over these flows.
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It is perhaps not strictly correct to attribute the loss of control 
solely to the diversion of funds into other channels since even 
before, when Bank Rate was central .control of financial markets in 
the U.K. was at best imperfect; while after, the monetary authorities 
might have been able to exercise sufficient influence over capital 
flows if the rates of interest in the parallel money markets had been 
closely geared to Bank Rate. Although these rates were certainly 
not completely free of controlled interest rates on government securities 
they appeared to have a considerable degree of independence. It 
should be noted that if the monetary authorities had been willing to 
countenance the swings in interest rates that it would have entailed, 
they could have determined the level of capital flows; they were 
reluctant, however, to do this because of the impact on both the 
gilt-edged market and domestic economic activity.
C C
Clendenning in an examination of the impact of the Euro-dollar 
market on domestic monetary conditions in the U.K. reaches three 
conclusions. Firstly,the existence of the Euro-dollar market has 
increased the elasticity of supply of short-term capital; secondly, 
has increased the elasticity of demand by increasing the ability of 
the rest of the world to absorb or release capital in response to 
small changes in relative interest rates; and thirdly, probably 
increased the ease with which short-term capital can move in
*
response to relative interest rates by partly circumventing national 
exchange controls. The result is to further weaken the effectiveness
of domestic monetary policy since this is dependent,under a regime
fi7 
of fixed exchange rates,upon the interest-elasticity of capital flows.
The question of whether the pattern of local authority borrowing has 
weakened the effectiveness of monetary policy can be divided into 
two parts; whether the emergence of the local authority temporary 
money market increased the interest-elasticity of capital flows; and 
whether this new market reduced the ability of the monetary authorities 
to neutralise such flows. An attempt at an answer to this will be 
attempted in chapter 5; but it can be noted here that if local
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authorities had not been in the market the increased central 
government borrowing requirement would have entailed, in the absence 
of larger sales of gilt-edged stock, the issue of a larger volume 
of treasury bills. Any increase in the holding of treasury bills by 
the non-clearing banks would depend upon the yield relative to 
alternative assets both abroad and in the U.K. If the non-clearing 
banks refrained from switching foreign currencies into sterling to 
buy treasury bills because the yield was insufficient, and in the 
absence of some other alternative short-term asset with the 
characteristics of local authority short-term deposits of security and 
high yield, the result would be, other things being equal, a lower 
interest-elasticity of short-term capital and therefore a slightly more 
effective monetary policy.
As it was there did occur flows of short-term funds between the 
E uro-dollar market end the local authority temporary money market 
whenever the differential between the two respective rates, after 
allowance had been made for the cost of forward cover, changed.
CO
After the devaluation of sterling, however, the covered differential 
was dmost continuously in favour of the Euro-dollar which led to the 
gradual weakening of this link. In addition the non-clearing banks 
were steadily increasing their lending to industrial companies 
especially after 1968 when company liquidity was tight. The central 
position of the local authority temporary money market in both the 
network of new sterling markets and in the area of capital movements 
was eroded further by the growth of the inter-bank market, sterling 
certificates of deposit, and the inter-company market. The inter-
CQ
bank market was and still is used by the non-clearing banks to 
adjust their liquidity positions from day to day. They lend and 
borrow clearing bank deposits between themselves on an unsecured 
basis. This has been in part at the expense of local authorities 
because local authority short-term deposits cannot provide the 
flexibility required for day to day adjustments. In 1968 a number of 
non-clearing banks began to issue sterling certificates of deposits
which are negotiable instruments which makes them attractive short -
70 term assets in competition with local authority deposits.
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71 A more recent development, the inter-company market , arose out
of restrictions on advances by the banks and added further to the 
competition for funds. The effect of all these new markets was to 
make the local authority sector only one among a number of borrowers 
in the parallel money markets and to increase the proportion of the 
financial system that lay outside of the effective influence of the 
monetary authorities.
2:7 Borrowing From The P.W.L.B. After 1963
In the early months of the new arrangements there was, in most 
cases, little firm, evidence on which the twenty per cent quota could 
be estimated. To provide some sort of basis the Board relied upon 
estimates of longer-term borrowing supplied by the authorities them- 
selves. These tended, however, to reflect projected capital 
programmes without any allowance for the various factors which cause 
delays in the execution of these programmes. Consequently, the 
Board found it necessary to scrutinise applications very carefully in
order to avoid substantial over-issues which would have swollen the
72 borrowing requirement of the central government.
It had been envisaged that the freer access to the P.W.L.B. would 
provide local authorities with an opportunity to fund their temporary 
debt. This, however, became unlikely with the rise in interest rates 
during 1964. Furthermore, those local authorities which had been 
heretofore reluctant to make much use of temporary borrowing were 
presented with an official document which gave its blessing to a
'permanent 1 amount of 'temporary' borrowing; this,added to the weight
73of opinion virtually compelled them to make more use of it.
Because of the rise in interest rates local authorities put off borrowing 
from the Board until later in the year in the hope that interest rates 
would have fallen by then. The sterling crisis of November 1964
resulted in the withdrawal of substantial amounts of foreign funds
74 from the local authority temporary money market which placed an
upward pressure on interest rates.
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The P.W.L.B. rates which had been raised previously in August,
75
remained unchanged . These factors coupled with the large volume
of quota entitlements that had been held over from earlier in the
7 year, produced a considerable drain on the Board.
The difficulties created during 1964 for the orderly functioning of 
the P.W.L.B., and thereby for the borrowing of the Exchequer, by 
local authorities who tended to switch between the P.W.L.B. and 
the open market as monetary conditions altered, were equivalent to 
those experienced during 1955 and 1900. On the two previous 
occasions the Treasury had countered by denying all but the smallest 
local authorities access to the facilities of the Board; in 1964, how- 
ever, it was not possible to reverse a policy only a year old.
The increase, in Bank Rate in November 1964 was followed by a rise 
in other short-term and long-term rates during December. P.W.L.B. 
rates for quota loans, remained, however, unchanged. The reason 
for this lay in the Labour Government's Commitment'to do something 1 
about interest rates which were regarded as too high. One thing 
which was done to mitigate the effects of the rise in Bank Rate was 
to allow local authorities to draw the first £100,000 instead of the
first £50,000 of their longer-term borrowings from the Board. The
77figure of £50,000 had been announced in the White Paper so as to
assist small local authorities who made little demand on the capital 
market and who even under the old arrangements had satisfied a 
large part of their needs from the Board. This concession made 
known by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in January 1965 resulted 
in an increase in quota allowances of about £30mn during the last 
quarter of the financial year. In all, during the financial year, 
1964-65, because of the minimum quota provision of £100,000 and 
overdrawing by some authorities of their quotas, the Board advanced 
about 30 per cent of gross longer-term borrowings of local authorities, 
and 40 per cent of net longer-term borrowings.
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For the next financial year, as had been agreed, the quota was 
increased to 30 per cent. Interest rates in the market for mortgages 
and bonds rose during the first quarter but P.W.L.B. rates remained 
unchanged. This was part of the new government's two-tier system 
of interest rates which left P.W.L.B. rates at the level of gilt-edged 
rates in August 1964 0 The relative attractiveness of P.W.L.B. rates 
led to a large switch of demand for funds to the Board away from 
the open market, as local authorities attempted to take up their 
quota before the rates were increased. Some went as far as to take 
up their quota before it was needed for capital expenditure and used 
it to reduce short-term debt or else lent it to other local authorities. 
Table 2 lists monthly loans made by the Board from April 1964 to 
Dec. 1965. By the end of June 1955 local authorities had borrowed 
£191mn from the Board as compared with £45mn in the equivalent 
period in the previous financial year. One other factor may have 
contributed to the demands made on the Board; in the April 1965 
Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced, as part of 
measures to assist various regions, that higher quotas were to be
made available to certain local authorities coming within what were
78 
called 'less prosperous areas'. The higher quota was to be 40
per cent.
The increase in drawings from the Board .had the expected impact on 
the borrowing requirement of the central government. In addition 
"The high rate of public spending in general, and in particular the
very heavy drawings made by local authorities on the Public Works
79Loan Board... attracted criticism abroad as well as at home".
The measures which were introduced in July 1965, although primarily 
concerned with the correction of the external deficit by deflationary 
means, were also in part directed at the problem of regulating local 
authority borrowing from the P.W.L.B. To ensure that this was 
spread more evenly through the remainder of. the year, the rest of 
the year was divided into four issue periods. Any local authority, 
however, that had already taken more than half its quota could draw
no more in the first period which ended in October, but could take
60
the remainder by equal instalments in the other three periods; 
quota instalments could be accumulated and taken in a later 
issue period if desired
TABLE 2:5
Gross Loans Made By P.W.L.B. Monthly Totals
April 1964 - December 1965
£mn
1964 April 2.0 1965 Jan 33.9
May 22.0 Feb 33.6
June 20.8 Mar 42.3
July 22.8 Apr 99.1
Aug 18.1 May 57.4
Sept 16.9 June 34.4
Oct 15.5 July 52.6
Nov 31.6 Aug 28.0
Dec 60.8 Sept 13.3
Oct 39.2
Nov 25.1
Dec 72.2
Source:
Annual Reports of P.W.L.B.
If this phasing scheme had been allowed to expire at the end of the 
year it appeared likely that the same problems would have arisen 
whenever market rates moved sufficient to give local authorities an 
incentive to delay or accelerate their borrowings from the Board. 
In the next financial year, therefore, six issue periods of two months 
length were introduced with the proviso that a local authority drew 
up one-sixth of its year's quota in each period or accumulated the
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instalments and took them later in the year. This measure improved 
substantially the regularity of lending by the Board even though it 
did not rule out the possibility that an unfavourable pattern of 
interest rates in the early part of the year might encourage local 
authorities to accumulate most of their quota until later in the year, 
with a consequent heavy drain on the Board concentrated in the last 
months of the year.
Although the phasing of loans ensured that the burden on the 
Exchequer fell reasonably evenly throughout the year, it could not
influence the total amount borrowed from the Board. It had been
81 
estimated in the White Paper of 1963 x that the call on the Exchequer
would be about £300mn in 1965-66, The estimate given in the Budget 
Statement of April 1965 was £360mn; but in fact a net total of no less 
than £535mn was drawn from the P.W.L.B., well over half of total 
net borrowing from all sources. There were two inter-connected 
reasons for this. The interest rates for quota loans made by the 
Board remained based on the rates the government itself could borrow 
at in the market during the summer of 1964. Market rates, however, 
rose during 1965 and there emerged a considerable differential between 
rates on P.W.L.B. loans and market rates on loans for equivalent 
periods. This provided local authorities with a strong incentive to 
borrow as much from the Board as was possible. One of the ways 
in which this could be done was by turning over long-term debt more 
rapidly so that gross borrowing, on which quotas were calculated, 
was increased. This was made possible by introducing 'yearling' 
bonds and by relying heavily on mortgages and local bonds, with 
a life of one year or a little more. Again, it had been assumed that 
in the April 1965 Budget local authorities would raise their total of 
temporary debt in line with the increase in total debt; they, in fact, 
reduced it which further increased their entitlement to funds from
oo
the P.W.L.B. .
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In an attempt to reduce the volume of funds being lent by the Board 
it was decided that for the financial year, 1966-67, the quota 
entitlements were to be fixed at the levels of 1965-66 rather than 
raised by another 10 per cent of long-term borrowing as had been 
agreed in 1963. Moreover, long-term borrowing was redefined more 
narrowly to exclude the refinancing of debt that had been included 
before as part of an authority's long-term borrowing in the calculation 
of its quota. This meant, in other words, short-dated mortgages 
and bonds could only be included once in such a calculation and 
could not be renewed for another year or a little more and then 
reused again when they matured. It .was expected under these 
modified arrangements that about £400mn would be drawn from the 
Board during 1966-67. The increase in Bank Rate, however, in July 
1966 to 7 per cent raised short-and long-term interest rates to almost 
unprecedented levels; in consequence a number of authorities were
faced with the invoking of 'break' clauses in mortgages by lenders
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seeking higher interest rates. The re-borrowing that this entailed
increased the amount local authorities were able to borrow from the 
P.W.L.B. The increase in interest rates generally also raised 
temporary borrowing which had the opposite effect and reduced 
entitlements to loans from the Board. These two influences did not 
offset each other completely because temporary debt fell by £114mn 
between September 1966 and April 1967. The final result was that 
net drawings from the Board amounted to £543mn sum well in 
excess of what had been expected.
Since the existing system introduced an unacceptable element of 
uncertainty into calculations of what the requirements of the P.W.L.B. 
from the Exchequer .would be over any financial period it was decided 
that some major revision needed to be made of the basis upon which 
loan quotas were calculated. Prior to this long-term borrowing had 
consisted of three elements. These elements were, respectively, 
borrowing required to finance new capital programmes, the replacement 
or renewal of maturing debt and the funding of short-term debt. The
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first element was the most stable and most easily estimated. The 
last two elements were "...dependent on day to day decisions made 
by the lenders or by individual local authorities which are governed 
by a number of continuously variable factors, the most important
O/Jbeing current views about the likely course of interest rates ".
The major revision amounted to confining the definition of long-term 
borrowing to the first element, borrowing required to finance new 
capital programmes. A transitional element was added as a 
concession to those local authorities that had not yet reduced the 
proportion of their temporary debt below the prescribed limits that
o c
were to come into force in 1968; any funding of this excess 
temporary debt would allow more to be borrowed from the Board.
The various modifications, by Treasury request, that the P.W.L.B. 
found it necessary to make in the arrangements ruling advances 
made to local authorities sprang from the same clash between local 
authority interests and the interests of the monetary authorities that 
had produced the changes of 1955 and 1963. In a period of fluctuating 
interest rates it is natural that local authorities should attempt to 
minimise the cost to local revenues by varying the maturity structure 
of their debt and the sources from which they borrowed. Their large 
borrowing requirement, however, cannot but be of considerable 
importance for the capital and money markets and theefore for the 
actions of the monetary authorities who are obliged to accomplish 
their various objectives through the medium of the financial system.
Despite these modifications other difficulties emerged in the following 
years which necessitated further changes. For the 1967-68 financial 
year it was decided that the general economic situation did not justify 
raising quotas by another 10 per cent of long-term borrowing, the 
quota, therefore, was set at 44 per cent for local authorities in the 
development areas and 34 per cent for local authorities in other 
regions. At the end of May 1967, following the change in arrangement
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for housing subsidies, P.W.L.B. interest rates, which had remained 
unchanged since August 1964, were increased to levels reflecting 
gilt-edged rates. Later in the year interest rates rose after the 
devaluation crisis which resulted in a fall in loans made by the 
Board during January 1968 as local authorities left off the taking 
up their quotas in the hope that interest rates would fall again. 
Eventually many local authorities did take up their quotas, even 
though there was no fall in interest rates. Many, however, were 
willing to forego the opportunity to borrow from the P.W.L.B.; 
rather than commit themselves to high long-term interest rates they 
borrowed in the short-term money markets. The result was that 
advances by the Board fell short of the estimates made earlier in 
the financial year by approximately £150mn.
Before the 1966-67 financial year it had been the practice if a local 
authority over-drew its quota that the excess was deducted from the 
following year's quota. Equally any undrawn quotas could be carried 
forward. "While the former tended to be very small substantial 
undrawn quotas had been carried forward. Since this made it 
difficult for the P.W.L.B. to estimate the level of loans both for 
the year in which it is due and the year in which it is advanced, 
it was decided for future years that borrowings effected in the open 
market near the end of the year would no longer affect the main 
element of an authority's quota. This meant that any capital payments 
made in the last few months of the financial year that had not been 
previously anticipated and therefore used in the estimation of the
o 
quota for the year would not be eligible for an additional quota. 
This measure effectively reduced the proportion of a local authority's 
quota that could be carried forward. The shortfall, therefore, of 
£150mn in estimated drawings from the Board resulted in only £24mn 
being carried forward. The local authority associations who were 
aware that,if interest rates were high at the end of any year, 
considerable sums could be lost to the local authority sector, asked 
that any 1968-69 quotas which were not taken up should be reallocatec 
to other local authorities. The Board, to achieve this, had to amend
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the method of phasing loans in order to assess the likelihood and 
possible extent of any shortfall that could be reallocated. "The 
financial year was accordingly divided into four issue periods of 
three months each; a local authority could draw one-third of its 
year's quota in each of the first three periods or could accumulate
these instalments until the third period, but not more than one-quarter
87 
of the year's quota could be applied for during the fourth period " 
This measure had the effect of concentrating a large amount of 
drawings from the Board into the final few months of the calendar 
year and enabled any sums that had not been taken up by local 
authorities before the end of December to be reallocated.
Just before the beginning of the 1968-59 year it was announced that 
the quotas which were to be made available in that year were to be 
even less than in the previous year. Local authorities who were 
within the designated development areas were to receive a quota of 
loans amounting to 40 per cent of net capital payments or £100,000 
whichever was the greater; those authorities in other areas were to 
receive 30 per cent or £100,000. In the January of 1969 the Board 
began to estimate the amounts of quota which had been allowed to 
lapse by then and the likely volume of applications during the 
remainder of the financial year. It was concluded that about £55mn 
would be available for reallocation and so proportional quotas on net 
capital payments were increased by 3 per cent and the minimum 
quota of £100,000 was raised to £200,000. Table 2:6 sets out the 
proportionate quotas, the minimum quotas and the approximate 
number of local authorities who obtained all their borrowings from 
the Board, from 1964 to 1973. The effect of the rise in interest 
rates at the end of 1967-68 financial year can be seen in the fall 
in the number of local authorities obtaining all their borrowings from 
the Board. The P.W.L.B. acknowledged that if their calculations 
proved to be incorrect the original budgetary estimate might be 
exceeded by as much as £75mn. In fact total advances for the year 
fell short of the budget estimate by £38mn because interest rates 
which started to rise in November of 1967 continued to do so until 
March. Many local authorities, as in the past, preferred to borrow
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for shorter periods while interest rates were high' than those for
oo
which the Board could grant loans.
TABLE 2:6
P.W.L.B. Loan Quotas 1964-73
Quota
o/ /o
Minimum 
Quota
(£)
Approximate No .Obtaining 
All Borrowings From Board
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
20
30(40}*
30(40}
34(44}
33(43)
35(45)
40(50)
45(55)
40(50)
50,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
400,000
500,000
600
750
700
500
750
1000
1100
1150
* Quota for less prosperous areas in brackets. The intermediate 
areas were added in 1970.
Source:
Annual Reports of the P.W.L.B.
The original arrangements outlined in the 1963 White Paper introduced 
too much uncertainty into the calculation of the likely level of 
advances made by the P.W.L.B. and therefore made uncertain the 
borrowing requirement of the Exchequer. The uncertainty was 
reduced, first, by more clearly demarcating the basis upon which 
the quota was to be calculated. This measure enabled a more 
accurate estimate to be made of the total amount the Board would 
advance in the coming year. Second, the distribution of this
total was spread more evenly throughout the year, or at least 
spread in a manner that could be anticipated and therefore 
appropriate provision made for, to ensure that the P.W.L.B. and 
thereby the Exchequer was not faced with a large number of 
applications from local authorities at certain times of the year just 
because local authorities considered the pattern of interest rates 
to their own advantage.
2:8 Recent Developments In Local Authority Borrowing And Monetary 
Policy.________________________________________
Once the reforms outlined in the 1963 White Paper came fully into 
force and lending by the P.W.L.B. had been stabilised the topic 
of local authority borrowing, once the source of considerable public
debate, slipped from the limelight. It was suggested by The
89 Economist that "this is a measure of the success of the change
in the rules...in the event short-term debt has been brought under 
control as envisaged". Furthermore, "...there seems to be little 
direct connection between the local authority market and the inter- 
national money market". This has been alluded to in section 2:6 
above and explained in part by the high cost of forward cover as 
a consequence of the disruption in the international monetary system 
following upon the devaluation of sterling.
These comments were made in the middle of 1971. Figure 2:2 plots 
the growth in total loan debt and in temporary debt, and also the 
ratio of temporary to total debt. Compared with the increase in 
total debt that of temporary debt appears less daunting than would 
be supposed from the unease that it caused in the 1950s and early 
1960s. A better idea of the issues involved can be gleaned from 
the ratio of temporary debt to total debt. It rose continuously from 
1958 to 1962, declined slightly and then continued to rise to a peak 
in 1965; then it fell continuously, except for short periods, to a low 
point at the beginning of 1972. After this it rose rapidly to a peak 
in 1974. These fluctuations are something which ought
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to be explained and an attempt will be made to do so in subseqent 
chapters. It can be noted here, nevertheless, that a comparison 
with figure 2:3 which plots short and long-term interest rates from 
1961 to 1973 indicates a close visual relationship between rises 
and falls in the ratio and rises and falls in the interest rates* 
The rapid rise in temporary borrowing since the middle of 1972 
has been associated with an unprecedented rise in interest rates 
after June 1972; with the result that temporary borrowing has almost 
doubled in the space of three years while total loan debt has only 
increased by 40 per cent.
The answer to the question whether or not the 1963 measures have 
controlled temporary borrowing depends upon how the level of 
temporary borrowing would have behaved in their absence. Of 
course, control has been successful in the sense that an upper 
limit has been set in terms of the ratio of short to long-term debt; 
but it has to be established that temporary debt would otherwise 
have exceeded this ratio. There are two parts to this matter; 
first, there was, before the introduction of the limits, a consider- 
able variance among local authorities in the ratio of their temporary 
debt to their total debt. While some were reported to have had as 
much as eighty per cent on a short-term basis, others had comparat- 
ively little. Second, many of the problems created for monetary 
policy arose from the temporary borrowing of all local authorities 
taken together.
Some local authorities after 1955 borrowed almost completely on a 
short-term basis because they held 1he view that interest rates 
would eventually fall back to what they considered to be the 
normal long-term interest rate; others were more cautious in the 
degree to which they were willing to back up their expectations 
about the future course of interest rates by accumulating short- 
term debt. Nevertheless it does not seem unreasonable to suppose 
that faced with interest rates that failed to return to the 'normal 1 
level those local authorities with a considerable volume of temporary
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debt would begin to reconcile themselves to high interest rates 
and fund. On this interpretation the rapid increase in temporary 
debt after 1955 was mainly due to the slowness with which some 
local authorities adjusted to the new monetary climate. Once 
they had adjusted, their temporary borrowing would have been 
moderated. This does not mean necessarily thai temporary 
borrowing would cease since obviously fluctuations in interest 
rates provide ample scope for careful timing of funding operations 
directed towards the aim of minimising the costs of capital 
financing. Even if interest rates were constant short-term finance 
would still be used to iron out day to day movements in cash 
flows, in anticipation of revenue and pending the raising of a 
long-term loan. This is likely to be, however, a much smaller 
proportion of total loan debt, more at the level of temporary debt 
prevalent in the 1930s..
The twenty per cent limit would constrain any local authority that 
judged it to be to its advantage to hold a larger proportion on a 
short-term basis; but equally it has been pointed out that a number 
of local authorities hitherto more cautious have since 1963 increased 
the amount of short-term finance they use. It is not, therefore, 
possible to state categorically that the controls have restrained 
the level of temporary debt that otherwise would have been; it has,
nevertheless, prevented a few authorities from taking too many
89a 
risks in the management of the maturity structure of their debt.
The effects that the pattern of local authority borrowing had on the 
exercise of monetary policy sprang from the total amount of 
temporary borrowing as well as from its rate of increase. The 
remarks made above about the total are of relevance here too; 
it is not possible to be certain whether or not the total amount 
of temporary debt would have been larger in the absence of the 
controls. The rate at which local authorities accumulate short- 
term debt is of importance for monetary policy because a very 
rapid rise in temporary borrowing is likely to put pressure on
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short-term interest rates and create disorderly money markets 
which may be to the detriment of monetary policy. If local 
authorities choose to maintain a proportion of temporary debt up 
to the limits then clearly the rate at which temporary debt could 
be accumulated would depend upon the rate of increase of total 
debt. They would, however, be able to reduce the proportion at 
any chosen rate, only constrained by the difficulties that wholesale 
funding would create for the long-term capital markets. If, on 
the other hand, they decided to maintain a level of temporary debt 
below that level prescribed then there would be opportunity to take 
up the slack when the pattern of interest rates necessitated it. 
During 1969, 1970 and 1971 the ratio of short to long-term debt 
was falling almost continuously; when interest rates rose after 
June 1972 local authorities began to build up their temporary debt 
at a rate even greater than that of the late 1950s (see figures 2:1, 
2:2). The rate of increase eventually levels off when the ceiling 
is reached; how long this takes will depend upon how far below 
the ceiling the ratio has fallen beforehand and how fast the slack 
is taken up. As the restrictions on temporary borrowing now stand 
there are very imprecise checks on the rate at which local 
authorities can accumulate and decumulate temporary debt. There 
are, of course, strong market forces that would counteract this 
through shifts in relative interest rates, but these movements might 
be contrary to the aims of the monetary authorities and have 
serious consequences for the regularity of the money and capital 
markets.
There remain two very important developments which have not yet
been touched upon. These are, one,the long-term borrowing of
90 local authorities in foreign currencies ; and two, the introduction
in September 1971 of 'Competition and Credit Control 1 .
The first inkling that the government was well disposed towards 
the possibility of local authority borrowing abroad emerged from 
a statement made by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in
73
February 1969 in which he announced that local authorities would 
be encouraged to borrow foreign currency for the benefit of the 
reserves. To make this feasible a clause was included in the 
Finance Bill to enable local authorities to pay interest without 
deduction of tax. The encouragement given local authorities was 
tempered somewhat by the opinion expressed by the Treasury that 
the existing local Government Acts did not confer power to borrow 
abroad and therefore, any authority wishing to borrow in this 
manner would have to obtain power through a Private Bill; with the 
exception of the G.L.C. which had already obtained it after the 
London reorganisation. Moreover, the Treasury stipulated that 
local authorities should obtain official consent for the amount, 
terms and conditions of any loan; the loans were to have a life 
of about seven years; and bearer bonds were to be used. In 
addition the Treasury offered to guarantee the interest and the loan 
repayments against fluctuations in exchange rates but not the loan 
itself since this was secured on the rates and revenues of the 
authority concerned. A charge was to be made for this exchange 
cover such that the final cost to the local authority would be one- 
quarter per cent below the ten year P.W.L.B. quota rate prevailing 
at the time of the loan.
In the event only Derby and the G.L.C. raised loans in foreign 
currencies. By the time statutory powers had been obtained by a 
number of local authorities foreign rates had become less attractive 
The development of this source of funds was further dampened by 
the withdrawal, in March 1972, of the Treasury guarantee. The 
exchange cover had been given at a time when the encouragement 
of capital inflows was important to the balance of payments. By 
1972, however, the problem had become one of containing the
expansionary effects of capital inflows as the external position
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was in substantial surplus . The Local Government Act of 1972
also included a general power to borrow in foreign currencies and 
there may have been the fear that this would have led to a large 
increase in capital inflows. Local authorities were still allowed
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to borrow without exchange cover, subject to obtaining exchange 
control consent but none chose to do so.
In March 1973 it was announced that exchange cover facilities
9 2 
similar to those withdrawn a year before would be restored .
The nationalised industries were also included in this scheme and 
both parts of the public sector expressed immediate interest 
because interest rates in the domestic money and capital markets 
were well in excess of those in the Euro-bond market. The 
government decided to restore these facilities because of the 
desire to finance the deficit on the current account by borrowing 
from abroad rather than reversing the reflationary policies of
1971 and 1972.
As with the previous scheme, a number of conditions were imposed. 
They differ, however, on a number of points. Only local authorities
with an outstanding loan debt in excess of £100 million at March
931972 are eligible for the scheme. Borrowing must be in U.S.
94 dollars for a minimum of five years ; and the total cost to the
borrower is one-half per cent below the ten year P.W.L.B. quota 
rate. This last condition was subsequently modified to give 
borrowers a greater share in the savings involved in foreign 
borrowing. They are now permitted to retain a third of the 
difference between the P.W.L.B. quota rate and the cost of the 
loan. Table 2:7 lists the various sums borrowed since the 
beginning of 1973.
TABLE 2:7 
Foreign Currency Borrowing By Local Authorities 1973 - 1974
Foreign Currency Foreign Currency
Borrowing By Local Borrowing By
Authorities______ Local Authorities
£mn £mn
1973 1st Qtr 30 1974 1st Qtr 129
2nd " 103 2nd " 188
3rd " 28 3rd "
4th " 64
Source: Financial Statistics - December 1974 - Table 30
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When local authorities have borrowed in a foreign currency they 
sell the proceeds for sterling to the Exchange Equalisation Account. 
This is recorded as a net addition to the foreign currency reserves; 
and the larger sterling borrowing requirement that this transaction 
gives rise to has implications for the exercise of monetary policy 
and will be explored in chapters 5 and 6.
The second development, that of 'Competition and Credit Control',
was heralded by the monetary authorities themselves as a major
95 
change in their approach to monetary policy . The reason for
such a change have been explored fully in a number of recent
96studies and it is necessary only to refer to them in passing
The main purpose here is to explain the role local authority 
securities play in the new monetary arrangements and to explore 
the consequences, if any, for local authority borrowing.
In place of the previous liquid assets ratio that only the clearing 
banks had been obliged to maintain, it was proposed that all banks 
were to be put on a common basis and obliged to hold not less 
than 12J per cent of their sterling deposit liabilities in certain 
specified reserve assets. This measure extended reserve require- 
ments to the secondary banking system and was intended to enhance 
the influence the monetary authorities could exercise over the level 
of sterling deposits. Such influence was to be reinforced by the 
calling of Special Deposits by the Bank of England whenever 
monetary conditions were believed to warrant it. Eligible reserve 
assets comprise cash at the Bank of England, and certain assets 
which the Bank is willing to convert into cash. Local authority 
bills eligible for rediscount at the Bank of England are one of
these along with, among others, treasury bills and money at call
97 
with the money markets . This last asset does not include,
however, money placed in the inter-bank or local authority 
temporary money markets. A similar arrangement was made for 
deposit-taking finance houses with the difference that their minimum 
reserve assets ratio is set at 10 per cent.
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A further feature of the new techniques of monetary control was a
restriction on the extent to which the Bank proposed to operate
98 in the gilt-edged market. This abandonment of the policy of
'leaning into the wind 1 was a necessary part of the new reliance 
oh changes in interest rates as a means of regulating lending by 
the banking system. Since 1952 the Bank of England has exercised 
control over the terms and timing of any local authority stock issues 
and from 1964 over negotiable bonds on the grounds that unfettered 
local authority issues would disrupt the careful nurturing of the 
gilt-edged market which the monetary authorities considered 
essential to the management of the national debt. The reversal 
of this view, nevertheless, did not result in any relaxation in 
control over local authority issues.
Separate proposals were made for the Discount Market. Part of 
the changes for the clearing banks was the abandonment of their 
collective agreements on interest rates. This had clear implications 
for the weekly tender for treasury bills by the discount houses and 
it was decided that they would continue to cover the weekly tender 
of treasury bills but no longer at an agreed price. Since money 
at call with the discount market is an admissible reserve asset it 
is necessary that the monetary authorities have sufficient influence 
over the credit extended by the discount market. To achieve this 
the houses agreed to hold a minimum of 50 per cent of their funds 
in public sector debt. This debt comprised treasury bills, local 
authority bills and bonds, British government, British government - 
guaranteed and local authority stocks with not more than five years 
to run to maturity.
The inclusion of local authority bills and bonds and short-dated 
stocks among the set of reserve assets, and the exclusion of 
local authority temporary debt can be explained quite simply by 
which forms of local authority debt .the monetary authorities had 
adequate influence over. It also accounts for the decision to 
retain discretion over the terms and timing of any local authority
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issues of negotiable bonds and stocks instead of allowing local 
authorities freer access to a market no longer managed by the 
monetary authorities. The supply of local authority bills was 
limited originally by the need for a local authority to obtain local 
powers; general powers were granted, however, by the local 
Government Act 1972, At present a local authority can issue 
revenue bills up to twenty per cent of their rate intake for the 
year providing the rate intake is not less than £3mn.
Local authority negotiable bonds are issued for minimum amounts 
of £250,000 and the maximum which any authority may issue is 
based on their total debt. Table 2:8 details the way in which 
this works.
TABLE 2:8 MAXIMUM ISSUES OF NEGOTIABLE BONDS FOR 
_________INDIVIDUAL LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF VARYING SIZES
Outstanding Loan Debt Ceiling (£mn)
Not exceeding £40mn 1.5
Over £40mn but not exceeding £60mn 2
Over £60mn but not exceeding £100mn 3
Over £100mn but not exceeding £200mn 5
Over £200mn but not exceeding £300mn 7.5
Over £300mn 10
Source:
Long, Till and Colvin Ltd (1972) Section 5
The result is that there is an upper limit to the amount of 
negotiable bonds local authorities can issue but this limit grows 
as the total indebtedness of local authorities grows. There is 
no upper limit, however, on issues of stock. The government
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broker on behalf of the Bank of England operates lists of local 
authorities wishing to issue stock. Only when an authority is 
at the head of the queue can they proceed. One list comprises 
issues of less than £10mn, another issues of over £10mn, and
there are special lists for very large issues, e.g. G,L.C. and
39for yearling bonds . In practice, however, local authorities
prefer to issue negotiable bonds because they are more convenient 
and large issues of stock are likely to follow only after the issue 
of negotiable bonds have reached the upper limit.
Although there appear to be limits to the volume of bills and bonds 
that local authorities can issue it is possible that the volume can- 
fluctuate and this may undermine the control that the monetary 
authorities are able to exercise over the reserve assets of the banks 
and the discount houses. Some of the causes of fluctuations in 
the supply of these forms of local authority debt will emerge from 
the next few chapters and the consequences for Competition and 
Credit Control will be explored in chapter 5. Table 2:6 shows 
net changes in issues of revenue bills, negotiable bonds, and 
quoted stocks from the beginning of 1971. There appear to be 
variations in the issue of these forms of debt. Revenue bills 
exhibit a strong seasonal variation reflecting the rate collecting 
periods of the year. The figures for negotiable bonds from the 
beginning of 1973 include borrowing in foreign currencies. Stock 
issues have fallen considerably since the second quarter of 1972 
because of an unfavourable stock market and reluctance on the 
part of local authorities to borrow long term at high rates of 
interesto
The exclusion of temporary money in the local authority market 
from the list of reserve assets meant that the non-clearing banks 
that hitherto had held local authority deposits along with funds in 
the inter-bank market as liquid assets were obliged to switch 
towards the more traditional markets particularly money at call 
with the discount houses and treasury bills in order to satisfy 
the minimum reserve assets ratio.
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TABLE 2:9
Net Issues Of Bills, Negotiable Bonds And Stocks 1971-74 
£mn Revenue Bills Negotiable Bonds Quoted Stocks
1971 1st Qtr 9
2nd " 43 41 17
3rd " 24 67 - 11
4th " 14 61 30
1972 1st Qtr -2 41 53
2nd " 21 32 - 52
3rd " 28 4 2
4th " 4 25 - 20
1973 1st Qtr -11 36 18
2nd " 36 109 6
3rd " 5 - 15 - 9
4th " 12 40 - 25
1974 1st Qtr -5 80 - 11
2nd "54 .6 - 29
3rd " 44 47 - 29
Source:
Financial Statistics Table 30
The fall off in lending to the local authority sector by the non- 
clearing banks can be seen in figure 2:4. The switching to 
treasury bills and money atcallis shown in Table 2:10. The 
greater part appears to be into money at call. While advances to 
local authorities by the non-clearing banks have fallen, all the 
more significant given the increase in the total volume of temporary
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debt since the middle of 1972, advances by the clearing banks 
have risen. Although the non-clearing banks reduced their 
advances to local authorities the funds were diverted back 
because the discount houses used the funds deposited with them 
at call to purchase negotiable bonds.
TABLE 2:10
Some Liquid Assets Of Non-Clearing Banks: Treasury Bill 
Holdings Of Clearing Banks (£mn)__________________
NON-CLEARING BANKS
Advances To Money At Call Treasury 
Local Author. And Short Notice Bills
1971 1st Qtr
2nd " 
3rd " 
4th "
1967
2142
2161
2035
96
89
112
132
54
33
82
161
CLEARING 
BANKS
Advances To 
Local Author.
161
80
121
171
1972 1st Qtr 
2nd " 
3rd "
4th "
1974
1859
1921
1828
147
126
131
165
1973 1st Qtr 
2nd " 
3rd " 
4th "
1715
1747
1837
1835
229
260
262
260
33
30
127
104
344
267
382
440
1974 1st Qtr 
2nd " 
3rd " 
4th "
1739
1346
1795
1757
247
220
205
180
57
46
104
116
375
281
291
308
Source: B. E. Q. B. Table 11
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CHAPTER THREE 
MODELS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY BORROWING
1 Tobin and Hester have described monetary micro-economics as being
concerned with the balance sheet or portfolio choices of individual 
economic units; choices are constrained by the wealth of the unit and 
by its opportunities to buy and sell assets and to incur or retire debt.
An important part of this branch of theory is concerned with the study
2of decision-making under uncertainty . If it is assumed that the
decision-making unit is rational then many aspects of portfolio and
3debt selection behaviour can be analysed. Whenever local authorities
decide to issue stock in preference to taking funds on temporary deposit 
or borrow from the P.W.L.B. in preference to the banks they are making 
decisions that may have wide repercussions for the rest of the monetary
system. The nature of these decisions are the concern of this chapter.
4 If the small amount of lending to house-purchasers is ignored a local
authority's choices are essentially one-sided concerned with the incurr- 
ing and retirement of debt. Local authorities do, of course, accumulate 
real physical assets as a result of capital spending; but since they are 
not commercial undertakings and profit maximisation is considered an 
inappropriate objective, the making of decisions about the structure and 
size of their debt is separated from the making of decisions about the 
scale of capital investment. Capital budgeting theory, therefore, is 
not directly relevant to the study of borrowing and some modified frame- 
work of analysis is called for that makes greater allowance for the 
assumption that the scale of capital spending is unresponsive to the 
rate of interest .
The approach taken in this chapter is to postulate that a local authority 
will attempt to minimise the cost of a pre-determined borrowing require- 
ment, subject to the constraint that the requirement is met, by varying 
the maturity structure of its debt. The maturity structure refers to the 
average period that must elapse before debt incurred comes up for 
renewal or repayment. Primary emphasis is placed on the ratio of short
to long-term borrowing; where short-term borrowing, as in chapter two
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is defined as that made for less than one year. Within this category 
of debt, however, there are loans contracted for periods of up to one 
week, for up to three months and for up to one year, and it may well 
be that the factors that determine the very short term loans may differ 
from those determining loans for a little less than one year. In order 
to test this possibility temporary borrowing is disaggregated into its 
component parts; and the implications of this are considered in section 
3:4. In the same section a distinction is also drawn between the 
various forms in which local authorities borrow long-term. Using the 
simple models of debt selection behaviour that are developed in sections 
3:1, 3:2, and 3:3, an attempt is made to explain the supply of bonds, 
mortgages and stock and to enlarge upon some of the problems raised 
in chapter two, section 2:7 with regard to lending by the P.W.L.B.
Section 3:1 contains a model of local authority debt selection behaviour 
which formalises the ideas contained in the comments the Radcliffe 
Committee made about local authority borrowing. Section 3:2 extends 
the analysis by employing the mean-variance approach on the lines 
first set out by Tobin (1958). Section 3:3 takes the argument one step 
further and attempts to show that the model of the previous two sections 
because of the stress it places on the role of expectations about the 
future course of interest rates, can be subsumed under those species 
of theories formulated in order to explain the term structure of interest 
rates. Section 3:5 reviews briefly the demand side of local authority 
debt and considers some of the recent literature on the portfolio select- 
ion behaviour of a few financial institutions; and in particular of those 
which are large holders of local authority debt.
3:1 A Radcliffean Model Of Local Authority Borrowing
In the previous chapter's account of the relationship between the 
exercise of monetary policy and local authority borrowing some 
importance was attached to the part expectations of interest 
rates played in the determination of the large amount of short- 
term borrowing that many local authorities went in for after 1955.
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The observation is encapsulated in the view of the Radcliffe 
Committee that "...many authorities.. .reckoned that interest 
rates were abnormally high, and went in for extensive short- 
term borrowing in the expectation of being able to fund their
borrowing when long-term rates were lower " .
The notion that local authorities have a concept of what is the 
'normal 1 long-term interest rate which influences their debt
management is in some ways analogous to Keynes 1 analysis of
7 
the speculative demand for money . He postulated that on the
basis of past experience investors have in mind a normal level 
of long-term interest rates, towards which current rates are 
expected to move. If the current interest rate is below the 
'normal 1 level then the current rate is expected to rise an 
investor holds money so as to avoid the capital loss involved 
in holding bonds; if the current interest rate is above the 'normal 
interest rate the investor expects the current rate to fall, and 
holds bonds to take advantage of the expected rise in bond 
prices. An aggregate demand for money can be derived by 
assuming a market of numerous investors all of whom hold a 
different conception of the 'normal 1 or "expected 1 interest rate.
The application of the 'normal 1 rate hypothesis to the explanation i
of the debt selection behaviour of local authorities first requires 
some clarification and some simplifying assumptions. The 
clarification refers to the difference between stock and flow 
variables. The total amount of debt incurred is a stock variable; 
the amount of borrowing whether short or long-term is a flow
o
variable . Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between 
net and gross borrowing. Net borrowing is that debt incurred 
in consequence of new capital expenditure while gross borrowing 
includes the replacement of debt that has matured. The model 
presented in this section is based on net borrowing, that is a 
flow; and it will be assumed that each financial quarter'is regarded
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as a single decision period within which each local authority 
must satisfy a given borrowing requirement. It will also be 
assumed that a decision has to be made within the period 
whether to borrow short-term or long-term. This dual-maturity 
case will provide a framework that then can be used to explain 
the actual pattern of borrowing behaviour.
If a local authority believes, along with Keynes' speculative 
investor, that the long-term rate of interest has some 'normal' 
level when the current long-term interest rate rises above this 
level the local authority will borrow on a short-term basis. 
When the long-term rate falls back to the 'normal 1 level it v/ili 
fund the short-term debt by borrowing long. The high cost of 
long-term borrowing, then, will be avoided while interest rates 
are high and the burden on the rates and revenues of the local 
authority minimised. Of course, while the long-term rate is 
above the expected rate there is the cost of borrowing on a 
short-term basis. If the short-term interest rate is above the 
current long-term rate then the reduction in capital cost as a 
result of unfunding will be accordingly smaller and vice versa.
The capital cost (cc) of a sum, B, borrowed for 'n 1 periods will 
be :-
CC =
where R is the current long-term rate of interest. If it is L(t)
supposed that the local authority expects at the end of- the first 
period the long-term interest rate will be at the 'normal 1 level, 
below the current rate, then it will borrow short-term for one 
period, at a rate of interest, R S /.^» The capital cost saving 
(D) the local authority expects to achieve by this debt manage- 
ment will be equal to:-
,n 
l(t)'
n-1 r '1.11 / _ __ ^* \ * * .*  /«  -. i i iD = B (1 + RT/^) A - (1 + R M ) (1 + RSM i [3.2J
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where R , . is the long rate expected to rule at the beginning
of the next period. Thus when D is greater than zero the local 
authority will borrow short and fund at the end of the period. 
This need not always necessarily happen since it may be expect- 
ed that the current long-term rate will not return to its 'normal 5 
level until the completion of two periods; in which case the 
local authority can contract a short loan for two periods duration 
or two one period loans; the first to expire at the end of the 
first period and the second to begin at the start of the second 
period. This, however, would entail the generation of expectat- 
ions about what short-term interest rates will be at the start of 
the second period. Since a small change in short-term interest 
rates is unlikely to have much impact either way on the capital 
cost saving this complication can be safely ignored for the 
present. It is interesting to note that if the current long-term 
interest rate is at the 'normal 1 level, a rational borrower, within 
the confines of the framework that this section deals with, may- 
still borrow on a short-term basis if the current short-term 
interest rate is below the current and 'normal 1 long-term interest 
rate and the long-term rate is expected to prevail until the end 
of the first period; or for that matter up to the 'normal 1 period 
as long as short-term rates remain unchanged.
All these conclusions are based on the supposition that the 
'normal' rate is expected with certainty so that the decision to 
meet a borrowing requirement on a long-term or a short-term basis 
is an all-or-nothing choice depending upon whether D is less 
than, equal to, or greater than zero.
When all local authorities are aggregated it is possible to write 
an equation for either long-term borrowing or short-term borrowing 
The analysis which follows is for the latter, the only difference 
using the former makes it the reversal of the signs of the 
coefficients. Thus: -
TB (t) = ao + a l (RL(t) " R£^ )+ S 2 ^-W " RS(t))+ S 3 B (t)
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where TB, , is net temporary borrowing; RTM , the current 
w 
long-term interest rate; R T /.>,/ the expected long rate; 
Rqft-V the current short rate; and B. the net borrowing 
requirement. This last term needs some explanation. 
The larger the borrowing requirement the more that needs 
to be met on a temporary basis if the actual rate exceeds 
the expected rate. The constant term, on the. other hand,
can be thought of as that temporary borrowing which
.,..,. - 9s occurs in anticipation or revenue
Local authority net temporary borrowing is a function of 
the difference between the current and the expected long-term 
interest rate, the difference between the current long-term 
and the current short-term interest rate, and the borrowing 
requirement. This model as advanced is essentially Radcliffean 
with the emphasis placed on the role of expectations about the 
future course of interest rates. The problem with the use of 
expectational factors in economic models is that expectations 
as such are unobservable. Fortunately, many ways have been 
found to make expectations operational; the most widely used 
since the seminal work of Cagan (1956) and Nerlove (1958) 
has been the adaptive expectations hypothesis. Applying it 
to the local authority sector, if the long-term interest rate 
rises it is suggested that local authorities are unlikely to 
become convinced of its permanence until a considerable period 
has elapsed. Instead they will revise their expectations in 
proportion to past forecasting errors. If the long-term 
interest rate at the beginning of the second period turns 
out to be different from what was expected at the beginning 
of the first period the local authority will alter its expect- 
ations of the future rate by a fraction of the forecasting 
error. This can be formalised in a discrete model as:-
RL(t) - RL(t-l) - (1 -*> K(t)
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Equation j3 ,4J can be rewritten as:-
RL(t)
lagging [3 . 5 j one period
+ (1-A) RT /4. [3.6J 
and repeated substitution into J3. 5J gives
X 1 R fs ?1A KL(t-i) ir-'J1=0
The effect of the term R T/ . n fades away since its
, i-i( t~ l+i) \ 1+1 ^ '
coefficient A ~ approaches zero as 't' increases as
The result, therefore, is that the 'expected' or 'normal'- 
long-term interest rate is expressed in terms of an 
infinite distributed lag on RT /.> with geometrically declining 
coefficients.
Substituting 1.3.7j into J3.3J and adding an error term yields 
TB (t) = ao + S l (RL(t) " ^ RL(t-
+d 2 (RL(t) " RS(t) } + Q 3 B (t) + Ut
A distributed lag variable is practically useless for purposes 
of estimation; but the application of the Koyck transformation 
that is lag [3.8] once, multiply by X and substract the result 
from [3.8J gives the estimatable equation after rearrangement
TB (t) bo + bl A
(RL(t-l) - RS(t-l) ) + b 5 B (t) + b 6
V [3.9]
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where b = (!-A) a
o ob i = a
b2 = x
b3 = a 2
D S = a 3 ., 
b 6 = -3 3 :
Vt = Ut " 
The problems involved in estimating an equation that contains a
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable will be 
considered in chapter 4.
The use of an adaptive expectations model as a means of casting 
expectational factors in an operational and an estima table mould 
raises some interesting issues. First, the idea/embodied in the 
previous discussion of the 'normal' rate/that local authorities 
hold their expectations about the long-term interest rate which 
will prevail at the beginning of the second period with certainty 
does not lie well with an hypothesis that suggests that if these 
expectations are found to be wrong they are revised in proportion 
to the error made. It implies particularly myopic behavbur since 
it suggests that once the revision in the expected rate has been 
made the new 'expected 1 or 'normal 1 long-term interest rate is 
once more considered to be a certainty. It appears that the 
borrower does not learn from past mistakes to beware of making 
new mistakes in the future.
The second issue concerns the more general plausibility of using 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis as a means of generating 
a proxy or surrogate for the expected or normal interest rate in
the form of autoregressive schemes. This type of hypothesis
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has been described as 'weak-form 1 because it is assumed, 
in this instance, that borrowers base their expectations of 
the future only on the information contained in the past 
history of long-term interest rates. Nerlove (1958) 
distinguished between expectations that are induced by past 
movements in the variable in question and autonomous 
expectations which are not; only the former he believed were 
amenable to economic analysis . A recent study, by 
Rutledge (1974) casts some doubt on this proposition; 
Rutledge was concerned with the generation of expectations 
about the rate of inflation and with the possibility that 
market participants utilise information other than that 
furnished by autoregressive models; and in particular that 
they will learn to understand the structure of the economic 
process generating the variable being forecast. Forecasting 
is-regarded, by Rutledge, as a productive activity into which 
information enters as an input such that each source of 
information will be exploited until the marginal cost of 
exploitation is equal to the marginal return . The idea that 
market participants are encouraged, as an optimising form of 
behaviour, to gather information about the structure of the 
economy and thus that expectations will depend upon the 
understanding of the structure of the economy was first 
advanced by Muth. (1961) in his path-breaking work on the 
theory of Rational Expectations; in which expectations, being
informed predictions of future events, are "...essentially the
12
same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory.. " .
Since Muth chose to illustrate the theory with a model in 
which only one exogenous variable appeared the result was 
that the rational expectations which would be formed by market 
participants in full knowledge of the structure of the economic 
system was reducible to an autoregressive form; the only 
information required to produce an optimal forecast was the 
past behaviour of the relevant variable. It has been argued 
by Nelson (1972) and by Walters (1971) that this is a 
misinterpretation since if more than one exogenous variable 
enters into the forecasting of a variable the forecast.
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cannot be reduced to the virtual extrapolation of the history 
of the variable in question; in other words 'weak-form' 
hypotheses, including adaptive expectations, cannot be deduced 
from well-grounded axioms of optimal behaviour and must be 
regarded as 'ad hoc'.
There is the added implication that when market participants, 
within the logic of the adaptive expectations hypothesis,revise 
their expectations in response to previous errors they will also 
take into account information, provided from other sources of a 
non-autoregressive nature,that arises from the structure of the 
economic system, The costs of information processing may be 
prohibitive for individual market participants so that some pooling 
of the forecasting activities may occur. The development of the 
money markets, though in the past due to an attempt to minimise 
the search costs of borrowers and lenders, can also be ascribed 
to the pooling of information-processing that money brokers 
achieve. The results are then passed on as forecasts to local 
authorities who pay for them through the commission charged on 
loans negotiated. Although the empirical results considered in 
chapter 4 are concerned only with autoregressive models it is 
as well to bear in mind their shortcomings.
One final point will be made about adaptive expectations models. 
It has been pointed out by Bierwag and Grove (1966) that if the 
parameters of adaptive expectations functions differ among 
economic units and the market expectation is a weighted 
combination of individual expectations then the function represent 
ing aggregate behaviour is not a Koyck function with geometrically 
declining coefficients but rather some other function belonging 
to the general class of Pascal distributed lag functions. This 
problem could only be obviated by assuming that the same 
expectations are held by all local authorities; but of course this 
is incompatible with the assumption of the normal rate hypothesis 
that local authorities differ in their idea of the critical normal 
rate.
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3:2 (a) Local Authority Borrowing Under Conditions Of Risk
The framework of section 3:1 in which a limited dual-maturity 
debt selection process was explained in terms of a 'normal 1 
rate hypothesis is open to the same criticisms that were leveled 
at the original Keynesian form. Johnson (1961) regarded Keynes 1 
concentration on expectations of future charges in interest rates
as the determinant of the asset-demand for money as a major
13limitation . Tobin (1958) in his seminal work on liquidity
preference was able to show that it was not necessary to assume 
inelastic interest-rate expectations only that there is uncertainty 
about the future course of interest rates. In what follows there 
will be an attempt to show that when mean-variance analysis 
is applied to the rationalisation of debt selection behaviour, it 
is necessary , in fact, to assume that borrowers have inelastic 
and not unit elastic expectations of interest rates.
14 For the purposes of the model it will be assumed that:-
(a) All local authority borrowers are single-period expected 
capital cost minimisers.
(b) Borrowers have identical expectations of the future course 
of interest rates.
(c) There are only two forms of debt differentiated by maturity: 
a short-term debt incurred for the duration of the decision 
period; and a long-term debt incurred for 'n 1 periods.
(d) The borrowing requirement made necessary by capital
expenditure is fixed for the decision period; and must be 
satisfied within the period by either short-term or long- 
term borrowing, or both.
(e) There are no limitations on the amount of the borrowing
requirement that can be satisfied by short-term borrowing.
(f) At'the beginning of the first period there is no inherited 
debt.
(g) Borrowing short-term or long-term does not affect inter-
temporal relative interest rates.
A number of these assumptions will be relaxed in both this 
and subsequent sections .
If a borrower at the beginning of the first period contracts 
for a loan the expected capital cost saving can be written 
from equation f,3 . as: 
E(D) = TB (t) " <! + RL(t) ) n - (1 + P^t+1 ) n -fc, t1t )]' [3.10]
where E(D) is the expected capital cost saving as compared
with D the capital cost saving expected with certainty;
M R T /. ,» is the mean expected long-term interest rate; andL VC-
^ . is the proportion of the borrowing requirement met on a \ -/
temporary basis.
In Tobin's original paper uncertainty about the future rate of 
interest on consols meant that investment in consols involved 
a risk of capital gain or loss. Since the investor was 
assumed to hold unit-elastic expectations the expected capital 
gain was zero; so that the expected return on a portfolio 
invested in cash and bonds was equal to the rate of interest 
times the proportion of the portfolio invested in bonds. In 
the case of borrowing if borrowers are assumed to hold unit- 
elastic expectations then the expected difference between the 
current and the mean expected long-term interest rate will be 
zero; this is because of the expectation that., on average, at 
the beginning of the next period the long-term interest rate 
will be the same as at the beginning of the first period. But 
since the current short-term interest rate is known the value 
of E(D) is known and whether local authorities borrow on a 
short-term or a long-term basis will depend upon the difference 
between the short-term and the long-term interest rate, the lon< 
term rate and the risk entailed by the probability distribution 
of possible capital cost savings, Thus^-
J3. 10 . a ]
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is the expected capital cost saving; and:
or ^ = E [(D - E(D) ) 2 j f3.10.b]
is the percentage variance of capital cost savings. The more 
that is borrowed on a temporary basis the greater the total 
risk, thus the total variance is:-
2 is the total variance.
[s.io.c]
The terms on which the borrower can obtain greater expected 
capital cost savings at the expense of assuming more risk can 
be derived from [S.lO.a] and J3.10.cj
E(D) =
This gives the technical situation facing the borrower - the 
opportunity locus along which is traded increased risk and 
increased expected savings. The slope of the line is
E n 1 9R R , .) (1+ R , v ) / ^ D; shown as OC in figure [3.1]L(t) S (t) L(tJ ., 1
The length of the lower vertical axis, OB, is the borrowing 
requirement. The amount of temporary borrowing is measured
from the origin; long-term borrowing is then ( OB-TB). For any
2given tf^ the value of TB can be located by multiplying by
or by reflecting it from the line with slope 1/^2 in the lower
Dquadrant of figure 3:1. The equilibrium risk and expected capital
cost saving can be determined by assuming that a borrower
2have preferences between E(D)and ^^ such that the borrower
.2is indifferent between all pairs (E(D),^T ) that lie on curve I,, 
in figure 3:1.
FIGURE 3:1
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O
Debt Selection At Various Values Of
{RLt - R S (t ) }
Borrowing Requirement
It will be assumed that the map of indifference curves describe 
risk-a verting behaviour so indifference curves are concave 
upwards and borrowers will only accept more risk for more
expected cost saving. The tangency of OC. and the indifference2 ' 
curve I gives the equilibrium values and E(D) . The
,2
determined value of ^ T makes it possible to establish the level
of temporary borrowing as OX. .
Holding constant the borrower's estimate of the dispersion of 
possible capital cost savings, with positive or negative values, 
an increase in the difference between the long and the short- 
term interest rate, or more precisely the excess of the long overw
the short rate, will rotate the opportunity iotas to the Jefa so 
for the same level of risk a higher expected capital cost saving 
can be achieved. An increase then in the difference between 
the long-term and the short-term interest rate will increase the 
amount borrowed on a temporary basis. If, however, the short- 
term interest rate exceeds the long-term interest rate the 
opportunity locus will rotate into the lower quadrant and no 
temporary borrowing will occur.
It appears, therefore, that the application of mean-variance 
analysis, under some restrictive assumptions, to the. supply-side 
of the market in assets and liabilities, and on basis of unit- 
elastic expectations of the future interest rate, results in the 
conclusion that the proportion of a borrowing requirement that is 
met by short-term borrowing will depend on the difference 
between the long and short-term interest rate. Even casual 
inspection of the available data, however, suggests that is not 
a very important determinant of temporary borrowing. The 
triviality of the model outlined so far may be due to its confine- 
ment to a single-period; if more than one period is considered 
it becomes necessary for the borrower to forecast not only the 
expected interest rate but also the short-term rate that will 
prevail at the beginning of each successive period.
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An alternative way of providing a more realistic model is to 
drop the assumption that the holds unit-elastic 
expectations. This means that the expected long-term interest 
rate becomes, as in section 3:1, a function of past interest 
rates. For expositional purposes it will be assumed that the
mean expected long-term interest rate is equal to the long-term
M
interest rate in the previous oeriod: that is, R_ ,.» = R_ ^ 1X
Thus equation [3.10J can be rewritten 
E(D ) = <l+RL(t))n'-[tt + R^ln-l (1 + Rs(t) )]
It is not necessary to repeat the mean -variance analysis to see 
that temporary borrowing is now a positive function of both the 
first difference of the lon-term interest rate (R,-/ - R
and ( RT /. x - R^/.N ); very much the form arrived at in bH
section 3:1 and described by equation 1.3. 9j
3:2. b A Relaxation Of Some Of The Assumptions Of The Mean-Variance 
Model ___________________________________________
The conclusions of section 3:2 are only clear-cut because many 
of the complications were assumed away by focusing on a single- 
period, by ignoring the difficulties created by inherited debt; and 
by assuming that two forms of debt, differentiated only by 
maturity, were available to local authorities. No attempt will 
be made to deal with all of the difficulties the relaxation 
of the assumptions produce. Instead the approach will be to 
show 'how they can be integrated into the analysis without 
actually providing detailed solutions.
First, inherited debt.- By assuming that no inherited debt was 
in existence from prior periods there was no need to allow for 
temporary debt incurred at the beginning of the first period, 
t, coming up for renewal at t+1. If the proportion of the 
borrowing requirement met on a temporary basis in the first 
period is a then the temporary debt due for
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renewal in the second period will be a B M , where B, , 
is the first period borrowing requirement and o ^ a ^ 1 
The decision in period t-t-1 will involve not only the new 
borrowing requirement B, but also a B, N thus:
a i % + VD = GV> 
where GB, . is the gross borrowing requirement . If in 
period t+1 , a of the gross sum is met on a temporary basis
the inherited short-term debt in period t + 2 is: 
a 2 (a ! B (t) +
where o - a ^
£*
and the gross sum in period t + 2 will be
B (t) + B (t+l)' + B (t+ 2) = GB(t+ 2)
therefore after ' n ' periods the inherited short-term debt will be:
(an Vl    a l ) B (t) + (an
an [3.12.d]
After 'n ' periods it is possible that the long-term debt,
(1-a )B, x, incurred in the first period will come up for renewal.
 !  \^-/
Whether this occurs will depend upon the period over which the 
debt incurred has to be serviced. If the loan sanction is for 
1 n ' periods then there will be no renewal of any maturing long- 
term debt.
The consequence of including inherited temporary debt in the 
model is that after the first period net temporary borrowing can 
be negative because of funding. In the second period temporary
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debt carried forward from the first because of an expectation 
that the long-term interest rate was to fall in the second, could 
be funded because the expectation of a fall was realised. 
Alternatively, if in the second period the long-term interest rate 
did not fall the inherited temporary debt could be carried over 
into the next period along with a proportion of the current 
borrowing requirement that is met on a temporary basis.
While it is clear that the introduction of inherited short-term 
debt into the model provides more realism it has still been 
assumed that only two forms of debt are involved. In fact debt 
selection decisions involve more than one-period and ' n ' period 
horizons; there is also the possibility of holding expectations 
about two or more periods so that if there is an expectation that 
the long-term interest rate will not fall until the end of three 
periods a local authority could borrow for three periods and then 
fund. In addition the local authority could contract three one- 
period loans; the first to begin immediately and the other two to 
begin at the beginning of the subsequent periods. Once the 
possibility of multi-period borrowing is allowed it becomes 
necessary for the borrower to hold expectations not only about 
the long-term interest rate at the beginning of the next period 
but also of short and long-term interest rates over all subsequent 
periods and for all maturities. The need to know, in other words 
the term structure of interest rates both now and in the future 
brings local authority debt selection behaviour within the compass 
of the various theories, both expectational and institutional, that 
have been advanced to explain the term structure. These theories 
are discussed in the next section; and a number of alternative 
models of debt selection behaviour which are suggested by the 
discussion are considered. The assumption that the pattern of 
local authority borrowing does not affect inter-temporal relative 
interest rates is of relevance also and the implications of its 
relaxation will be considered as well.
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3:3 Theories Of The Term Structure Of Interest Rates And 
Local Authority Borrowing _________________________
It is usual to distinguish three competing theories of the 
term structure of interest rates: the traditional Expectations 
Hypothesis; Hicks' Liquidity Premium Theory; and the 
institutionally grounded Hedging Pressure (also denoted 
'Preferred Habitat 1 and 'Market Segmentation'} Theory. 
The second theory,that of Hicks', v/ill not, however, be 
considered . In its place there will be substituted a 
variant of the Expectations Hypothesis developed by 
Malkiel (1966)/ because the main focus of this study is 
concentrated on the borrowing side of the market and 
Malkiel 1 s ideas are of particular interest in this context.
The impact of the supply side of the market on the term 
structure of interest rates raises some problems of 
simultaneity since in the model outlined in the previous 
sections it was assumed that the pattern of local authority 
borrowing does not affect long and short-term interest rates 
This, nevertheless, does not accord with the view of the 
monetary authorities that in the early sixties, at the very 
least, local authority temporary borrowing raised short- 
term interest rates independently of any rise caused by 
the monetary authorities. Thus "competition for short-term
funds by local authorities has on occasions forced.. .rates
17 
up to high levels" . If shifts in the maturity composition
of local authority borrowing do alter the spread between 
the long and short-term interest rate any results reported 
on the basis of the model already outlined will be biased. 
The theoretical possibilities of such an effect occurring 
will be pursued in what follows; the empirical 
relevance will be explored in chapter 4.
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Almost without exception explanations of the term structure 
of interest rates have been confined to the behaviour of 
investors. One possible reason for this may be that most 
studies have used yield curves constructed from data on 
default "free government securities; and it is usual to assume 
that governments supply securities of various maturities
according to criteria different from those that influence
18investors . This is not to suggest, however, that the
supply side plays no part in theories of the term structure 
- in fact it plays a crucial role in the Hedging Pressure 
Theory - it is just that little if any formal analysis of the
behaviour of borrov/ers has been carried out as compared
19 
with that of the behaviour of lenders
3:3 .a The Expectations Hypothesis
The traditional expectations hypothesis as conventionally 
stated admits of no role for changes in relative supplies 
of debt; so that a change in relative supplies of securities 
with different maturities will not alter either the level or 
the spread of interest rates. It appears to follow, then, 
that a switch by local authorities into the short end of the 
market cannot, contrary to the claim of the monetary
»
authorities, raise short term interest rates. Whether or 
not, within the context of the expectations hypothesis, 
this is correct depends on the factors determining the 
relative supplies of local authority debt. The above claim 
is based on the assumption that the supply of debt is 
exogenously determined, something regarded as appropriate 
for the supply of government debt. If, however, the supply 
of local authority debt is dependent upon the same factors 
that determine the demand for securities of various 
maturities, then the supply side is likely to determine 
the term structure as much as the demand side.
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This contention will be clearer when the hypothesis has 
been explained in more detail.
The expectations hypothesis rests on three basic premises 
which were originally detailed by Lutz (1340).
a, Everyone involved in financial markets knows what 
future short term interest rates will be.
b. Transactions costs for borrowers and lenders are zero.
c. There is total shiftability for lenders and borrowers. 
The lender is equally prepared to buy a ten year bond 
or to make ten one-year loans. The borrower is willi:. 
equally to issue a ten-year bond or to issue ten one- 
year bonds in succession.
From these assumptions follows the 'Equalisation Theorem' 
which states that the expected return from investing a unit 
of money for any given length of time should be the same 
no matter what length-of-life assets are purchased by 
investors in financial markets. The theorem can be writter 
using a different notation from that in sections 3:1 and 
3:2, as:
(1 + R ) n = (1 + R.) (1 + rj...(l + r ) {3.13.a] 
n 1 n   J
where R is the current long-term interest rate for ' n ' 
n
periods, R, is the current one-period rate and r ... r
1 2 n 
are 'forward' or expected short-term rates (note R =r ).
The long-term interest rate is a geometric average of the 
current spot one-period rate and all 'expected 1 one period 
rates up to the ' n ' th period. This describes an equili- 
brium and is brought about by investors shifting between 
the long and short ends of the maturity spectrum in
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response to differences in expected returns.
The same theorem, moreover, must follow from the 
behaviour of borrowers. If borrowers act under the same 
three premises the maturity structure of debt will be such 
that the expected cost, of borrowing for ' n ' periods will 
be the same as for borrowing successively for single 
periods. Equally any combination of length-of-life issues 
will yield an identical capital cost. The equalisation
theorem must then foliow as it does from the behaviour
20 
of investors . When both sides of the market are
considered the resulting term structure must be determined 
simultaneously such as to ensure equalisation of expected 
costs and expected returns for borrowers and investors.
The expected short-term interest rates are actually 
unobservable but, given the assumptions of the expectations 
hypothesis, are embodied implicitly in the equalisation 
theorem. If equation [s.lS.a] is written:
(1 + Rn _1) (1 + R^ (1 + r 2 ) ... (1 + rn _1} [3.13.4]
divided into equation [3.13.aj and rearranged it gives
r = (1 + R ) n
n ___n_ _ 1
(1 + R _ 1} n-l |3.13.cl
Thus from the actual long-term interest rate on ' n '
and 'n 1 period bonds the expected one-period .
rate at the beginning of the ' n 'th period can be calculated
If there is the expectation (it is assumed that all market 
participants hold the same expectations) that short-term 
interest rates will rise monotonically in the future then at
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time 't ' the long-term interest rate will exceed the 
short-term rate of interest because investors will shift 
to the short end in the expectation of capital gains while 
borrowers will fund in the expectation that it will be more 
expensive to borrow in the future. Alternatively, if 
monotonically falling short-term interest rates 
are expected investors will buy long-term bonds and 
borrowers will shift into the short end of the market in 
the expectation of being able to fund in the future.
The assumptions on which the expectations hypothesis 
rest are particularly extreme but they do enable some 
substantial conclusions to be drawn. Some relaxation, 
however, is necessary if the hypothesis is to provide a 
framework to explain the actual pattern of local authority 
borrcwing. The last assumption, that of complete shiftabil- 
ity, is not tenable when local authority behaviour is under 
scrutiny. It has already been hypothesised that local 
authorities shift between the long and the short end of 
the market in response to variations in the expected cost 
of borrowing. Local authorities, however, are constrained 
by how much of their total debt they can hold on a tempor- 
ary basis - more attention will be given to this shortcoming 
in the next chapter. Furthermore, much of the debt issued 
by local authorities is not marketable; and yet a cornerstone 
of the pure expectations hypothesis is that the asset'in 
question is available in the open market to be bought or 
sold in response to differences in expected returns. If 
there is no secondary market in previously issued debt and 
there exists no provision for the premature retirement of 
outstanding obligations a local authority will be locked into 
an irreversible commitment until the debt entered into comes 
up to redemption. This will create a large measure of 
inflexibility in both debt and portfolio management.
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Decisions, therefore, on which period to borrow for can 
only be made as existing debt matures or as new 
obligations arising from new capital expenditure are taken 
up.
The second assumption, that of zero transactions costs, 
will not be discussed here; but reference will be made to 
it when Malkiel's ideas are considered later. The first 
assumption, that market participants know what future short 
term interest rates will be has been the subject of much 
debate. It can be interpreted in two possible ways. In 
the sense that market participants have 'objective 1 
knowledge of future rates; or in the sense that market 
participants have 'subjective 1 knowledge of future interest 
rates. The first interpretation is based on the view that 
perfect information of the future makes all future interest 
rates known with certainty, The second and weaker 
interpretation only maintains that market participants believe 
they know with complete certainty the future. This is 
more in accordance with the Keynesian expectation - held- 
with-certainty formulation used to explain local authority 
borrowing in section 3:1. The subjective knowledge 
assumption of the expectations hypothesis has been given
a different and very important twist by Meiselman and
his contribution will be considered next.
3:3.b.Meiselman's Contribution To The Empirical Testing Of 
The Expectations Hypothesis___________________
Prior to the work of Meiselman empirical testing of the 
expectations hypothesis rested on the assumption that 
for the hypothesis to have any relevance as an explanation 
of market behaviour and of the term structure it was
necessary that the expectations upon which market
21 participants acted were correct . But "...to assert that
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behaviour is governed by expectations is something quite
different from asserting that expectations are accurately
22 formed" . Meiselman's contribution was to abandon the
assumption that expectations need necessarily be correct 
and to substitute in its place the assumption that if 
expectations turn out to be confounded they are revised in 
a consistent fashion. This is equivalent to the adaptive 
expectations model employed earlier and means in this 
context that if the actual one-period rate at time ' t ; is 
different from what it was expected to be in the previous 
period, market participants will revise their expectations 
of future one-period rates in proportion to the degree of 
error incurred in forecasting the present one-period rate. 
The twist which he gives to the empirical verification of 
the expectations hypothesis is that no attempt is made to 
explain the term structure itself; instead he explains how 
the term structure changes over time - that is by changes 
in expectations induced by errors in forecasting the level 
of the one-period rate - and tests this hypothesis.
More formally, let r represent the expectation formed 
in period ' t ' concerning the one-period interest rate on a 
loan to be made at a fixed ppint of time in the future ' n
The notation is that used by Meiselman. Then ,r ist~i n
the expectation of the one-period rate at time ' n ' formed 
at time ' t-1 ', and r is the expectation of the 
current one-period rate formed in the previous period. 
Meiselman postulated that the one-period rate expected 
to prevail in ' n ' periods will be changed in proportion to 
the difference between the actual current one-period rate 
and what it was expected to be in the previous period. 
Thus:-
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Since these are 'expected 1 rates they are not directly 
observable. Meiselman did not employ any scheme 
based on previous observed rates to generate expected 
values because according to the hypothesis he wanted
to test "...expectations are already impounded and
23 discounted in the term structure ". Thus the 'forward'
rates revealed by the market and embodied in the yield- 
to-maturity curve, he takes as unbiased indicators of the
24 
market's expected rates . The equation that he actually
fitted was:
t r n -t-l r n = a + Mt R t -t-l r t> 3 ' 14 - b
wh 8 re rt n is the forward rate implicit in the term
structure and calculated from equation 3.13.C and the
constant term allows for the possibility of liquidity
25 preierence
Meiselman 1 s hypothesis is an attempt to explain changes 
in the term structure by changes in expectations about 
short-term interest rates. It is clear, however, that to 
have such a link it is necessary that any change in 
expectations is acted upon; in other words, market 
participants, both borrowers and lenders, must alter the 
composition of their portfolios and the maturity structure 
of their debt; a step which will in turn alter the term 
structure of the previous period and thereby embody in the 
new one the new expected one-period rates. Meiselman's 
attention was directed at the lending side of the market; 
but as with the traditional formulation the analysis on the 
supply side is completely analogous. If borrowers find that 
they are wrong in their expecations about short-term 
interest rates they will revise their expectations in pro- 
portion to the error. If the actual interest rate turns out 
to be greater than was expected then expectations of 
future one-period rates are revised upwards. The 
difficulty lies in trying to specify in what
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ways a local authority will alter its borrowing behaviour, 
according to the premises of the Meiselman Hypothesis, 
in response to an upward revision of expected one-period 
rates. The effect on borrowing can be seen more clearly 
if in the f irst instance attention is concentrated on a first 
period decision and expected long-term interest rates. 
For instance , since the long-term rate is an average of 
current and forward short-term rates, if expected short- 
term rates are revised upwards expected, long-term interest 
rates will also be revised upwards. Thus if there is an 
error in the forecasting of the one -period rate the expected 
long-term interest rate at ' t+1 ' will also be revised. At 
the beginning of the first-period, ' t+1' , the expectation will 
be that at the margin the expected unit capital cost of 
borrowing for ' n f periods will be the same as the expected 
capital cost of borrowing for one period and then borrowing 
for 'n-1 1 periods at the beginning of the subsequent period. 
That is:
[3 .15.
n
where t n-1 (t+1) is the long-term rate of interest 
expected to prevail at the beginning of the second period
n
and t It is the short-term interest rate prevailing for the 
first period. If the forecasted long-term rate turns out to 
under-estimate the actual long-term rate at 't+1 1 expectat- 
ions, according to Meiselman, are revised upwards. The 
expectation that the long-term interest rate will be higher 
in the future leads to the inference that borrowers will 
choose to fund while interest rates are low; and so tempor- 
ary borrowing will be a negative function of the forecasting 
error. The increased supply of long-term debt will raise 
long-term interest rates and lower short-term interest rates 
and produce a steeper term structure; which is the same 
profile obtained from an analysis of the behaviour of inves 
ors .
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An extention of the argument to many issue periods for 
debt raises a number of difficulties. Although expectations 
are regarded as referring to periods over a considerable 
period of time into the future it is not clear how revisions 
in such expectations are related to changes in the maturity 
composition of debt. Such a relationship could be formalis- 
ed as:-
t B n ~ t - 1 B n = f ( t r n "" t - 1 f n) [s.lS.b]
TD
where t n are net amounts of debt issued at time ! t ' 
for issue periods 1 to n . Changes in the amount issued, 
then, within each bond of the maturity spectrum will be 
related to revisions in expected interest rates. While, 
however, it appears that net short-term debt -should be 
reduced if expectations turn out to under-estimate the 
actual rate, and very long-term debt increased, there is no 
certainty as to what happens in the middle range between 
the two. There is an additional complication involved in 
the use of the revision in expectations as an independent 
variable in ary model explaining the pattern of borrowing. 
There is, by assumption, a simultaneous relationship 
between the new term structure incorporating the revised 
expectations and tie pattern of borrowing. How important 
this bias will be depends upon how significant local 
authority borrowing is in the capital and money markets.
3:3 ,c MalkJel's Hypothesis
Malkiel (1966) has proposed an alternative formulation of 
the expectations hypothesis. He takes the view that 
although the expectational approach is in principle correct 
a more reliable explanation of the term structure of interest 
rates can be achieved if a short decision period is 
substituted for the long-run horizon implicit in the
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traditional view; and if more attention is paid to the role 
of expected bond price changes rather than expected future 
short-term interest rates. Thus investors will pay particu- 
lar attention to bond price movements when deciding 
whether to invest at the short end or the long end of the 
market; and in turn this will determine the term structure.
In forming a judgement about likely movements in bond 
prices, Malkiel suggests that the investor has in mind, 
what he calls, an 'expected normal range of interest rates'. 
This is a frame of reference against which likely changes 
in specific current interest rates can be judged* In this 
way an opinion can be formed of 'expected 1 specific 
interest rate changes which provide guidance on possible 
capital gains or losses from investing in different parts 
of the market. If it is believed that interest rates are go- 
ing to rise to the upper bound of the normal range it will 
imply for investors as a whole that short bonds are 
relatively more attractive to hold than long bonds. The 
short rate will fall while the long rate will rise. The 
yield gap will be positive and will be reflected in an 
upward-sloping yield to maturity curve. Alternatively,if 
the rate of interest is expected to fall to the lower bound 
of the normal range, investors will attempt to divest 
themselves of short bonds in an endeavour to increase 
holdings of long-term bonds which promise to produce the 
greater capital gain. There will emerge a downward sloping 
yield to maturity curve.
The actual hypothesis which he tested was that when the 
level of interest rates is near the upper bound of the 
normal range, the spread between long and short rates 
will be small and possibly negative. When the level of 
rates is near the lower bound the spread will be relatively 
large. By taking the long term interest rate as
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representative of the general level of interest rates, 
Malkiel was able to write the postulated relationship as
R R = i 
s(t) (RL(t) " RLN(t) )
- ULUN(t)
[3.16,a]
where R and R are as before, RT L (t) b -L-.J.
lower bound of the normal range and R T ~ T , j. L u J.N! fv
upper bound
is the
is the
** ^.
Equation [3.16.a] is not in an operational form and it 
is therefore necessary to indicate how the normal range is 
to be calculated. Malkiel suggested that investors form 
their expectations of the limits of the normal range by 
taking some average of rates over some period in the past, 
with the more immediate past being more influential, and 
adding a specific number of standard deviations to each side 
of the average t The standard deviations are calculated 
over a very long period of time and are considered constant 
from year to year. Thus the upper and lower bounds of the 
normal range can be written as:
RLUN(t)
RLN(t)
= Rn
L(t)
where R is the moving average of long-term interest
rates and is equivalent to Rj/t \ . of section 3:1, the 
expected or normal long-term interest rate; and k is a 
constant. Substituting [3.16.b] into [3.16.a.J gives 
the amended hypothesis:
_n
RL(t) " RS(t) RL(t)
2k
[3.16.cl
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A straight-forward approximation to equation [s.IG.c] 
is:
RL(t) " RS(t) ~ f (RL(t)
and linearising gives:
RL(t) - RS(t) =ao +a i (RL(t)
The only remaining task is to specify how R . . is toL(t;
be calculated. Malkiel proposed thai investors have in 
mind when forming their expectations the course of 
interest rates over the previous ten to fifteen years. A 
number of averages, both arithmetic and geometric/ were 
then calculated and used in the regressions that he ran.
Although Malkiel conducts his analysis largely from the 
point of view of the investor he does acknowledge that 
the same arguments can be employed on the borrower's 
side. "An analysis of the introduction of expectations 
to the supply side of the market is completely analogous 
to our previous argument. If issuers of securities believe 
that interest rates are relatively high compared with their 
expectations of what constitutes a normal range, they will 
tend, to whatever extent possible, to issue short-term- 
securities rather than longer bonds. Conversely, if rates 
appear attractive, issuers will take advantage of the 
opportunity and issue long term securities. The motivation 
of issuers cannot be cast in terms of price risks but must
rather be explained by considering the desire to minimise
9 fi 
long-run financing costs."
This describes in a nutshell the model outlined in 
section 3:1. One difference between it and that proposed
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by Malkiel is in the use of a 'normal 1 or expected 
interest rate. While Malkiel employs an average of 
past rates to measure the normal rate, in section 3:1 
an adaptive expectations hypothesis was used to generate 
a distributed lag scheme which was then rendered estimat- 
eable by a Koyck transformation.
27 Dodds and Ford have pointed out that the introduction
of expectations to the supply side in Malkiel 1 s hypothesis 
means that the difference between the long and the short 
rate is accentuated at each point in time. "Thus, suppose 
that the long rate is near the lower bound of the normal 
range. Just looking at the investors' side of the market 
would produce the conclusion, according to the Malkiel 
hypothesis, that the current long rate should stand above 
the current short rate. Investors will move into the short 
end of the market and out of the long end. ... Borrowers 
'ought 1 to borrow long-term, in which case the supply of 
long bonds will increase and the supply of shorts may fall, 
These supply changes will aggravate the decline in the 
price of long bonds and the decrease in short yields. The
yield-gap will be larger than it would have been if supply
28had been passive; but it will- be of the same sign"
The possibility could be tested that in the market for all 
forms of local authority debt, because supply is not passive 
the yield-gap is accentuated at all points in time. 
An alternative way in which the Dodds-Ford hypothesis 
could be tested would be to compare the market in local 
authority debt with a market in which supply sometimes 
actually off-sets demand with the consequence that the 
yield-gap is narrowed at all points in time. Such a 
market might be that in government securities in the U.K.
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Goodhart (1974) has argued that the view which the 
monetary authorities have taken, before IS of how
investors in financial markets act is very much that
29 propounded by Malkiel . According to the monetary
authorities, investors have short planning periods and 
are influenced decisively by expectations of short-term 
capital gain and loss. This has meant that they have 
been very reluctant to attempt to lead the market by 
buying and selling gilt-edged securities. They have 
preferred, instead, a policy of continuously 'leaning into 
the wind 1 . This means in practice that, in terms of the 
discussions above, any tendency on the part of investors 
to switch between government bonds of differing maturities 
has been accommodated by the monetary authorities to 
prevent wide fluctuations in bond prices. The moderating 
influence on the market of official intervention should mean 
that the resulting term structure at any moment in time 
will be different from that which would otherwise have 
prevailed as a consequence of the climate of expectations 
at that moment in time.
If it is to be maintained that the spread between short- 
term and long-term interest rates in the local authority 
market will differ from the spread in the market for 
government debt because the mo letary authorities pursue 
a policy of leaning into the wind while local authorities, 
because they switch between each end of the market in 
response to changes in expected capital costs, actually 
accentuate the yield-gap in the market for local authority 
debt, it is necessary to assume that a degree of capital 
market imperfection exists sufficient to ensure that 
arbitrage does not erase any differential between long rates 
and short rates in the two markets that is not due solely
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to differences in marketability and risk of default.
It is possible, moreover, that the influence of the supply 
of local authority debt will differ as between the long and 
short end of the market. A considerable and, since 1964, 
gradually rising proportion of local authority long term 
funds have been obtained from the P.W.L.B. The monetary 
authorities have exercised, in addition, control over the 
terms and timing of local authority issues of negotiable 
bonds and stocks and these factors may weaken-the impact 
on the long end of the market. At the short end, on the 
other hand, despite the restrictions on temporary borrowing 
described in the previous chapter, local authority 
borrowing is likely to have more effect.
3:3»aThe Hedging Pressure Theory
In its extreme form the Hedging Pressure Theory (also 
called 'Market Segmentation 1 or 'Preferred Habitat 1 ) is in 
complete opposition to the traditional Expectations Theory, 
It is maintained that the difference between yields on bonds 
of differing maturities is caused by an imbalance between 
the maturity structure of debt demanded by investors and 
that supplied by borrowers. Lenders (and possibly 
borrowers) do not shift up and down the maturity spectrum 
in response to differences in expected returns. Instead 
investors have 'preferred habitats' determined solely by the 
structure of their liabilities. If an investor's liabilities 
are primarily long-term then, it is argued, holdings of 
assets will be primarily long-term. This, of course, is 
subject to the proviso that there is an adequate supply 
of long-term debt. If there is not then the investor will 
be unable to match fully assets and liabilities. Investors, 
then, will not be influenced by expectations; even if they 
form expectations of future interest rates, they do not act
upon them.
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A weaker version of the Hedging Pressure Theory allows 
for some switching out of preferred habitats when interest 
rates move sufficiently to outweigh the desire to match 
assets and liabilities. Alternatively the theory can be 
formulated so that investors have a preferred habitat 
range and short run expectations will stimulate movement 
between bonds but only within the relevant maturity range.
Whichever interpretation of the Hedging Pressure Theory 
is chosen, one prediction results: ceteris paribus, the 
term structure is determined by the maturity structure of 
outstanding debt. Supply, therefore, is the critical factor 
in this theory.
It is not altogether clear whether speculative activity on 
the part of borrowers, in a situation in which investors 
have 'preferred habitats' for their assets, is a sufficient 
condition to generate a term structure in accordance with 
the postulates of the traditional theory. That this 
possibility has not been considered in the literature is an 
indication that it is felt to be implausible. Concentration 
on government bond yields makes it unlikely that this 
possibility would suggest itself since governments , as" has 
already been noted, do not act in the ways postulated by 
the traditional theory.
Malkiel in an analysis of the supply side of market comes 
to the conclusion that bond issuers (borrowers) are unlikely 
to move much up and down the maturity spectrum because, 
what he calls, new - issue costs are so high that the 
saving in interest rate charges arising from speculative
movement s are unlikely to be sufficient to tempt borrowers
30 
out of their preferred habitat area . He acknowledges,
therefore, that the advocates of the Hedging Pressure 
Theory are probably correct in asserting that, in the U.S.A
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at least, private - and municipal - bond issuers do not 
appear to have been induced to make long-run changes 
in the maturity composition of their debt* He does, 
however, point out that the high level of transactions 
costs does not exclude anticipatory or delayed funding. 
That is to say, if interest rates are high borrowers will
postpone issuing bonds until rates fall; or if rates are
31 low they will attempt to bring issues forward . Thus,.
"The timing of long-term debt issues may still conform to
32the behaviour suggested by the expectations theory" ;
so that the flexibility afforded borrowers to adjust the
timing of their long-term bond issues will allow
33
"expectations to exert considerable influence"
Malkiel'-s comments apply to the institutional features of 
the American economy which differ in some crucial aspects 
from those in the U.K. If we consider the local authority 
money market, its highly organised nature and the volume 
of transactions seems to reduce transactions costs. The 
credit-worthiness of local authorities enables them, 
furthermore, to move between the short end and the long 
end of the market without too much difficulty - subject to 
the restrictions on temporary .borrowing, on revenue bills, 
and on negotiable bonds and stocks operated by the 
monetary authorities. This has meant that local authorities 
in the U.K. have been able to shorten the maturity 
composition of their debt in the short-term and in the 
long-term.
In the U.K. at least then, there is some indication that one 
sector, the local authority, acts in a way which is 
contrary to the behavioural tenets of the Hedging Pressure 
Theory. It has already been suggested that their borrowing 
behaviour is influenced by expectations about the future 
course of interest rates. This is not, however, a
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sufficient condition to refute the Hedging Pressure Theory 
of the term structure of interest rates or for that matter 
to establish the expectations type theory. The evidence 
can only be indicative and how important it is found to 
be will depend on how influential local authority borrowing 
is relative to the total flow of funds.
3:3.e Recent Empirical Evidence On The Term Structure: The 
Influence Of The Supply Of Debt_______________
Much of the recent work on both the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of the term structure, in contradistinct- 
ion to the Meiselman approach / has concentrated on 
explaining the difference between the short and the long 
rate by weighted values of past interest rates - much on the 
lines developed by Malkiel but with some important 
differences. The seminal work is that of De Leeuw (1965). 
From demand equations for short-term and long-term 
government debt, he derived a reduced form equation which 
included as explanatory variables amounts of debt 
outstanding in different maturity classes, changes in these 
amounts and expected capital gains. His main contribution 
was in the estimation of capital gains. He first employed 
the Keynesian notion of a normal rate towards which the 
long term interest rate was expected to gravitate. This 
form has already been discussed above. Duesenberry 
(1958), however, has pointed out that logically this 
hypothesis could be reversed so that a rise in interest 
rates led to an expectation of a further rise and vice 
versa. Expectations, therefore, could be extrapolative as 
well as regressive.
From the premise that the long-term interest rate is equal 
to the short-term interest rate plus the expected capital 
gain which is taken to be proportional to the expected fall
120
34 in the long-term interest rate
we can write
RL(t) = R S(t) L(t) 3 .17. a
Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967) have written De Leeuw's 
formulation of the 'normal' rate as:
.n m
1 ',
R 11 = ~ ,, R - 
L(t) v ^J i L(t-i) + (i-v) c !3.17.bj
where the normal rate is approximated by the average of 
the long rate over the previous 'm' periods and a con- 
stant, C, which can be thought of as a very long-run normal 
level. The regressive hypothesis can then be formalised 
as:
A R e - a (Rn - R ) A KL(t) d l ^KL(t) KL(t) J
- =   ,, R j. n-vi r - R
l v f^ i L(t-i) L(t) i 1 i
[3.17.c]
a is a measure of the speed with which R . . is 
expected to return to R
The Extrapolative hypothesis, on the other hand, can be 
expressed as:
e n ^ 
A RL(t) = 3 2 (R L(t) ' C\ RL(t _ l)') 
1 J.
where ' n ' should be appreciably smaller than ' m' and 
the weights, X. / decline much more rapidly to reflect 
the influence of recent past rates. Since it is quite 
conceivable that expectations contain both extrapolative 
and regressive elements the right-hand sides of equations 
[3.17.c] and [3.17.di can be combined to obtain:
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A P. 6 = - R   H R
° L(t) o L(t) + ^,i KL(t-i) 4- dc [3.17.e]
where a = (a. - aj
o 12.
b. = a, vu - a_ *'x- i i 1 i 2
and d = a (1-v)
De Leeuw tested various lag structures with the 
expectation that for averages spread over many past 
quarters the coefficient on the difference between the 
current long-term interest rate and weighted averages of 
past long-term interest rates would be negative, while 
for averages bunched in recent quarters the coefficient 
would be positive.
O 
Modigliani and Sutch have made a number of 
modifications to De Leeuw 1 s basic model. First, rather 
than estimating the lag structure by choosing various values
for the lag coefficients they have employed the Almon
37 Interpolation Technique which involves the calculation
of Lagrangian interpolation polynomials which are used to 
weight past values of the variable whose lag is to be 
estimated. Secondly, they overcame the difficulty of
explaining the long-term interest rate in terms of lagged
38
values of itself . They proposed that R . . be expressedL\tj
as a function of R . and a weighted sum of all previousS (t)
short-term interest rates. Thus:
RL(t) = bo + bl RS(t) + tbi RS(t-i) [3.18]
1 J-
As Modigliani and Sutch put it "Whether it is more 
convenient and efficient to approximate the basic model
by a long lag on the long rate or on the short rate is,
in the last analysis, a purely pragmatic and empirical
39 issue" ". They were able to arrive at the basic equation
of De Leeuw which explains the spread by simply 
substracting ^5(i) from the two sides of equation U- '^ j 
the only change being that the coefficient on KS(JO 
on the right-hand side becomes ('"*£>, ).
The model of De Leeuw and the modifications made to it 
by Modigliani and Sutch suggest a number of ways in 
which the Radcliffian model of section 3:1 can be improved 
upon. First, the adaptive expectations model is implicitly 
regressive; but it may well be that if the long-term 
interest rate rises there may be the expectation on the 
part of local authorities that it will rise further before 
eventually falling back towards its normal level. The 
problem lies in determining how such an expectation will 
influence the relative supplies of long and short term 
debt. If there is the expectation at the beginning of the 
first period that the long-term interest rate at the beginning 
of the second period will be higher than now funding may 
well occur. If, however, the current rate is above the 
'normal 1 rate local authorities could choose to ride out the
further rise by borrowing for two periods. Even if,
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therefore, expectations are extrapolative a rise in
interest rates in the first period will increase temporary 
borrowing. The same need not be the case if the rate of 
interest falls and there was the expectation that 
would fall further; since local authorities might choose to 
postpone funding until the interest rate had returned to 
its normal level. As a result there is an asymetrical 
response of borrowing to a unit change in the rate of 
interest which may prove very difficult to capture. 
Nevertheless, the Almon Interpolation Technique may be a 
better way of estimating the lag structure of interest rates;
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especially in the light of the econometric difficulties 
involved in estimating equation [3.9J and the structures 
of Bierwag and Grove.
Secondly, the use of lagged values of the short-term rather 
than the long-term rate of interest by Modigliani and Sutch 
suggests that such a procedure would be applicable to the 
determination of temporary borrowing. This question is 
taken up in more detail in the next chapter.
The studies of Modigliani and Sutch and of De Leeuw 
refer to the U.S.A. Rowan and O'Brien (1970) and 
Hamburger (1971) have used the same framework for the 
U.K. They differ, however, in the way in which they   
proceed from equation [3.17.a] . Substituting equation
f.3.17.e] into equation [3.17.a] and solving for 
gives:
1 +pa 
o * o
2 m
I.bi RL(t-i)
1 + a 1=1 
o
which is the form Modigliani and Sutch arrived at before 
they switched to short-term interest rates as in equation
[3.181 
  Instead of estimating the distributed lag 
directly Rowan and O'Brien chose to describe b, as an 
exponential decay function of the form:
b =  X(l-X) 1 '1 ; i = m [s.lS.b]i
Substituting this value into [s.lS.aj , lagging the result 
once and multiplying by (1-JO and substracting the product 
yields (since this is a Koyck transformation).
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RL(t) = Bo + Bl RS(t) + B 2 RS(t-l) + B3 RL(t-l)
[s.lS.c]
where
o
B, = 1
B 2
1 + a
1 + a 
o
Since this reduced form is overdetermined Rowan and 
O'Brien proposed that the equation:
RL(t) " RL(t-l). = Bo + B l (RS(t) " RL(t-l) )
+ B 2 (RS(t-l) "
be tested and its explanatory power compared with that of 
equation J3.18.cj . They pointed out that it is a 
necessary although not sufficient condition for the 
acceptance of their model that the variance explained by 
the former is not significantly greater than that explained 
by the latter. Hamburger has also proposed that another 
test of the distributed lag model is that does not equal 
zero, A comparison, therefore, of:
RL(t) ~ RL(t-l) = Bo + Bl (RS(t) " RS(t-l) )
[3.18.e]
a first difference relationship which implies that X
V» t«
is equal to zero, with equation |3.18.dJ provides a 
further test of the model.
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42 Hamburger concluded on the basis of the tests which
he made of the Rowan-O'Brien model that there was no 
support for the hypothesis that there is a systematic 
relationship between past movements in rates and expect- 
ations of the future . Hamburger attempted to provide 
an alternative approach to the explanation of the long-term 
interest rate in the U.K. He derived his explanation from 
the macro-economic approach -to the determination of inter- 
est rates developed by Ball (1965), Feldstein and Ecksteh 
(1970), Hamburger and Silber (1969) and Walters (1966). 
The methodological characteristics of these studies differ 
markedly from those of term structure theories. Reduced- 
form equations are derived from models which include as 
variables income, the supply and demand for money, the 
expected rate of inflation and past values of the interest 
rate. - Because of the open nature of the U.K. economy 
and London's role as a major financial centre, Hamburger 
proposed that the euro-dollar interest rate and the forward 
exchange rate should also be included in an equation to 
explain the long-term interest in the U.K. In fact he only 
included among the independent variables, with which he 
sought to explain changes in the con sol rate, the change 
in the euro-dollar rate and the current and lagged-once 
change in the forward discount on sterling.
Okun (1963) in a study of the effects of changes in the 
supply of long and short-term government securities on 
long and short-term interest rates in the U.S.A. specified 
separate equations for each rate that included income and 
money stock as explanatory variables.; A more complete 
explanation of interest rates in the U.K. would have to 
include not only the influence of external factors but also 
the effect of the level of internal activity and relative 
supplies of long and short-term debt. Hutton (1972) has 
attempted to incorporate the first two aspects in an
equation to explain the change in the local authority
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short-term interest rate as part of a model of U.K.
44 
short -term capital flows. From reaction functions of
the monetary authorities who attempt to maintain a 
desirable level of reserves and of domestic economic 
activity, Hutton proposes that the change in the local
authority short-term rate, R c ,.> , is dependent upon0(1;
changes in reserves, changes in the euro-dollar rate, 
lagged values of changes in income, the lagged spot rate 
on sterling, the change in the forward rate, and the lagged
visible balance of trade, A modified version of Hutton 's
45
model will be used of the form
ARS(t) = bo + bl* Red(t) + b 2 AC (t) + b3 ^
b4 ^(t-l) + b 5 TB (t)
where AR -/.\ is the change in euro -dollar rate, AC,(t)
is the change in the forward discount on sterling, .i A 
is a distributed lag on changes in income, VB, . 
the visible trade balance and TS, . local authority 
net temporary borrowing. It has been suggested therefore 
that the maturity composition of local authority borrowing 
will influence changes in the short-term interest rate.
*
As it stands the interrelationship between /I R , . and
i
TS, x is indirect since in equation I3»9.i the short- 
term interest rate only appears in the yield differential 
term, RT (+) " RSft) * This difficulty can be overcome 
if the model suggested by Malkiel's hypothesis is employed 
so that temporary borrowing is a function of the difference 
between the current interest rate and its normal level, and 
where drawing on the study of Modigliani and Sutch the 
interest rate is defined as short-term; and in which, making 
tie somewhat extreme assumption that the normal short-term
interest rate can be approximated by R , n , the
o^t-i;
temporary borrowing function can now be written as:
(t) !S(t) + 9 2 B (t)
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Both equations can be estimated by an appropriate 
econometric technique such as two-stage-least-squares. 
It should be noted though that equation [3.20] may be
seriously mis-specified which may throw doubt on the
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estimates that result . The change in the long-term- 
interest rate can be accounted for in a similar manner 
with the long-term interest rate replacing the short-term 
interest rate in the two equations. Since an increase in 
temporary borrowing is understood to increase the short- 
term and depress the long-term interest rate and vice 
versa, it is to be expected that the ordinary least squares 
estimate of the coefficient on the change in the short- 
term interest rate in equation [3.2OJ will overstate the real 
value of the coefficient; while it will understate the real 
value of the coefficient on a change in the long-term 
interest rate e
3 .4 Disaggregation Of Short-Term And Long-Term Borrowing
The analysis of the proceeding sections has been based 
upon a division of local authority borrowing into that 
made on a temporary basis, of less than one year, and 
that on a long-term basis, of more than one year. This 
particular level of aggregation served a useful analytical 
purpose in focusing attention on the one-period decisbn- 
making process and enabling some fairly substantive 
propositions to be derived about the manner in which local 
authorities would choose to borrow in response to changes 
in monetary conditions. The category of long-term debt 
includes bonds, stock and mortgages which possess 
differing characteristics and which are taken up by varying 
sectors including the central government which purchases 
mortgages through the offices of the Public Works Loan
Board. Ideally, from the point of view of an analysis 
of the maturity structure of
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local authority borrowing, it would be better if long-term 
borrowing were disaggregated by its term to maturity. 
Gross figures for long-term borrowing are available on a 
term to maturity basis; net figures, however, are only 
differentiated by their type (stock, mortgage, etc) and by 
their source (banking sector, P.W.L.B., industrial and 
commercial companies, etc). The following disaggregation 
is, therefore, proposed.
(a) Net borrowing from the P.W.L.B., usually for more 
than ten years in a non-negotiable form.
(b) Net borrowing by the issue of stock and negotiable
bonds. These two are combined because they are close 
substitutes for each other in the sense that the gradual 
introduction of negotiable bonds after 1964 has been 
at the expense of stock issues.
(c) Net borrowing by the sale of mortgages and local
bonds. These are non-negotiable instruments and are 
close substitutes for each other ever since the local 
bond was introduced in 1964 with the intention of 
superceding the antiquatQd mortgage.
Disaggregation of net long-term borrowing in this way 
does raise the possibility that some light can be thrown 
on the determinants of the supply of negotiable bonds and 
stock. The concern with which the monetary authorities 
regarded the volume of stock and negotiable bonds issued 
by the local authorities has been described along with the 
reasons for it in chapter 2. In any regressions which 
seek to explain the supply of this form of debt some 
allowance needs to be made for the effects of the control 
exercised by the monetary authorities over timing and 
terms of issue. Very little, however, is known of the
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criteria by which the monetary authorities decide the 
appropriate amount of new issues they will permit within 
a certain period. Before the introduction of 'Competition 
and Credit Control' the primary reason why they controlled
the timing and terms of local authority issues sprang from
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a desire to preserve an orderly market for government debt.
If the borrowing requirement of the central government were 
very large at any one time it might leave little scope for 
issues of local authority debt. Equally / if the monetary 
authorities were being successful in placing government 
debt on a rising market they might look more favourably 
upon local authority issues.
Another constraint upon the supply of this category of debt 
is that a local authority is limited in the extent to which 
it can issue negotiable bonds by its outstanding loan debt. 
These limitations are set out in Table 2.8. It is 
difficult to measure such a constraint other than by 
assuming that it will be captured by the use of total net 
borrowing as an explanatory variable.
As can be seen from the discussion in chapter 2 lending 
by the P.W.L.B. has been subjected to numerous forms of 
control. In particular the gradual increase in quota 
entitlements and the phasing of loans during each financial 
year imply that considerable difficulties may arise from 
trying to identify the influence of interest rate expectations 
on local authority borrowing from the Board. Some ways 
in which dummy variable s might be used to handle these 
complications will be considered in the next chapter.
Mortgages and local bonds are the forms of long-term debt 
most free from restriction and there is no need to include 
in the supply function any additional variables, other than
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those specified in previous models.
Supply functions for each component of long-term borrowing 
can then be written in the most straight-forward manner as:
SB (t) = bo + bl (RL(t) - RL(t) ' + b2 B (t) + b3 Z (t)
[3.20.aj
MB (t) = Co + Cl (RL(t) - RL(t)> + C 2 B (t)
[3.20.b]
tVV (t) do ^ d l lRL(t) RL(i) J + d2 B (t) 
+ d3 X (t)
[3.20.c]
where i- s net issues of negotiable bonds and stock, 
MB, . mortgages and local bonds, ^W, » loans from 
the P.W.L.B.;"Z,» a vector of variables which influence
h \ , probably including controls and ceilings on 
issues; and X,^ is a vector of variables that account 
for the phasing and for the changes in quota entitlements.
the equations in this.form, however, raises a 
number of important theoretical problems about the correct 
features of a model of debt selection behaviour in which a 
borrowing requirement has to be met. The first problem 
concerns the exclusion of any relative interest rates among 
the set of explanatory variables. In the former model in 
which there was only long-term and short-term debt it was 
sufficient to explain the ratio of one to the other almost 
completely in terms of expectations about the future course 
of interest rates. Since, however, the disaggregation of 
net long term borrowing outlined above has been made 
necessary by the availability of data and does not coincide 
exactly with the maturity structure of long-term debt,
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relative interest rates on loans of the same maturity will 
become influential. For example, if in a given climate 
of expectations a local authority wants to issue a ten 
years bond or mortgage it will seek to borrow, subject 
to the restrictions described above , from the cheapest 
source. Since quota loans from the P.W.L.B. have been 
obtained at rates reflecting government credit they have 
been generally cheaper than mortgages and local bonds so 
that with the upward trend in lending by the Board sales 
of mortgages and local bonds have declined. On the other 
hand P.W.L.B. loans and negotiable bonds and stock are 
unlikely to be substitutes except in the expectational sense 
because the Board rarely makes loans for less than ten 
years while the majority negotiable bonds have a life of 
rarely more than two to three years .
The second problem relates to the necessity that the total 
effect of a difference between the current and expected
interest rate summed over the whole borrowing requirement
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must equal zero . For since
B (t) = + PW (t) 
the sum of the coefficients 
a + b 1 + c 1 + d 1 [3.21.bJ
must equal zero; and it is further implied by the form of 
the model that
b + c + d = -a [3.21.CJ
1 j. J.    
This further implies that the complete list of relevant 
variables must appear in ail equations; and that if three 
equations are estimated the coefficients of the remaining
equation can be calculated. This may not be as serious 
a problem as it first appears since many of the variables 
which have been treated as peculiar to a particular equation 
are probably not measureable and therefore probably will 
have to be ignored, anyway. These issues will be taken 
up again in the next chapter.
The disaggregation of temporary debt raises slightly 
different issues from those produced by the disaggregation 
of long-term debt. The one-period decision-making frame- 
work employed in the previous sections did not accord with 
any particular period of time and there is no strong reason 
for supposing that in reality the decision period should 
coincide with the conventional definition of temporary debt 
as that incurred for less than one year. Decisions 
to borrow for a week or less or for just under a year are 
unlikely to be a reflection of the same expectations about 
the future course of interest rates. Data is available for 
temporary borrowing for up to seven days, over seven days 
and up to three months, and over three months and up to 
twelve months. Other than it being differentiated by term 
to maturity, temporary debt is also differentiated by the 
source of funds. From the point of view of monetary 
policy whether local authorities borrow by overdraft or in 
the money markets by accepting short-term deposits is 
important because of the implications it has for the level 
of clearing-bank advances. Local authorities have tended 
to switch between the use of their overdraft facilities and 
the money markets in response to the difference between 
the rate charged by clearing banks on overdrafts and the 
equivalent rate ruling in the open market. The extent to 
which local authorities are able to switch towards the use 
of overdrafts will be constrained of course by the ceiling 
on advances that the banks impose by agreement with
individual local authorities.
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Revenue bills, issued in anticipation of revenue from 
rates and government grants normally for a period of 
three months are also classified as temporary debt. It 
is not possible to separate them out from the total of 
temporary debt because figures for revenue bills are only 
available on a separate basis from the beginning of IS71. 
They differ, furthermore, from other forms of short-term 
debt in being excluded from the particular definition of 
short-term debt applicable under the 1963 Restrictions, 
and explained in chapter two. Into which part of the 
maturity spectrum revenue bills actually fall will depend 
upon where within a financial quarter they are issued, 
If a revenue bill is issued near the beginning of the 
quarter by the time the quarterly returns are made to the 
C.S.O. the revenue bill will not be very far from its 
date of redemption and may be so close as to be classi- 
fied as temporary debt on seven days notice. Equally 
if a revenue bill is issued near the end of the quarter 
and the term is more than three months then it may be 
classified as temporary debt incurred for over three and 
up twelve months. Consequently there is no obvious 
way of knowing into which part of the maturity spectrum 
revenue bills will fall at any moment in time.
The disaggregation of local authority borrowing brings 
into play a number of important influences which have 
been overlooked in the abstract model building of previous 
sections. One other factor, moreover, which has not yet 
been considered adequately in this chapter is the effect 
upon temporary borrowing of the 1963 Restrictions. These 
restrictions and their possible effects were considered at 
some length in chapter two. It was noted there that whether
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or not the restrictions on temporary borrowing have had 
any real effect will depend upon what the level of 
temporary borrowing would have been in their absence. 
This question will be taken up and considered in the next 
chapter. It should be noted that a market which has been 
characterised by rapid growth and frequent institutional and 
statutory changes is likely to present many difficulties for 
econometric study. Since, nevertheless, attempts have 
been made to apply econometric techniques to. a variety 
of aspects of the monetary system all of which have 
suffered similar transformations, there are few reasons to 
suppose that the local authority market will prove to be 
any less tractable.
3:5 The Demand For Local Authority Debt
The primary concern of this chapter has been to specify 
a number of models, or perhaps a number of variants of 
a basic model, that purport to explain the supply of variou 
categories of local authority debt. No attention has been 
paid to the demand side. This omission could be justified 
by the argument that the supply of local authority debt is 
not of sufficient moment in the capital and money markets 
to warrant any need to specify a larger model in which the 
rate of interest is endogenous. The question whether the 
rate of interest is exogenous to the models of local 
authority borrowing has already been considered above; and 
the reduced-form approach does embody at least some 
demand influences. Nevertheless it would require a fully 
detailed econometric model of the financial system to 
produce a complete answer; since this is not within the 
scope of this study there will be substituted in its place 
a very brief review of a number of partial studies of the 
portfolio behaviour of some financial institutions; and in 
particular those portfolio's into which local authority
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debt enters as an asset; and a very brief mention of the 
Sheffield model of the U.K. financial system.
A now common approach to the study of financial
49 institutions, pioneered by Parkin among others , is to
try to explain their portfolio and debt selection behaviour 
within a "...simple but strongly specified model..." 
that places particular emphasis upon decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty. The approach itself owes its 
origins to the earlier theoretical work of Markowitz (1959) 
and Tobin (1958, 1945) and usually postulates that the 
financial institution under study possesses a utility 
function such that the aim is to maximise its expected 
value subject to a balance sheet constraint; this equality 
constraint requires that the total of assets is equal to the 
total of liabilities. From this constrained maximisation 
framework demand functions for assets and supply functions 
for liabilities are derived. The first studies were of the 
clearing banks and of discount houses and local authority
securities did not appear among the list of assets in their
51 52 portfolios . A more recent study , of Building Societies,
does include both short-term and long-term local authority 
debt as assets. The empirical results, however, were 
disappointing for the demand equations for local authority 
debt. The own-rate coefficient for local authority short- 
term debt was perverse, though not at a significant level, 
while the own-rate coefficient for long-term debt was also 
perverse and at a very significant level. In some more 
recent work which extends these results Ghosh (1974) still
finds no significant own-rate coefficients of the correct
53 
sign for short-term and long-term local authority debt.
It would be very premature to suggest that these results 
are a partial consequence of the implicit assumption that 
supplies of local authority debt are exogenous but the 
possibility cannot be ruled out completely.
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Clayton, et.al., have developed a general equilibrium
54 
model of the financial system in the U.K. \ It is a
nine sector model containing sixteen categories of assets- 
liabilities. Attention will be given only to their treatment 
of local authority debt. First they aggregate over all forms 
of local authority debt but do not dispute the contention 
that disaggregation is desirable. Second, because local 
authority debt is the only item to appear in the balance 
sheet of all sectors of the model it was chosen, for 
convenience, to assume the role of residual item. It 
could then be found from the balance-sheet identity after 
estimation. The first results reported were those for a 
pilot model and it was acknowledged that further work was 
required. One direction this took .was to try to allow for 
the effects of the funding of government debt by separating 
government securities into short-term and long-term; and 
thus explore the effect of changes in the maturity of debt 
on the term structure of interest rates. The outcome was 
published in Dodds and Ford (1974) .
From the point of view of local authority debt 
the Dodds and Ford model provides a far better framework 
for testing the proposition that changes in relative supplies 
of long and short-term local authority debt alter the term 
structure. As it is, their concern is only with the influence 
of supplies of government debt. This being so they take 
the view that supplies of local authority debt can be 
regarded as exogenous to their model; clearly this does 
not accord with the explanation of the supply of local 
authority debt employed in this chapter; how far this view 
is from reality is an empirical matter and some light will 
be thrown on it in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this chapter the models developed in chapter three are tested 
against quarterly data from 1961 (111) to 1973 (111). The precise 
form of the data and their sources are described in appendix B.
With the exception of that derived from the Meiselman approach, 
the hypotheses used to account for the maturity structure of local 
authority borrowing are all of a kind differing only in the type of 
variables included and the form by which the distributed lag 
structure is approximated. Section 4:1 reports some results for the 
Radcliffe model, the Malkiel model, the Modigliani-Sutch model anc 
the Meiselman model of temporary borrowing . The question whethe 
the restrictions on temporary borrowing have had any measurable 
impact is taken up in section 4:2 and. the period during which there 
were no restrictions is compared with the period during which 
restrictions have been in force. The models tested in section 4:1 
are applied, with suitable modifications, in section 4:3 to disaggre- 
gated long-term and short-term debt. The possible way in which tr. 
pattern of local authority borrowing has altered the term structure o1 
interest rates is considered on a rudimentary level in section 4:4. 
A direct comparison, however, of the term structure in the local 
authority market with that ruling in the market for central govern- 
ment debt is postponed until chapter five when monetary policy is 
examined in greater detail.
4:1. Models of Temporary Borrowing: The Empirical Evidence
Before the results are presented three points need to be raised. 
First, allowance has to be made for the seasonal pattern 
of borrowing from the Public Works Loan Board. Normally this 
could be accounted for by the inclusion in the regressions of
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seasonal dummy variables. As was explained in chapter two, 
section while during the financial years 1965-66, 1966-67 and 
1967-68 the phasing scheme meant that a large part of quota 
entitlements were taken up between December and April, from 1958- 
69 a switch in policy, for the reasons given, meant that the bunch- 
ing of loans from the P.W.L.B. become concentrated, in the last' few 
months of the calendar year. Since if local authorities fail to take 
up a certain proportion of their quotas by the deadline they forfeited 
them, other things being equal, temporary borrowing will be less
during the relevant quarter. A single dummy variable, DQ(t), is
? therefore included in the regressions".
Secondly, it could be objected that the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis given by equation [3.8j (in chapter three), which implies
further the distributed lag given by equation [3.9J , includes in an
e
estimate of the expected rate, R T/J. X/ the current actual interestju(t)
rate, R ,. . In order to exclude R it is necessary to write the 
adaptive expectations hypothesis as:
\ £*
R L(t) ~ R L(t-l) = (1 "X) (RL(t-l) " R L(t-l)
[4.1.a]
which after manipulation gives
R [4JL.b]
This turns out to be a rather convenient formulation as will become 
clear later. Its inclusion in equation [3.8J only results in a
slight change in the coefficient b, in equation [3.9]; b now becomes
\ 3
equal to a , rather than Aa. .
The third and final point concerns the argument of Modigliani and
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Sutch that the underlying expectations model can be approximated 
by a distributed lag on short rates as well as on long rates . This
can be achieved by substituting R , » for R ,> in equation [3.9~j
An O.L.S. estimate of equation [3.9 j, with the dummy variable, is 
shown in Table 4.1. As it stands it is of little value. The 
appearance of a lagged dependent variable among the explanatory 
variables means that the O.L.S. estimates are biased and incon- 
sistent. Moreover, it is impossible to obtain a unique, consistent 
estimate of A, the coefficient of expectations, because the equation 
is over-identified. The difficulties are compounded by the coilinearity 
of lagged dependent and lagged independent variables. It is possible 
to estimate equation [3.9J subject to non-linear restrictions; but 
since an appropriate computer package has not been available some 
alternative procedures are aclopted.
The dependent variable, TB,^, can be transformed thus:
TB = TB (t)
where X is the autocorrelation coefficient and also, since an adapt- 
ive expectations framework has been used, the coefficient on
T3, .. The value of X was varied between 0.1 and 0.9 at intervals \t~~l,'  
of 0.1. This coarse search procedure was used to determine the 
approximate optimal value of A ; the criterion used was the minimi- 
sation of the standard error of estimate. The transformed function 
is listed as equation [3.9.a.J in Table (4.1) with A = 0.3. 
Although this transformation overcomes, in part, the econometric 
problems created by a lagged dependent variable the parameters
on the right-hand side are still non-linear. To overcome this
4 
additional transformed variables were obtained of the form .
B (t) = B(t) - l) 
TABLE (4.1)
The Radcliffe Model Of Net Temporary Borrowing', Long -Term Rate Of Interest - 1961(111)-1973(111) O.L.S. Estimates
Equation
3.9.a
3.9.b
Dependent Variable
TB
('t 1 - statistic in parenthesis)
-38.80 + 0.28 TB~t~ \J % £-> \J \J 
(1.37) (2.44) (1.91)
49.89 A RL(t) -i- 0.46 B (2.95) (t)
0.15 B 
(0.98) (t-1)
L(t>
-2 - 0.612 K
-39.17 + 48.10 A R 
(1.40) (2.03)
+ 50.65 (R , n - R (2.83) Mt ~~ij
-2 - 0.561
-36.81 + 56.72 R 
(1.38) (2.30)
- 129.72 DQ X
S.E.E. == 64.11
+ 0.43 B, jN - 0.15 B 
(3.07)
- 125.56 DQ 
(4.40)
- 125.16 DQ. 
(4.32) r
D.W. = 2.15
44 94 (R - R )
S.E.E. - 63.37 D.W. = 2.178 X = 0.3
°* 51 B 
(4.08)
15.33 (1.01) 0 /, S(t
2 = 0.505 S.E.E. - 67.69 D.W. - 1,89 X = 0.
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(RL(t) - RS(t)>* = (RL(t) - R S(t)> ^ (RL(t-l) - V-l)' O"*-
where A is again the autocorrelation coefficient and is allowed to 
vary between o.l and 0.9 at intervals of 0.1. Since the distributed 
lag model of equation [4.1.bj is now bciing used, the variable
A R / » remains unchanged . The second transformed function is 
 Lw ^ - -N
listed as equation [3.9.b.] in Table (4.1) with A= 0.3. With
the exception of (R ,. N - R , all the coefficients are of the
-L- \t 
correct sign and significant al the 5% level. There is no evidence 
of autocorrelation. The value of X suggests that some 70% of an 
adjustment to a divergence between the actual and the expected 
long-term interest rate occurs in the first quarter. The wrong sign
on [R_ ... - R n/ ..v)* may be due to a spurious correlation with the ( LUJ oU)j
dependent variable because as can be seen from the work of 
Malkiel and Modigliani and Sutch the spread between the long and 
the short-term interest rate can be accounted for by a distributed 
lag on past interest rates; this implies some collinearity between
and (R R0 /M )* - the more serious the closer A is to 
6 
zero .
Table (4.2) contains the results obtained for the Malkiel Model 
which is equivalent to equation [3.9,1 above with the omission of 
the lagged and current values of (R , , - R , J and therefore provides
L(t)
a means of circumventing the collinearity noted in the previous 
paragraph. The transformed equation, listed as equation L3.9.e] 
has correctly signed and significant coefficients on all the variables
That on ART /.x/ with the dropping of (RT/ .x - Rc /,\)/ is larger and L(i) ^ 
more significant than in equation [3 . 9 .£>.]. The stahdard error of 
estimate is also not significantly different which suggests that
(R - R0/ J makes no significant contribution to the explanatory 
L(t) S(t)
power of the model. There is no indication that the Malkiel model 
is rejected by the data; even so only half of the variance in net 
temporary borrowing is accounted for. This may not be too serious
TABLE (4.2)
The Malkiel Model Of Net Temporary Borrowing: Long-Term Rat^Qf Interest 1961(111)-1973(111) O.L.S. Estimates 
Equation Dependent Variable
3.9.C TB, . -31.86 + 0.23 TB,. n + 73.59 A + 0.59 B, . - 0.28 B, , - 135.67 DO
(t} (1.13) (1.93) (t "1} (2.96) Mt; (3.75) W (1.86) (4.45)
-2 = 0.562 S.E.E. = 68.09 D.W. = 1.89 R
3.9.d TB* -31.39 + 76.27 R + 0.58 B - 0.27 B . - 134.81 DQ.
(1.13) (3.40) (3.84) j (1.88) (4.49) T
-2 - 0.520 S.E.E. - 67.37 D.W. - 1.848 X = 0.2 K
3.9.e TB* -49.14 + 66.74 A R ,, + 0.52 B* - 127.55 DQ
(2.08) (2.96) (4.13) (4.44) 
-  ^
R - 0.502 S.E.E. = 67.70 D.W = 1.92 X = 0.3
r/V
144
a failing, however, since net temporary borrowing is equivalent to 
the first difference of total temporary borrowing; and it is much 
more difficult to 'explain 1 the variance of a difference than that of 
an absolute value.
It was suggested above that the models could be estimated on the
r~
basis of the short-term in place of the long-term interest rate . 
Since the Malkiel Model appears to be the most suitable form as 
suggested by the results for the long-term interest rate, Table (4.3) 
only reports results for the Malkiel Model with substituted
for AJ^,^, Again the econometric difficulties remain with the 
untransformed variation so comment will be confined to the. second 
transformation, listed as equation [3 .9.g] in Table (4.3), which is 
equivalent to the results for equation 1.3 .9 .ej in Table (4.2.). 
Although the best fit was obtained with A equal to 0.3, the same 
value as that found when the long-term interest rate was employed,
the overall fit is improved. As measured" both by R , the corrected 
coefficient of multiple correlation, and by S.E.E., the standard error 
of estimate, the short-term interest rate appears to provide a better 
proxy for the influence of expectations on the pattern of net 
temporary borrowing. This may reflect only the common tendency 
of the long-term interest rate to fluctuate less than the short- 
term interest rate. Since net temporary borrowing is subject to 
marked variation it is likely to be better correlated with movements 
in the short-term interest rate.
The work of De Leeuw/and Modigliani and Sutch, on the term 
structure of interest rates^t was proposed in chapter three, 
suggests the possibility that expectations held by local authorities 
about the future course of interest rates may be extrapolative as 
well as regressive. That is to say , if interest rates rise there 
is the chance that they will rise further; while if they fall there 
is some prospect of their falling further. From the point of view 
of the investor this will imply that extrapolative expectations will
TABLE (4.3) 
The Malkiel Model Of Net Temporary Borrowing: Short-Term Rate Of Interest 1961(111)-1973(111) O.L.S. Estimates
Equation Dependant Variable
3.9.f TB -33.88 + 0.28 TB, n + 47.64 126.02 DQ + 0.46 B , - 0.15 B,
ltj (1.31) (2.65) (t " ij (4.63) bW (4.47) t (3.01) (0.99) V
-2 = 0.627 S.E.E. - 62.78 D.W. - 2.122
3.9.g TB* -35.88 + 47.38 A R Q ,.v - 124.85 DQ. + 0.45 B*
(1.64) (4.51) bltj (4.88) (3.92) 
= 0.593 S.E.E. - 61.424 D.W. = 2.143 X = 0. K
 F
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predominate at first giving way after a short period to the influence 
of regressive expectations. It was noted, however, that as far as 
the behaviour of borrowers is concerned the response of the pattern 
of net temporary borrowing to a change in the rate of interest is 
unlikely to be symmetrical.
If there is. the expectation that a rise in the interest rate only- 
presages a further rise the borrower can borrow short-term and ride 
out the higher level of interest rates. If interest rates fall, on the 
other hand, and are expected to fall further the borrower may choose 
to leave off funding until interest rates fall to what is regarded as 
their floor.
This asymmetrical response may not be captured by the geometrical
lag profile derived from the adaptive expectations hypothesis and so
7the equations have been re-estimated using Aimon Variables . Of
course, it is not been maintained that this is likely to be a suffi- 
cient means of identifying the kinds of lag structure which are 
implied by the mixing of extrapolative and regressive components; 
the Almon Technique, however, is very flexible since it allows 
both the degree of the polynomial and the length of the lag to be 
varied and the best fitting equation selected.
The equation to be estimated, then, is of the- form:
n
TB (t) = ao + a l R (t) + bi Vi) + a 3 B (t) + 3 4 DQ (4.3)
1  1
where R. can be either the long or the short-term interest rate; (t) g
and 'n 1 takes values between five and nine .
By experimenting with various combinations of the degree of the 
polynomial, r, and the length of the lag, n, the equation that
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maximised R and minimised the S.E.E. was selected. It is
normal practice to provide the standard errors for each of the lag 
coefficients but since a computer programme to do this calculation 
was not available the actual coefficients on the Almon Variables, 
which number r+1, as well as the calculated lag coefficients are 
listed in Table (4.4). Since the scheme used to calculate the 
polynomial lag is a simplified version of the original,, a direct test 
of the correct degree of the approximating polynomial is provided 
by a test of significance of the coefficient of the r- degree term. 
For instance, equation 4.3.a. in Table (4.4) is a third degree 
polynomial over nine quarters and since there are r+1 Airnon Variables 
the 't 1 statistic on the coefficient on A4 is an appropriate test. 
Clearly the coefficient is significant. As the lag is calculated on 
long-term interest rates it is useful to compare the explanatory 
power of the equation with equation [3 .9 .e] which simply employs 
a geometric lag scheme (i.e. implying r-1). The addition of a 
polynomial lag scheme appears to have improved the fit by the
criterior of R . If the S.E.E. is used as the criterion the 
improvement is less marked. The lag profile spread over nine 
quarters indicates that the influence of expectations is clearly 
regressive in the first three quarters becoming extrapolative for 
two quarters and then regressive again. Clearly the impact of a 
deviation of the current long-term interest rate is concentrated in 
the first few quarters. See figure (4.1)
The results for a model in which the lag structure is constructed
on the short-term interest rate are an improvement but the shape
and length is substantially different. The best fit was found with 
a second degree polynomial on six quarters. The relevant equation 
is listed as 4.3.b. in Table (4.4). Again the polynomial provides 
a better fit than the simple geometric form embodied in equation 
[3.9.g]in Table (4.3).
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TABLE (4.4)
Modiglianl-Sutch Model Of Net Temporary Borrowing: Almon Variables: 
___________1963(111)-1973(111) O. L. S. Estimates______________
Long-Term Interest Rate
equation 4.3.a
TB, . - 98.04 + 0.61 B, . - 125.53 DO + 63.16 R 
(1.30) (3.68) v j (4.64) t (3.22)
+ 5* b.R_ ,. . .. £ i L(t-i)
La a Distributions
A. = -73.25 (3.86)
A - 55.48 (2.93)
A 0 = -12.152 (2.51)
A O e 795 (2.29)
-2 = 0.590
S.E.E.=65.75
D.W.= 1.66
Short-Term Interest Rate
Qtr 
t-i
t-2
t-3
t-4
t.5
t   6
t-7
t-S
Coefficient
- 73.245
- 29.126
- 4.541
5.280
5.107
- 0.290
- 6.141
  ' 0- US"
Ecru ation 4.3.b
6iB (t) = b / . b + 
(1.71)
U.Oy D,. - iOU.D^i J
(4.99) VL ' (5.54)
_^V, f 03 . /o i\ , , n
- (4.11) "^1 "S(t-i)
Lag Distributions
A ! =
A2 =
A3 =
-2 =
R
o . L . L .
D.W.
-37.90 (4
22.48 (3
-3.01 (2
0.660
= 59.95
= 1.87
.86)
.47)
.93)
Qtr
t-1
t-2
t-3
t-4
t-5
t-6
Coefficient
- 37.90
- 18.43
- 4.99
2.42
3.81
- 0.83
s/ I
t
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The final model suggested by the discussion of theories of the 
term structure of interest rates in chapter three is that based upon 
the work of Meiselman. He proposed that revisions in expectations 
about future one period retes would be correlated with errors in 
previous forecasts. For this relationship to hold it is a necessary 
condition thai market participants act upon the forecasting error, 
such that the revision in expectations is embodied in an altered 
term structure.
It was argued in chapter three (section 3.3.b) that the result of a 
upward revision in expectations about future interest rates would be 
that temporary borrowing would be reduced on the understanding that
interest rates would be higher in the future. Such a relationship,
P> 
then, can be represented simply by substituting for (R 0 ,, N - R~ 0 /.,.v)
b(l) b(t)
in the Malk'iel Model based on the short-term interest rate, the 
forecasting error (R - r ). Thus:-
L u L JL U
(t) = 5o + 31 (tRt - t-1^ + 3 2 B (t) + S3 DQ (t) [4-4.a.]
Since r is the 'forward' rate implicit in the term structure ir-i 
there are no problems created by the need to approximate the 
'expected 1 rate by past observed rates.
Equally, the independent variable in Meiselman 1 s hypothesis, the 
actual revision in expectations as revealed by the term structure, 
could be employed. The use of the latter^iowever, comes up 
against the difficulties created by the lack of data on the term 
structure of local authority interest rates and on the maturity 
structure of local authority net borrowing. In addition, the periods 
referred to in Meiselman's study, and in most subsequent work 
which followed his lead, were one year. Although so far in this 
section all the results reported have been for temporary borrowing 
defined as that for up to one year, it may well be too long a
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decision period for local authorities. Anticipating, therefore, the 
results of section [4.2,] it is proposed that a one period decision is 
encompassed by the interest rate on seven day loans; it will be 
assumed also that the two period rate is that on three month loans.
The forward rate, r , can then be calculated from the formula:
-t-i
t-irt - (1 + t-1 R 2) 2 - 1 [4. 5. a.J 
(1 + t-1 R l)
where in this instance R is the sevc-ft clay loan interest rate (one 
period rate) and R is the three month loan interest rate (two 
period rate). If the revision in expectations, (trn - t-i r n), were 
used as the independent variable it would be necessary to obtain in- 
terest rates on periods up to the 'nth'. For example, the forward 
rate t n can be calculated in principle from the formula:
t r n- (1 + t R n)n - 1 [4.5.bj 
(1 + 
But data is not available on the interest rate for the 'nth' and the 
'n-lth 1 period. Since data is available only for the first two 
periods just one revision in expectations variable can be calculated. 
This then can be regressed against the equivalent one-period borrowing 
which is temporary borrowing for up to seven days (for which other 
results are reported in section 4.2. below). /This will be denoted 
as TB7, x. Table (4.5) contains the results for the Meiselman
Model. Equation 14.4.al embodies the forecasting error as an«»  *
independent variable while the revision in expectations is embodied 
in equation [4 .4. b."] . Although the coefficients are significant and 
have similar values to those for the other models the all important 
coefficient a is of the wrong sign. It is clear that something is 
wrong. It is possible that the borrowing behaviour underlying the 
Meiselman hypothesis has been misunderstood. It is also possible 
that a spurious correlation has been picked up. In equation
[4.5.a.] if R and R move closely together, and in practice they i ^
T ) - 
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have done, the forward,rate will approximate closely to the lagged 
value of the short-term interest rate so that the forecasting error 
will approximate closely to the first difference in the short-term 
interest rate, ARg , s, which, as is clear from Table (4.3), is 
positively correlated with temporary borrowing. No other comments 
will be made about the Meiselman Model.
In summary, it appears that the best explanation of the pattern of 
net temporary borrowing is that provided by the Modigliani-Sutch 
Model using short-term interest rates, which was a marginal 
improvement on the Malkiel Model using short-term interest rates. 
Furthermore, the maturity pattern of local authority borrowing is in 
accordance with at least those theories of the term structure of 
interest rates that emphasise the role of expectations; establishing, 
however, that local authorities in the U.K. appear to arrange the 
maturity structure of their borrowing at least in part according to 
the premises of those theories of the term structure that emphasise 
the role of expectations, cannot be interpreted as evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that the term structure of interest rates in 
the U.K. is determined by expectations about the future course of 
interest rates. It may be the case that local authority borrowing 
is of insufficient sway in the money and capital markets to out- 
weigh the influence of non-expectational factors such as those 
suggested by the Hedging Pressure Theory. T-his question will be 
taken up in section (4.4.).
4.2 The consequence of the restrictions on temporary borrowing
The results of the previous section, although encouraging, make no 
allowance for the restrictions that were imposed on temporary 
borrowing in 1963 and brought eventually into force in April 1969. 
This might be a serious mis-specification since the restrictions 
may have resulted in a major behavioural shift in the relationship 
between local authority temporary borrowing and expectations about 
the future course of interest rates.
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A test of the hypothesis that the restrictions on temporary borrow- 
ing have altered the behavioural relationship raises a number of 
methodological difficulties. First, there is the problem of deciding 
from when exactly the restrictions apply. Although they came into 
force nominally in April 1969 originally they were to have come into 
force a year earlier. The postponement was made necessary by the 
failure of a number of local authorities 10 reduce the ratio of their
temporary debt below twenty per cent of total loan debt by the
deadline. Most local authorities, on the other hand, had success- 
fully reduced their ratio, if previously it had been in excess of 
twenty per cent, before April 1968. Moreover, there is the possib- 
ility that in the early part of the period under study, in the years 
after the announcement of the restrictions in 1963, there was a perverse 
response. Up until 1963 local authorities in Scotland had been 
subjected to a ceiling on their temporary debt of fifteen per cent 
of total loan debt. From then until the imposition of the controls 
in 1969 the Scottish authorities were not subject to any controls 
and it is possible that they increased their temporary borrowing 
during the interim over and above twenty per cent. A more serious 
perverse consequence of the 1963 measures, though it is something 
that cannot be quantified, is that, as already mentioned in chapter 
two, they gave official approval to the concept of 'permanent 1 temp- 
orary borrowing; and encouraged some local authorities who hitherto 
had been reluctant to use temporary funds on a large scale to be 
more venturesome. Since it is impossible to be clearcut about 
the 'policy-on' and 'policy-off periods the choice must be some- 
what arbitrary. A test of significance will be employed to decide 
between the two periods and determine whether a shift in the 
relationship has occurred. For the reasons given above the 
division will be made at 1968 (D/1968 (11).
Having decided upon the sub-periods that are to be compared, the 
second difficulty concerns specifying, 'a priori', how the relation- 
ship is expected to change from one period to the next as a result
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of the restrictions.
The reforms may have acted directly upon the expectations 
generating mechanism. The knowledge that there has existed an 
upper limit to the amount of total temporary debt thai a local 
authority could incur during the second period, may have been an 
inducement to fund more rapidly when interest rates fell so as to 
provide as much slack as possible between the ceiling and the 
existing ratio when interest rates once more rose. In terms of 
the adaptive expectations model of chapter three the value of X 
after 1968(1) would be expected to be lower than before. This 
conclusion, however,, follows only when interest rates are falling. 
It has already been noted that the response of temporary borrowing 
to a change in interest rates will not be necessarily symmetrical. 
A further source of asymmetry springs from the restrictions on 
temporary borrowing. Although there is no limit on the extent to 
which a local authority can fund its temporary debt, other than 
that provided by the constraints of the money and capital markets, 
the imposition of an upper' limit means' that, if" a' local authority 
is increasing its temporary debt, for how long the process can go 
on will depend upon how much slack there is and how quickly it 
will be taken up. If it is supposed that the amount of slack which 
a local authority has in the ratio of its temporary to its total debt 
is equal to the net borrowing requirement in a given financial 
period, and there is the expectation that the interest rate will fall 
back to its 'normal' level at the beginning of the next period, then 
there would exist the opportunity to meet the whole of the current 
net borrowing requirement on a temporary basis and to fund it after 
one period when interest rates fall. If, on the other hand, there 
is some uncertainty as to the likely course of interest rates over 
the near future there may be a need on the part of the local autho- 
rity to decide whether the interest rate will rise further at the 
beginning of the next period. If there is a strong possibility that
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this will occur then it will be worthwhile, in the sense of mini- 
mising the cost of borrowing, to retain some, if not all, of the 
slack in the ratio until the following period when it can be 
employed to ward off the even higher cost of long-term borrowing . 
Thus in a situation in which extrapolative expectations predominate 
(in contrast to that situation prior to the controls on temporary 
borrowing in which a rise in interest rates would stimulate immed- 
iate unfunding) a rise in interest rates might not result initially 
in unfunding because of a desire to retain sufficient scope to 
react to the even higher interest rates expected in the following 
period. Equally though, a local authority might choose to hold 
sufficient slack in its temporary debt to allow the borrowing 
requirement to be met on a temporary basis for as many periods 
as there was the expectation that interest rates would remain above 
the 'normal 1 level; subject to the qualification that according to 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis the level of interest rates 
regarded as being normal would be in the process of being revised 
upwards.
It is clear that the number of possibilities is large. The actual 
outcome is of course an empirical question and will depend upon 
whether expectations are regressive or extrapolative; the probability 
of a further rise in the interest rate after an initial rise and its 
extent; and the ratio of the slack to the net borrowing requirement.
Table (43 ) reports the results for the two sub-periods for the. 
Malkiel Model based on short-term interest rates. Only the 
transformed equation J3 .9 . g] is reported. Again a coarse search 
procedure was used to locate the approximate optimal value of 
for each of the sub-periods. At first sight it appears that for the 
period during which the restrictions on temporary borrowing are 
assumed to have been operative, adjustment, as measured by the 
value of was more rapid. A more rigorous test, however, of 
the hypothesis that the two relationships, one for the policy-on
TABLE (4.6)
The Malkiel Model Of Net Temporary Borrowing: Short-Term Interest Rate - Q..L. S.
1961 (111) - 1968 (1)
Equation Dependent Variable
3.9.g TB*
1968(1 n - 1973(110
-48.83 + 41.06 A R 
(1.64) (2.86)
- 131.27 DQ + 0.70 B* 
(2.64) t (2.65)
0.376
K
S .E ,E. = 53 .11 D.W. = 1.99 \ '= 0.
3.9.g TB 1 -87.66 + 42.46 A Rq , - 145.91 DQ + 0.57 
(1.63) (2.59) (3.75) (2.98)
-2 = 0.694 K
S.E.E. - 70,415 D.W. = 2.56
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and one for the policy-off period, are significantly different is
12 provided by the Chow Test . No significant difference was to be
found in the estimated functions for the two sub-periods. Table 
(4.7) reports the results employing the Modigliani-Sutch Model 
with short-term interest rates. Again the degree of the polynominal 
and the length of the lag were varied and the equation selected 
which minimised the standard error of estimate. For both sub- 
periods the best fit was obtained with a second-degree polynomial 
over six quarters. As can be seen the lag profiles are very similar. 
A Chow Test indicated no significant difference between the two 
sub-periods.
These are surprising results in light of the widespread view that 
the restrictions on temporary borrowing have been effective, there- 
fore some comments are called for. It would seem that the pattern 
of net temporary borrowing would have been the same even if the 
restrictions had not been introduced. There are some difficulties, 
however, with this interpretation because of the aggregation 
procedure adopted; it was necessary for the purposes of estimation 
to take the local authority sector as a whole because disaggregated 
data for either individual authorities as for groups, such as the 
County Councils or the Municipal Councils, were not available. 
This has had the defect cf ignoring some of the larger local 
authorities who prior to the imposition of the controls certainly had 
well in excess of twenty per cent of their total loan debt on a 
temporary basis and must almost by definition have been restrained 
by the restrictions. Apparently the reduction in the proportional 
temporary borrowing of the larger local authorities has been 
cancelled out by the greater recourse of smaller local authorities 
to the temporary money markets. Whether this outcome is to be 
regarded as an indication of the failure of the measures announced 
in 1963 to contain local authority temporary borrowing below that 
level at which it would otherwise have been turns upon what the
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TABLE (4.7)
Modigliani-Sutch Model Of Net Temporary Borrowing: Almon Variables:
Short-Term Interest Rate: O.L.S.
1961 (111) - 1968 (1) 
Equation 4 .3 ,b
TB, , = 128.59 + 0.50 B, . - 97.41 DQ + 34.20 R , 
(1.37) (1.86) (2.01) (2.52) 
-35 ' 67 7R2 = 0.417 
5=1 t-2 -20.03
A - -35.67 (3.30) t-3 - 8.52
A = 17.70 (2.01) t-4 - 1.14 S.E.E = 55.21
Lt
A = -2.07 (1.47) t-5 2.11 D.W = 1.571
vJ
t-6 1.22 
1968 (11) - 1973 (111) 
Equation 4.3 . b 
TB, - -31.75 + 0.66 B, * - 135.61 DQ + 43.02 R
I L / *___\ / . **. V I l» / /y-^y*»^s,\ *- \(0.16) (3.46) KU/ (3.38) (2.41)
'i RS(t-i) t-1 -38.24 -2 = 0.766 
i=l t-2 -16.63 S.E.E = 72.76
A = -38.24 (2.68) t-3 - 2.01 D.W =  2.482 
A = 25.10 (2.09) t-4 5.63
Lt
A = - 3.49 (1.80) t-5 6.29
t-6 - 0.04
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actual aims of the original measures were. If it was the intention 
to ensure that individual local authorities were not financially 
imprudent through having too much debt on a short-term basis then 
this has been achieved. But the 1963 White Paper discussed in 
chapter two, section 2:5, makes no reference to the risks of 
insolvency; the case for control of temporary borrowing was phrased 
solely in terms of the detrimental effects temporary borrowing had 
for national policy. This means that the total amount cf temporary 
borrowing is of relevance rather than its distribution among local 
authorities of varying sizes. On these grounds then the Chow Test 
suggests that the 1963 measures have not been successful. It is 
possible that the type of temporary debt, that incurred for up to 
one year, used so far has had the effect of masking some major 
changes. Apart from the twenty per cent ceiling on temporary debt 
incurred for up to one year, there has also been a fifteen per cent 
ceiling on debt incurred for up to three months. It is possible 
that the restrictions have been effective in limiting the later form 
of temporary debt but that this only resulted in a switch to 
temporary debt incurred for between three months and twelve months, 
so that it would not show up in the regressions run so far. This 
possibility will be considered in the next section in which 
temporary debt as defined so far will be disaggregated.
4.3 Disaggregation Of Local Authority Borrowing
As was explained in chapter three, section (3,4), the aggregation 
of borrowing from one year to as much as twenty years or more in- 
to one category may disguise the effect of differing expectational 
factors on loans of varying maturities. Since, however, data are 
not available on the maturity structure of net long-term borrowing, 
but is available on long-term borrowing differentiated by either its 
source (from the P.W.L.B.) or its type (bond, mortgage or stock) 
it was proposed that net long-term borrowing be differentiated
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according to whether it was from the P.W.L.B.; by the issue of 
negotiable bonds or stock; or by the sale of mortgages or local 
bonds. This level of disaggregation accords very vaguely with 
the maturity structure but it does have the advantage that it focuses 
attention on the supply of certain forms of debt and on lending by 
the P.W.L.B.; two aspects of local authority which have 
been of considerable interest to the monetary authorities over the 
years.
Since figures are available which disaggregate net temporary 
borrowing by term to maturity (up to seven days, seven days to three 
months, and from three months up to twelve months) a direct examin- 
ation of the effect of interest rate expectations on very short-term 
borrowing is possible. Within this Letter category it is also 
possible to separate out borrowing which is made by using over- 
draft facilities and that which is carried out through the channels 
of the money market.
4.3.a Disaggregated Long-Term Borrowing
The results reveal some interesting dissimilarities in the response 
supplies of various types of long-term debt to deviations of the 
current from the expected interest rate.
So as to limit the number of regressions that need to be reported 
the results contained in this section are confined to the Malkiel 
Model and the Modigliani-Sutch Model using short-term interest 
rates. Furthermore, for the Malkiel Model only the second 
transformation contained in equation J3.9 .bj in Table (4.1) is 
employed. This requires the calculation of transformed variables 
of the form:
= pw(t) -Xpw(t_ 1}
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TABLE (4,8)
Local Authority Borrowing From The P.W.L.B 1961(111) - 1973(111)
Short-Term Interest Rate: O.L.S,
Malkiel Model
Equation 3.20.C
PvV* - - 33.43 + 0.48 B* + 86.95 DQ - 4.9SAR q 
(1.51) (5.27) (3.75) " (0.52) 
= 0.572 K S.E.E. - 57.47 D.W - 1.97 = 0.
Modigliani-Sutch Model
Equation 3.20.C
PW ,t x -169.54 + 0.31 B,. + 93.63 DQ. - 4.17 R <£ b. R 
(3.28) (2.20) u (4.16) r (0,38) V; i^l 1
A l 
A
A
A.
- 16.27 (1.39) 
=-29.64 (1.56)
= 14.22 (1.68)
- -2.45 (1.74) 
= 0.13 (1.78)
t-1 16,27
t-2 -1.4
t-3 -3.65
t-4 -0.29
t-5 1.71
t-6 -1,43
t-7 -10.37
t-8 -22.65
t-9 -32.69
-2 - 0,66 
S.E.E' = 54.79
D.W = 1.90
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SB (t) = SB (t)
where, again, the value of Xhas been varied between 0.1 and 0.9 
at intervals of 0.1, and the approximate optimal value of \ selected 
by the criterion of the minimisation of the standard error of estimate.
Table (4.8) reports the results for long-term borrowing from the 
Public Works Loan Board. It is interesting to observe that this 
form of borrowing appears to be insensitive to changes in the rate 
of interest^ The reason for this should be clear from the 
discussion of P.W.L.B. lending in chapter two, section 2:7. The 
propensity of local authorities to vary their borrowing from the 
Board in response to fluctuations in interest rates introduced a 
element of uncertainty into the affairs of the Board and thus into 
the borrowing requirement of the Exchequer. This uncertainty was 
reduced by the phasing scheme which regulated more evenly the 
times during the year local authorities were allowed to take up 
their quota entitlements; and therefore the scope local authorities 
had to fund or to put off borrowing from the Board was limited.
The results for the Modigliani-Sutch Model paint a slightly different 
picture and suggest that although the initial response to a fall in 
interest rates is a slight increase in borrowing from the Board it is 
not a very rapid response and it soon gives way to less borrowing, 
a perverse response. It may be that a different relationship obtains 
for the period after 1963, from when the Board was no longer closed 
to all but the smallest local authority, but to maintain comparability 
with the other results no such regressions are reported. It is 
possible also that the gradual increase in the quota of loans avail- 
able to local authorities may have distorted the lag structure found. 
Some attempts were made to make allowance for this by including
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a number of dummy variables . No significant difference was
found and so the results have been excluded.
The results for borrowing by issue of Stock and Negotiable Bond 
are contained in Tables (4.9) and (4.10), The first, that for the 
Malkiel Model, indicates that a fall in interest rates brings forward 
issues of stock and negotiable bonds very quickly. It is possible, 
however, that this relationship could be strongly influenced by demand 
factors. Issues are always easier on a rising market and the 
monetary authorities may be more willing to countenance local 
authorities entering the market during this period rather than at 
other times.
The foreign currency borrowing that local authorities pursued during 
1973 is classified in the statistics mostly as borrowing by the 
issue of stock or negotiable bonds. This means that because of 
the 'advantageous terms obtainable in the euro-bond market more
was borrowed in this form than would have been overwise the case.
14 
A dummy variable, FR/t%/ has, therefore, been included . This is
shown as the second regression in Table (4.9). It is not, though, 
significant at the level.
The results in Table (4.10) for the Modigliani-Sutch Model reinforce 
those of Table (4.9). Most of the adjustment to a deviation of the 
current from the expected interest rate occurs in the first two 
quarters. See figure (4.1)
The response of mortgages and local bonds to deviations of the 
current from the expected interest rate is somewhat different. As 
can be seen from Table (4.11) adjustment is much slower. In 
particular the lag profile indicated by the Almon technique suggests 
that most of an increase in sales of mortgages and local bonds 
occurs one to two quarters after a change in interest rates .a The 
reason for this may lie in the influence of extrapolative expectations.
TABLE (4.9)
Local Authority Borrowing By Issue Of Stock And Negotiable Bonds: 1961(111) - 1973(111) Q.L.S.
Malklel Model 
Equation Dependant Variable
[3.20.a"| SB* 5.23 + 0.12 B* + 2.87 DQ - 18.55 A R
(0.57) (3.05) (0.30) t (4.62)
0.351 S.E.E. - 23.82 D.W - 2.09 X = 0.1 K
[3.20.a] SB* 13.53 + 0,07 B* + 8.89 DQ. -- 17.81 A R ,. + 14.59 FR
(1.30) (1.49) W (0.87) T (4,47) Mt' (1.58)
R2 - 0,369 S.E.E 
- 23.44 D.W = 2.11 X = 0.1
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TABLE (4.10)
Local Authority Borrowing By Issue Of Stock And Negotiable Bonds:
1961(111) - 1973(111) O.L.S.
Modiqliani-Sutch Model
SB,., = 69.27 + 0.24 B, . - 0.23 DQ+ - 24.03 R + £ b. -R 
{t) (3.41) (4.45) (L) (0.03) - (6.19) S(t) i=l'
A = 11.51 (3.37) t-1 11.51 -2 - 0.462 
A = -8,54 (2.12) t-2 4,76 S.E.E = 21.89
A - 1.93 (1.65) t-3 1.03 D.W = 2.35 
o
A4 = -0.14 (1.48) t-4 -0.52
t-5 -0.73
t-6 -0.44
t-7 -0.49
t-8 -1.72
SB,,, = 69.22 + 0.19 B,., + 5.39 DQ, + 15.40 FR . - 23.05 R 
(t) (3.47) (3.09) (t) (0.57) L (1.60) (t) (5.94) S(t)
A = 10.23 (2.97) t-1 10.23 -2 - 0.483 
A = -7.53 (1.88) t-2 4.33 S.E.E = 21.48
= 1,76 (1.53) t-3 1.17 D.W - 2.203
A = -0.13 (1.42) t-4 -0.03 
4
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TABLE (4.11)
Local Authority Borrowing By Sale Of Mortgages And Local Bonds
1961(111) - 1973(111) O.L.S.
Malkiel Model 
Equation 3 .2 0. b
MB*, v = 38.90 + 0.08 B* + 27.97 DQ+ - 26,9S A R .. 
(t; (1.99) (0.74) (L/ (1.22) u (2,86) ()
-2 = 0.167 S.E.E.= 55.08 D.W - 2.04 X = 0.3 K
Modiqliani-Sutch Model
Equation 3 .20.b
8
MB,M = 25.42 - 0.11 B /M + 38.03 DQ - 14.65 R,,,. 4-£b. R , 
(0.56) (0.91) VL/> (1.90) (1.52) ^ 
A. = 5.76 (0.53) t-i 5.76 -2 - 0.417 1 K
A = 37.83 (1.76) t-2 21.05 S.E.E = 49.05
A Q =-28.21 (2.49) t-3 10.75 D.W - 1.93 
=6.07 (2.81) t-4 -3.10
A =-0.40 (2.95) t-5 -3.01 
o
t-6 -1.09
t-7 10.S8
t-8 11.95
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If interest rates fall there may be the expectation that they will 
fall further so that funding is postponed. It does not seem
plausible, on the other hand, to suppose that when interest rates
rise 
local authorities will continue to borrow long-term in the expectation
that interest rates are to rise further. From the discussion of both 
the previous sections and chapter three a more likely course of 
action would be immediate unfunding in response to a rise in 
interest rates.
An alternative explanation of the slow response of sales of mort- 
gages and local bonds may be the administrative delays in organising 
a new batch of issues in response to what appears a more favour- 
able monetary climate. Equally when interest rates rise a number 
of mortgages and local bonds may still remain on sale at the lower 
rate of interest. The slow adjustment of those who take up mort- 
gages and bonds to alteredmonetary conditions may serve to compound 
these effects. Many local bonds are taken up by the personal 
sector, the members of which are unlikely to adjust rapidly to 
changes in relative rates of return on differing assets.
In conclusion, it would seem that the disaggregation of long-term 
borrowing has uncovered some clear differences in the response of 
supplies of various kinds of long-term debt to changes in interest 
rates; and that these differences are due in part to the control 
that the monetary authorities exercised and to the influence of 
demand factors.
4.3.b Disaggregated Short-Term Borrowing
The results for short-term borrowing for up to seven days, TB7, ., 
are given in Table (4.12). Again a transformed variable of the 
form:
TB7 <t ) = TB7 (t) -'
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TABLE (4.12)
Local Authority Borrowing For Up To Seven Days: 1961(110 - 1973(111)
O. L. S.
Malkiel Model
TB7* = -5.07 + 0.27 B* - 131.57 DO. + 53.66 R ,., 
(0.17) (2.23) U (4,23) I (4.12) U
-2 = 0.498 S.E.E - 77.27 D.W = 2.133 X - 0.! K
Modlgliani-Sutch Model
TB7. = -4.66 - 0.31 B, . - 143.50 DQ + 43,24 R R 
(0.07) (1.83) (t) (4.78) t (2.88) S(t} 1=1'
A, = - 8.31 (2.46) t-1 - 8.31 -2 = 0.547
A = -69.09 (1.49) t-2 -33.98 S.E.E - 73.94
A Q - 55.45 (1.95) t-3 -13.49 D.W - 2.09 
<j
A, = -12.96 (2,12) t-4 8.88 
4
A = 0.93 (2.21) t-5 11.17 
o
t-6 - 6.26
t-7 -20.73
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is used as the dependent variable in equation [4.6.a] in Table 
(4.12). Although the results for the Malkiei Model are similar 
to those for temporary borrowing for up to one year as shown in 
Table (4.3), with the exception that adjustment as indicated by the 
optimal value of quicker, the results for the Modigliani-Sutch 
Model are substantially different. While in the earlier results 
(see Table (4.4)) the best fit was found to be that of a second 
degree polynomial over six periods, Table (4.12) indicates that 
a fourth degree polynomial over seven quarters is best. But more 
significantly it appears that the main response of TB7, . to changes 
in interest rates does not occur in the same period. Most is 
concentrated in the following two periods; which is some evidence 
in favour of the hypothesis that expectations are extrapolative as 
well as regressive. see figure (4.2)
The results for the other two components of temporary borrowing, that 
from seven days up to three months and from three months up to 
twelve months, are very different. As can be seen from Table (4.13) 
borrowing for these periods does not reflect the same expectational 
influences as does seven day borrowing. In fact there is some 
indication that TB2, . properly belongs to the category of long- 
term borrowing in the sense that when interest rates fall TB2, . is 
increased and vice versa. Little confidence, however, can be 
attached to any of these results. The Modigliani-Sutch Model 
results for TB3 , . were so poor that they have not been 
included.
In addition to the disaggregation of temporary borrowing according 
to its term to maturity it has also been proposed that borrowing 
by overdraft from the banks should be separated out . This has 
been done and the results are reported in Tables (4.14) and (4.15). 
Although they are not well determined they do indicate that the 
extent to which local authorities make use of their overdraft 
facilities is dependent upon expectations. Since, however,
\\\
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TABLE (4.13)
Local Authority Borrowing Over Seven Days And: Up To Three Months; 
And Over Three Months And Up To Twelve Monfe: 1961(111)-1973(111)O.L..S
Over Seven Days And Up To Three Months - _ Malkiel Model
TB3* = -2.46 - 13.31 £ R - 45.33 DO + 0.40 B*
(0.24) (1.24) b(t/ (1.67) r (2.81) Uj
-2 - 0.094 S. E. E = 62.45 D. W - 2.504 X = °- 9
Over Three Months And Up To Twelve Months - Malkiel Model
TB2* = -9.67 - 14.86 A R ,, - 43.36 DQ... + 0.35 B* 
(0.96) (1.56) (1.76) L (2.74) U'
-2 = 0.091 E. E = 54.88 D. W - 3.10 R
Over Three Months And Up To Twelve Months - Modigliani-Sutch Model
TB2 = -3.33 + 0.04 B,.. - 19.29 DQ - 10.50 R +Rqr . . 
(0.10) (0.48) (t) (1.20) t (1.60) S(t) i=lS(t - l
A
A
A
= 10.20 (1.92) 
= -7.42 (1.68) 
- 1.05 (1.50)
t-1 10.20
t-2 3.83
t-3 -0.44
t-4 -2.61
t-5 -2.68
t-6 -0.65
-2 - 0.02
S.E.E - 40.70
D.W = 2.70
171
TABLE (4.14)
Local Authority Borrowing By Overdraft: Malkiel Model; 1961 (111)-1973 (111)
O.L.S.
OV* N = 0.46 - 0.001 B* - 1.93 DQ. + 23.49 (o.os) (o.oi) (oai) T (3.14) blt;
-2 - 0.146 S. E. E - 44.30 D. W - 2.81 \= 0. K
OV* = -16.08 - 0.08 B* - 23.50 DO + 27.33 A 
W (1.01) (1.15) (1.37) (4.03) bW 
R2 = 0.315 S. E. E = 39.66 D. W - 2.70 0.1
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TABLE (4.15)
Local Authority Borrowing By Overdraft: Modioliani-Sutch Model
1961(111) - 1973(111) 0, L. S.
0V = 1.01 + 0.07 B - 4.77 DQ + 20.77 R , +Hb. R , .. 
(0.03) (0.86) W (0,29) (2.94) i=l 
A n = -25.06 (3.72) t-1 -25.06 -2 - 0.166 1 R
A = 22.82 (3.39) t-2 - 6.15 S.E.E = 42.29
A = - 3.91 (3.13) t-3 4.94 D.W - 2.88
t-4 8.21
0V . - -69.42 + 0.04 B_ - 24.86 DQ. - 55.27 SP, . + 29.76 R 
(1.80) (0.63) (tj (1.51) t (3.16) W (4.24
RS(t-i) 
  J.
A = -21.95 (3.55) t-1 -21.95 -2 = 0.315
A = 18.72 (3.00) t-2 - 6.32 S.E.E = 38.39
= - 3.09 (2.65) t-3 3.13 D. W = 2.69
t-5 3.49
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overdrafts are substitutes for loans received through the money market
some allowance for this has to be made. If what banks charge
1 fi 
on overdrafts is greater than interest rates in the money markets
local authorites will tend to switch out of overdrafts towards 
short-term loans from the money markets, The spread, therefore, 
between the two rates, SP, .* has been included in the regressions 7 .
Although the variable is very significant it is of the wrong sign .
1 P An anomaly that is difficult to explain .
The final issue of this sub-section concerns the restrictions on 
temporary borrowing considered in section (4.2) above.. The 
hypothesis that they have altered the relationship between temporary 
borrowing and expectations about the future course of interest rates 
was rejected on the basis a Chow Test, It was suggested,however, 
that a fairer test would be that performed on local authority borrow- 
ing for up to three months since a separate ceiling of 15 per cent 
has been applied under the 1963 measures to this category. The 
results contained in this sub-section suggest that the expectational 
factors which influence borrowing for up to seven days do not 
influence borrowing from seven days up to three months in the same 
way. The comparison of periods has, therefore, been carried out 
on the basis of borrowing for up to seven days only.
Table (4.16) reports the results for the two sub-periods using the 
Malkiel Model, Although the values of \ differ between the two 
periods, to a degree similar to the results in Table (4.6), a Chow 
Test again indicates that there is no significant difference between 
the two periods. Table (4.17), the best fit for the early period was 
obtained from a third degree polynomial over eight quarters with much 
of the impact concentrated in the first few quarters. For the later 
period, however, expectations appear to be extrapolative. A rise 
in interest rates does not increase short-term borrowing immediately; 
much of the impact is concentrated in the following two quarters, 
only to give way to further funding of short-term debt in the next
TABLE (4.16) 
Local Authority Borrowing For Up To Seven Days: Malkiel Model; O.L.S
1961(111) - 1968(1)
* *
TB7, , = 12.90 + 0.12 B . - 77.30 DQ + 52.12
(0.25) (0.41) W (1.30) * (2.84)
-2 - 0.194 S.E.E = 69.0.1 D.W = 2.303 X - 0. K
1968(11) - 1973(111)
TB7 ' = 53.74 + 0.11 B , - 167.45 DQ fc + 52.31 A R
(0.87) (0.42) W (3.41) 1 (2.54)
-2 = 0.574 S. E. E = 88.34 D. W = 2.29 =0. K
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TABLE (4.17)
Local Authority Borrowing For Up To Seven Days: Modigliani-Sutch
Model: O,L,S,
1961(111) - 1968(1)
= 112.30 - 0.08 B - 71.44 DO f 62.14 R
A
A
(0.76) (0.22)
-30.46 (2.02)
29.85 (1.69)
- 9.28 (1.79)
0.82 (1.94)
(1.27)
t-1 -30.46
:-2 - 9,01
- 1.32
t-4 - 2.29
t-6 -10.71
t-7 - 8.32
J 
Lb 4 R
-2 = 0.345
S.E.E = 62.78
D.W - 2.27
1968(11) - 1973(111)
TB7,., = 8.96 + 0.31 B M - 169.31 DQ + 36.63 R 
(0.02) (0.92) (tJ (3.18) (0.98)
. R
1=1
1 
^2 
^3
A
A,
= 0.54 (0.02 
=-75.36 (1.30) 
= 51.86 (1.69) 
=-10.77 (1.82) 
= 0.69 (1.86)
t-1 0.54
t-2 -33.04
t-3 -17.86
t-4 6.30
t-5 16.32
t-6 5.24
t-7 -16.74
-2 =  0.568 K
S.E.E = 90.96
D.W = 1.84
t-8 -23.26
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three quarters. The pronounced change in the lag profiles for
the two sub-periods points to the possibility that at least for
19 that category of debt with the shortest term to maturity the
effect of the ceiling has been to make local authorities more 
reluctant to borrow short when interest rates rise lest interest
rates rise even further and more willing to postpone funding until
19a interest rates fell further.
4.4 The Effect Of Local Authority Temporary Borrowing On The 
Term Structure Of Interest Rates.
The question whether the maturity composition of local authority 
borrowing has altered the relationship between short and the long- 
term interest rates is of interest for two reasons. First, any joint 
dependence between temporary borrowing and interest rates will 
bias the results of previous sections; and second, if the pattern 
of local authority borrowing does affect interest rates it is germane 
to a monetary policy which hopes to act upon interest rates as a 
means of regulating economic activity.
The approach taken here does not attempt to be complete. Only a 
much more detailed econometric model which incorporated influences 
such as the demand for local authority debt and supplies of central 
government debt would be an approximation to that. Two means of 
testing for the influence of local authority temporary borrowing were
suggested by the discussion of chapter three. The first is the
20 reduced-form approach and specifies an equation for either the
change in the short-term interest rate or the change in the long- 
term interest rate. The relevant equation is listed as equation 
[3.19] in chapter three. The second is suggested by Dodds and Fora 
who pointed out that if expectations influence the supply of debt 
then the difference between the long and the short rate will be 
accentuated at each point in time. They made their comments in 
the context of Malkiel's Model but here the influence of debt 
supplies will be tested for by using the Modigliani-Sutch Model.
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This means the estimation of an equation of the form:-
RL(t) - RS(t) = % + a i RS(t) + l bi RS(t-i)
using interest rates on local authority short-term and long-term 
debt in the U.K. and the calculation of the lag by the Almon 
technique. Modigliani-Sutch used their model to estimate the 
magnitude of the effects of changes in the relative maturity 
composition of the national debt in the U.S.A. on the term structure 
of interest rates . .They did this by including in their estimated 
form of equation J4 . 6j for the U.S.A. various proportions of debt 
differentiated by maturity. The influence of the supply of temporary 
debt on the term structure has been accordingly tested for by in- 
cluding in equation [ 4 . 6 j net temporary borrowing. The difficulty is 
that while it is possible to regard supplies of central government 
debt as exogenous , net temporary borrowing has been found to be 
influenced by the difference between the current short-term interest 
rate and the expected interest rate. This means that net temporary 
borrowing and the terms on the right hand side of equation 
are collinear. The degree of multicollinearity will depend upon 
how similar the polynomial which best explains the spread between 
the long and short-term interest rate is to that which best explains 
net temporary borrowing.
Table (4.18) contains the 2.S.L.S. estimates for the Reduced-Form 
model. The first thing to note is the marked improvement in the 
equation for net temporary borrowing even through the specification 
is one in which the value of Ais assumed to be zero. Furthermore, 
while for the earlier results, in section (4.1), the best fit was 
obtained with short-term interest rates, the results in Table (4.18) 
suggest that long-term interest rates better explain net temporary 
borrowing. The last two equations are for the change in the 
short-term and long-term interest rate respectively. There is no
TABLE (4.18)
The Interdependence Of Interest Rates And Local Authority Temporary Borrowing: The Reduced Form Model;
Two-Stage-Least -Squares Estimates . 19 61(111) -19 73 (111)
TB, , = -39.94 + 55.92 A R , , - 123.33 DQ + 0.38 B 
(2.98) (8.50) (9.08) (7.74)
-2 - 0.828 S.E.E = 34.37 D.W = 2.11
TB, * = -28.92 + 134.92 A R - 96.01 DQ + 0.29 B 
(2.55) (11.08) Lllj (8.01) t (6.63)
-2 = 0.880 S.E.E = 28.72 D.W - 2,01 K
= 0.033 - 0.005/AY , + 0.051 AY, . - 0.024AY ,. + 0.50 AC 
(0.74) (0.68) (6.61) (3.31) lI " Zj (17.10)
0.24AR 0.11 VB, n - 0.041 TB,, .. 
(6.26) 6d(t) (4.32) (t' 1} (0.77) (M)
= 0.948 S.E.E - 0.177 D.W = 2.80
AR = 0.012 + 0.014 AY,, + 0.013AY, n - 0.023 AY, . + O.llA 
(1.41) (10.44) W (8.54) lt "i; (16.27) lt " Zj (19.41)
0.12AR 0.083 VB . + 0.153 TB 
(16.41) 8CIU; (17.25) ^"i; (15.29) W
-2 = 0.993 S.E.E = 0.03 D.W = 1.69 R
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indication that the pattern of temporary borrowing affects the short-
term interest rate. On the other hand, TB, . appears to be a very 
significant determinant of the change in the long-term interest rate. 
Unfortunately the coefficient is of the wrong sign, since it is to be 
expected that when interest rates rise local authorities will switch 
away from the long end of the market and the rise in long-term 
interest rates will be moderated slightly.
Table (4.19) contains estimates for the term structure model of 
Modigliani-Sutch using interest rates on local authority debt.
The best fit was provided by a third degree polynomial over sixteen
22 quarters^ ; a result identical to Modigliani and Sutclvs. In addition,
the shape of the lag structure has an initial rising segment which 
provides support for the hypothesis that in the U.K. expectations 
involve extrapolative as well as regressive elements. Net temporary 
borrowing was included in equation [4 . 6. a .J in Table (4.18). Although 
the coefficient on TB, . is of the correct sign it is not significant. 
The presence of multicollinearity. however, may have affected the 
standard error of the coefficient. To measure the pure correlation
between the dependent variable, R R q /.\/ ar^ - net temporary 
borrowing it is necessary to first eliminate the influence of the 
polynomial terms from both variables. If the unexplained variation 
of equation [4 . 6] is regressed on the unexplained variation of a
regression of TB, » on the polynomial terms, it can proved that the
u)
simple correlation which results is equal to the partial correlation
coefficient between RT R_,.v and TB, . . This was done but
no significant relationship was discernible,
The results of this section provide no support for the hypothesis that 
the maturity composition of local authority borrowing has accentuated 
the difference between the long and the short-term interest rate.
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TABLE (4.19)
The Interdepency Of Interest Rates And Local Authority Temporary
Borrowing: Modigliani-Sutch Model: O.L.S. 196I-C
RL(t) '
Al
A 2
A3
A4
  2
S.E.E
D.W
RL(t)
Al
A2
A3
A4
R 2
S.E.E
D.W
- R , } = 0.21 - 
(0.76)
= -0.0072 (0.16)
- 0.0419 (1.51)
= -0,0074 (1.75)
= 0.0003 (1.91)
- 0.871
= 0.317
1.185
S(t) (0.76)
= 0.0033 (0.05)
= 0.0370 (1.23)
=-0.0068 (1.51)
= 0.0003 (1.69)
= 0.871
= 0.320
= 1.213
0.54 R - (9.14) b 'ty
t-1
t-2
t-3
t-4
t-5
t.6
t-7
t-8
0.55 R , . 
(7.93) bw
t-1
t-2
t-3
t-4
t-5
t-6
t-7
t-8
_16
-i- > b. R n/ , ., 
"  i Sl.t-ij
-0.0072
0,0276
0.0494
0.0600
0.0612
0.0548
0.0426
0.0264
16
+ Z:bi Rs(t-i) H
0.0033
0.0338
0.0525
0.0612
0.0617
0.0558
0.0453
0.0320
111) - 1973(111).
t-9
t-10
t-11
t-12
t-13
t-14
t-15
t-16
- 0.0003 
(0.44)
t-9
t-10
t-11
t-12
t-13
t-14
t-15
t-16
0.0080
-0.0180
-0.0282
-0.0424
-0.0516
-0.0540
-0.0478
-0.0312
TB (t)
0.0177
0.0042
-0.0067
-0.0132
-0.0135
-0.0058
0.0117
0.0408
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8.94
(0,34)
16.00
(0.60)
24.54
(0.94)
24.81
(2.25)
2.70
(0.16)
21.24
(1.79)
0.27
(1.52)
-0.24
(1.13)
0.14
(0.72)
0.23
(1.70)
-0.09
(0.43)
0.17
(1.19)
79,93
(3.28)
103.36
(1.99)
88.61
(5.61)
99.46
(2.43)
33.60
(1.53)
22.84
(1.67)
39.45 
(1.68)
26,86 
(0.73)
18.34 
(0.65)
3.63
(0.14)
19.87
(0.76)
17.80
(0.63)
20.29
(1.83)
-0,14
(0.13)
17.40
(1.48)
0.29
(1.64)
-0.17
(0.81)
0.18
(0.94)
0.27
(1.96)
-0.03
(0.13)
0.22
(1.53)
73.52 30.28
(2.98) (1.37)
139.36 85.92
(2.13) (1.25)
92.01 -9.91
(1.78) (0.16)
83.87 20.00
^5.26) (1.45)
125.22 88.15
(2.09) (1.43)
88.83 -2.25
(2.19) (0.06)
32.51
(1.31)
3.26
(0.14)
48.08
(1.87)
42.02
(2.54)
15.47
(0.66)
49.83
(2.80)
25.2.3 16.20
(0.67) (0.57)
-2.59 -20.86
(0.07) (0.52)
-13.29 1.20
(0.46) (0.04)
17.70
(0.75)
25.89
(1.10)
42.07
(1-74)
37.55
(3.49)
31.51
(2.48)
32.94
(2.93)
0.24
(2.44)
0.15
(1.18)
0.17
(1.42)
0.24
(2.33)
0.17
(1.31)
0,19
(1.68)
37.70 23.98
(2.53) (1.74)
7.49 2.40
(0.73) (0.24)
30.75 -3.82
(1.86) (0.39)
28.94 27.49
(2.73) (2.59)
7.00
(0.74)
3O.48 -O.O9
(2.35) (0.01)
52.73 39.33 2O.92
(4.25) (1.09) (0.65)
44.12 -18.31 -0.91
(3.24) (0.56) (0.03)
50.71 -25.54 -18.45
(3.75) (0.82) (0.56)
54.43
(4.75)
47.09
(3.54)
50.95
(4.10)
27.87
(0.81)
37.73
(1.18)
2.81
(0.08)

14.88
(0.51)
-9.12
(0.35)
-1.07
(0.04)
5.78
(0.44)
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(0.17)
'3.15
(0.24)
0.21
(1.49)
0.13
(0.96)
0.14
(1.04)
0.19
(1.51)
0.16
(1.22)
18. O4 13.68
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8.73
(0.77)
20.56
(1.09)
21.55 11.40
(1.65) (0.87)
9.66
(0.94)
25.56
(1.73)
51.97 28.79 22. OO 35.95
(3.37) (0.64) (0.55) (O.84)
0.34 47.65 -4.52 7.81 39.9
(0.03) (3.17) (0.12) (0.22) (1.13)
-6.99 51.04 -7.59 --1.33 21.99
(0.62) (3.29) (0.21) (O.04) (O.53)
55.25
(3.91)
4.01 50.95
(0.39) (3.53)
-5.13 53.56
(0.50) (3.79)
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Appendix A
The Impact Of Monetary Policy On State And Local Governments 
In The U.S.A.
The subject of local authority borrowing and monetary policy has 
an interesting corollary in the U.S.A. A considerable amount of 
research has been done there into the effects of a changing 
monetary climate on State and Local Governments and in particular 
into the impact of changing interest rates on their borrowing and 
capital spending behaviour.
In this study the relationship between local authority borrowing and 
the exercise of monetary policy has been found to be two-fold: the 
ways in which local authorities have chosen to borrow, by altering 
financial between different sectors, has impinged upon the 
efforts of the monetary authorities; while the varying credit conditions 
brought about by the actions of the monetary authorities has affected 
the ways in which local authorities have borrowed and especially 
the periods for which they have issued debt, The possibility, 
however, that by increasing the cost of borrowing the monetary 
authorities could reduce local authority borrowing and thereby the 
scale of their capital spending, has been ruled out by assumption.
One of the channels through which monetary effects can be 
transmitted to the real sector is that of the cost of capital. It is 
asserted that a decrease in the money supply as a result of open 
market operations would lower the price and raise the yield on 
short-term financial assets, cause in turn a change at the long 
end of the market and bring about a divergence between the cost 
of capital and the return on capital. This in turn would result 
in a fall in capital expenditure. A hypothetical situation can be 
envisaged in which a rise in the rate of interest would result at 
the margin in a divergence of the cost of capital from the return
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andtherefore fall in the capital expenditure of local authorities 
in the U.K. It might then be conceivable, depending upon the 
maturity composition of local authority net borrowing, that less 
would be borrowed from the P.W.L.B., with the result that the 
monetary contraction that brought about the rise in interest rates 
would be reinforced by the smaller Exchequer borrowing requirement. 
Some of the reasons why this situation is thought to be improbable 
have been discussed in chapter two"1 . Some other reasons are 
suggested by the survey of the American literature which now follows.
In the most recent studies of state and local governments in the
2 U.S.A., those carried out by the Federal Reserve board , (F.R.B.)
an important distinction has been drawn between borrowing and 
capital spending decisions because of a possible differential impact 
of monetary policy. State and local governments can insulate 
their capital spending from the consequences of rising interest 
rates by not borrowing long term and by financing capital expendi- 
ture either by running down previously accumulated liquid assets or 
by short-term borrowing. The degree to which this can be done 
will determine, along with other things, the responsiveness of 
capital spending to monetary conditions. Some of the American
studies, apart from those of the F.R.B., have concentrated almost
3 entirely on the impact of interest rates on long term bond issues ;
while others have placed most stress on the -direct effects on 
capital spending, making the assumption that a postponement of
a bond issue implies a reasonably equal decrease in capital
4 
expenditure .
The F.R.B. were interested in gathering information about future 
borrowing intentions, the extent to which such plans were realised 
under various monetary climates, and the links between borrowing 
and spending decisions.
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A. 1 Impact of Monetary Conditions on Borrowing
In the F.R.B. survey of anticipated borrowings for the 1970 fiscal 
year , state and local governments indicated that they planned 
long-term borrowing of an estimated $23 billion (see Table A.I). 
Some $15 billion in borrowing had already been authorised. The 
remainder represented as yet unauthorised borrowings and which 
required authorisation before they could be marketed. Some $2 
billion of the 1970 anticipated borrowings represented previously 
deferred bond issues reflecting the tight monetary conditions at 
the time. In the event conditions remained restrictive through 
most of fiscal 1970 with the consequence that only $13.2 billions 
was actually borrowed long-term. Of the net shortfall 5 of almost 
$10 billion some $5.2 billion was due to high interest rates 
a further $2.2 billion in borrowing represented bond sales that 
were postponed for interest rate reasons earlier in the fiscal year 
but were subsequently sold before the fiscal year was completed. 
In total the restrictive monetary conditions were responsible for 
delays and shortfalls in anticipated long-term borrowing amounting 
to $7.4 billion.
Table A.I
Anticipated And Actual Long-Term Borrowing By State And Local
Governments In The U.S.A. 1970 - 1972 In Billions Of Dollars.
1970 1971 1972
Anticipated 23.13 23.80 25.4
Net Shortfall 9.88 0.74 3.0
Actual Borrowing 13.25 23.06 22.4
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1971, December 1971, 
April 1973
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In the following fiscal year, 1971 (see Table A.I) the relatively
favourable monetary climate resulted in the issue of a record
7
volume of bonds . Governments were able to place an amount
equal to 97 per cent of their planned borrowings. During the 1972 
fiscal year governments were expected to borrow $25.4 billion,
but only $17,4 billion of planned issues were sold . Actual 
borrowing only reached $22.4 billion, as shown in Table (A.I) 
because borrowing not anticipated, at the time the report was made 
to the F.R.B. amounted to $5 billion. The reasons for the large 
shortfall in anticipated borrowing were mainly administrative and 
legal; only 5 per cent of the total shortfall was due tc interest 
rate factors. The unplanned borrowing occurred partly because 
governments accelerated their borrowing in response to falling 
interest rates.
An increase in interest rates may reduce long-term borrowing for 
a number of reasons. First, in the short run, the current cost of 
debt servicing would be raised and. if current revenues are inflexible 
borrowing would become difficult. Secondly, borrowers may wait for 
periods of lower interest rates In the hope of lowering the burden 
of future debt servicing. Thirdly, many governments in the U.S.A. 
have been, and are, subject to legal limits on the interest rate that 
could pay. Thus if interest rates in the market rise above the 
legal limit, as they did in many cases during the 1971 fiscal year, 
borrowing long-term becomes prohibited.
Tanzer (1954) in a study of the factors affecting the volume and 
timing of state and local government long term, borrowing during 
the 1950's found that interest rates were important but that the 
interest elasticity attributed to state and local governments as a 
whole was accounted for largely by the high interest elasticity of 
state issues. In the 1966 pilot survey of the F.R.B. large states 
were separated from small states and local governments and it was
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found that the larger units -were more sensitive in their long-term 
borrowing to interest rates.
A. 2 Impact Of Monetary Conditions On Capital Expenditure
Although it has been found that long-term borrowing is sensitive 
to interest rates it does not follow automatically that there will 
be an equal and matching change in the scale of capital spending. 
Any shortfall in long-term borrowing could be made up in a number 
of ways.
(a) A greater allocation for capital expenditure could be made 
from current revenues.
(b) As with local authorities in the U.K., state and local
governments could shift from long-term to short-term borrowing 
in order to postpone funding until interest rates are lower.
(c) Current expenditures and new outlay commitments could be 
reduced.
(d) Liquid assets could be drawn down; or governments which
ordinarily borrow well in advance of actual capital spending 
could postpone borrowing. This would result in a gap between 
actual and previously desired liquid assets,
The F.R.B. attempted to determine by which means governments 
insulated their capital spending from any shortfalls in long-term 
borrowing. Their findings are set out in Table (A. 2). For the 
1970 fiscal year, during which there was a major shortfall in 
anticipated borrowing, some $4.48 billion was obtained by 
alternative means. This meant that the net shortfall in capital 
spending amounted to approximately $2.90 billion. Of the alternat- 
ive means of financing capital expenditure by far the most important 
was short-term borrowing. Much of this was obtained from the 
commercial banks because of the high effective yields to banks on
obligations paying tax exempt interest.
Table (A.2)
Alternative Means Of Financing Long-Term Borrowing Shortfalls 
In The U.S.A. In Billions Of Dollars
1970 1971
Short-term borrowing 
Liquid assets 
Postponement of other 
cash outlays 
Other*
___ _ __ 1972 
2.68 59.8 2.03 56,3 1.0
0.03
1.12
9 50.7 0.34
25.0 0.45 12.5
0.9 
2.6
20.0
10.0
18.0
52.0
Total 4.48 3.60 5.0 
* includes governmental loans and funds that were not needed immed- 
iately. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin
Although the use of liquid assets was of less importance as an 
alternative to long-term borrowing it was given some emphasis in 
the F.R.B. surveys because of the light it shed on the channels 
of monetary policy . States tended to experience a weak link 
between borrowing shortfalls and shortfalls in capital spending 
because of a tendency to borrow well in advance of actual spending 
and to hold the funds in liquid assets. Thus if borrowing difficulties 
were being experienced liquid asset balances could be drawn down 
to finance capital spending. This was considered to have anumber 
of implications for the linkages between monetary policy and 
financial and real flows, First, causation runs not only from 
changes in borrowing to changes in liquidity, but in the opposite 
direction as well. States and local governments because of their 
high liquidity are more apt to postpone borrowing in response to
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rising interest rates, in the expectation that interest rates will 
fall, while still maintaining capital spending. Secondly, the 
degree of liquidity of borrowers will affect the length and character 
of lagged responses to monetary policy. If a restrictive monetary 
policy follows a long period of monetary ease during which liquid 
assets have been built up, then the effect on spending will be 
less than if monetary restrictiveness was continued, for a long 
period.
It is clear that liquid assets and short-term borrowing act as buffers 
between the state of the financial market and capital spending by 
state and local governments in the U.S.A. In another early study, 
Netzer (1960) investigated the various institutional obstacles that 
hindered state and local governments' ability to respond to higher 
interest rates. He found that in the 1950s state and local govern- 
ments were particularly vulnerable to a changing monetary climate. 
First, because the range of borrowing instruments available to them 
was limited. Most capital was raised by sales of bonds, and because 
of the need, to acquire powers from state legislatures to be able to 
use temporary internal financing, it was difficult to respond 
sensitively to market conditions. Short-term borrowing, moreover, 
was circumscribed severely so that most governments had little 
choice but to borrow at prevailing long-term interest rates. 
Secondly, there were institutional obstacles which placed restrict- 
ions on the volume, terms and conditions of borrowing and made it 
difficult to ward off the impact of higher interest rates. In addition, 
limits on the interest rates which could be paid on loans, restrict- 
ions on the maturity of bond issues and on the volume of outstand- 
ing indebtedness were also found.
Morris (1960) in an empirical study of the same period found that 
state and local governments bond sales were moderately sensitive 
to monetary policy; following a roughly consistent contra-cyclical 
pattern. A contra-cyclical pattern was also found for capital
expenditure but with a much smaller amplitude than for bond sales; 
mainly because a large proportion of capital expenditure not 
financed by borrowing.
Charlotte Phelps (1969) in a study of state and local government 
highway investment has taken a slightly different approach to the 
questions raised in this appendix but her findings are in agreement 
with those already discussed, She postulated that highway invest- 
ment would be sensitive to interest rate changes because the 
timing of capital expenditure depended upon the difference between 
the actual and the expected interest rate. The close resemblance 
of this hypothesis to the models of chapter three should not go 
unnoticed. She also stated that "unexpected changes in interest 
rates affect the timing of investment expenditures by affecting the 
timing of bond sales" ". But since highway investment has not 
been financed by long-term borrowing to any great extent, amounting 
to only about 18 per cent on average, it is not likely to have 
been particularly sensitive to interest rates. If, it was argued, 
a government delays a bond sale because the market is believed 
to be unfavourable capital programmes about to be started may be 
postponed unless an alternative source of finance can be found 
such as cash balances. For they "...cushion the impact of
tightening credit by providing a temporary alternative to the bond
12 
sale proceeds ". She found, in addition to.the fact that
unexpected changes in interest rates altered the timing of capital 
expenditures, that monetary policy appeared to have a greater 
impact on local governments than on state governments because the 
former relied more heavily on debt finance and had greater 
difficulty in securing short-term finance.
The broad conclusion of the evidence on the borrowing and capital 
spending of state and local governments in the U.S.A. is that 
whether monetary policy will affect borrowing depends upon how
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flexibly governments can respond by resort to short-term borrowing 
or internal funds. If borrowing is inflexible in the sense that if 
it is carried out it must be on a long-term basis whatever the rate 
of interest, then it is possible that governments will postpone or 
cancel capital expenditure rather than accept the high debt charges 
that it entails. The extent to which this occurs will depend, more- 
over, on what proportion of capital expenditure is normally financed 
by borrowing. From the point of view of monetary policy. Mayer 
(1972) has argued that the marginal impact of increased interest rates 
on capital expenditure is precisely the sort, of impact that is desired; 
a small percentage of spending is curtailed without it having too 
detrimental a consequence for the provision of services in the 
public sector.
A. 3 . A Comparison With The Experience Of Local Authorities 
In The U.K.
Apart from its intrinsic interest the American literature does provide 
some illuminating insights into the links between local authority 
borrowing and the exercise of monetary policy,
The setting in which local authorities borrow in the U.K. differs 
in a number of important respects from that in which state and 
local governments borrow in the U.S.A. The. institutional obstacles 
that hinder the borrowing of governments in the U.S.A. do not 
trouble local authorities in the U.K. There are no legal limits to 
the interest rates local authorities are allowed to pay; Treasury 
departments are much freer from control over the pattern of day to 
day borrowing; and decisions about the terms and timing of borrowing 
within the confines of statutory regulations, are usually left to the 
discretion of the local authority Treasurer. Capital expenditure 
programmes and the method of financing do not have to be authorised 
by referenda; there are no legal limits on the total indebtedness of 
a local authority.
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In addition, local authorites in the U.K. have available a much 
wider range of borrowing instruments which enable them to tap a 
much wider range of lenders than is the case in the U.S.A. The 
range, however, is much wider now than it was between 1955 and 
1964. The reduction of the role of the P.W.L.B, to that virtually 
of 'lender of last resort* meant that local authorities -were forced 
to rely on the sale of stock and mortgages for almost all of their 
long-term finance. The close control the monetary authorities exercised 
over stock issues made the stock market an uncertain source of 
funds. Mortgages, on the other hand had limited appeal to investors; 
so it was hardly surprising that in the face of rising interest rates 
local authorities chose to borrow short-term. This is the basic 
difference between the U.S.A. and the U,K. Local authorities in 
the U.K., with the except in Scotland., faced no statutory limitation 
on the extent of their short-term borrowing until 1969. Furthermore, 
there has developed in the London money markets a specialised 
market that supplied funds, on a short-term basis, from a wide 
variety of sources which were ready to lend to local authorities 
because of their security which was considered second only to that 
of the central government.
The restrictions on the use of temporary funds, that were announced 
in 1963, tempered by the reopening of the P.W.L.B. A number 
of new borrowing instruments were also introduced; the negotiable 
bond and the revenue bill both extended the appeal of local 
authority debt to more portfolio holders. In responding to changing 
monetary conditions local authorities have at their disposal a number 
of different borrowing instruments which appeal to a wide range of 
lenders. They are able also to raise short-term borrowing in response 
to rising interest rates, even though there is a ceiling.
At present there is no evidence to suggest that local authorities 
alter the timing or the volume of their net borrowing in response
to rising interest rates, of course this does not establish local 
authorities do not act in this way. If U.K. experience is compared 
directly with that of the U.S.A. it is reasonably clear that long- 
term borrowing is sensitive to changing interest rates, or at least 
according to the evidence of chapter four. It has already been 
noted that long-term borrowing in the U.S.A. appears to be sensit- 
ive to changing interest rates as well*
If total borrowing is unresponsive to interest rate changes it is 
unlikely that capital spending would be. Very little empirical 
investigation has been carried out into the interest elasticity of 
local authority capital expenditure. Nicholson and Topham (1971) 
have studied the determinants of housing investment by local 
authorities; and since about half of all capital expenditure by local 
authorites since the early 1960s has been on housing the results 
can be generalised. The authors used a number of variables to 
explain variations in average capital payments per head on housing 
by 82 county boroughs over the years 1962 to 1968. Total interest 
payments and the average rate of interest charged to spending 
committees were introduced as variables but no significant relation- 
ship was observable. The inelasticity of local authority capital 
expenditure is usually accounted for by the largely mandatory nature 
of many capital expenditure programmes; a point of view which was 
expressed strongly in the submissions to the Radcliffe Committee.
Since, however, not all the capital spending of local authorities 
is mandatory, the question can be posed in what circumstances would 
capital spending on projects of marginal value be postponed or even 
cancelled as a result of a rise in interest rates. Suppose that local 
authorities had little recourse to short-term funds, because either 
markets were relatively undeveloped or the credit rating of many 
local authorities were uncertain, then a rise in interest rates 
might face local authorities with the choice of either finding an
alternative means of financing capital expenditure or postponing
13 some capital spending until interest rates fell again . Some of
the alternatives might be in the form of a greater use of current 
revenues; or local authorities might adopt a policy of accumulating 
liquid assets during periods when interest rates were low as a 
buffer against a rise in interest rates.
The unresponsiveness of both local authority total borrowing and 
capital expend!-tore to monetary policy means that local authorities 
are subject to the vagaries of fiscal management since the central 
government is forced to use the loan sanction or exhortation as 
the only means of regulating local authority capital expenditure. 
The availability, at a price, of short-term funds has enabled local 
authorities to finance their capital projects without the need to 
postpone their execution until long-term funds become available at 
a lower rate of interest.
Appendix B
Definition Of Variables And Sources Of Data
TB, . Net temporary borrowing defined as including all loans
raised for less than 365 days. Although for purposes of 
General Consent relating to the restrictions on temporary 
borrowing it does not include money bills issued in 
anticipation of revenue, the volume of money bills has 
been included for purposes of estimation. Financial 
Statistics
TB7, . Net borrowing for up to seven days; includes inter- 
authority borrowing. Financial Statistics
TB3 t Net borrowing over seven days and up to three months; 
includes inter-authority borrowing. Financial Statistics
B, . Total net borrowing, seasonally unadjusteci. Financial 
Statistics
OV, The change in total bank overdrafts. From the 3rd
quarter 1965 total bank overdrafts were measured net, 
that is, authorities were asked to report the net overdraft 
on all accounts; in the figures for before bank overdrafts 
were on a gross basis, that is, the sum of all overdrafts 
on all accounts showing an overdraft. From the 2nd 
quarter of 1972 the figures reverted to the gross basis; 
estimated by reference to the net figures reported and series 
for local authority bank deposits supplied by the banking 
sector. Financial 
MB,. V Net sales of mortgages and local bonds. Financial 
Statistics
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Net issues of negotiable bonds and stock. Financial(t)
Statistics
PW, . Net lending from the Public Works Loan Board. 
Financial Statistics
R . v The averacre rate of interest on local authority mortgages 
for ten years or more. Calculated as the quarterly 
average of mid-month observations. The figures for 
and 1960 were obtained from various copies of Local 
Government F inance , the remainder come from Financial 
Statistics.
The rate of interest on local authority loans taken for a 
minimum term of three months and thereafter at seven 
days notice. Calculated as the quarterly average of mid- 
month observations. Bank of England Statistical Abstract, 
Vol.1, 1370; thereafter Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
Table 28.
DQ A dummy variable. Takes the value of 1 for 1965(1), 
1967(1), 1968(1), 1968Q.V), 19 69 (IV), 1970(1V), 1971(1V), 
19 72 (IV); zero values in all other quarters.
R Rate of interest on seven day local authority deposits. S7(t)
Quarterly average of mid-month observations. Financial 
Statistics
C,.v Forward premium/discount, three months, per cent per
annum. Statistical Abstract,. Table 28; thereafter B.E.Q.B.
R Rate of interest on three month euro-dollar deposits in 
ed(t)
London. Statistical Abstract, Table 28; thereafter B.E.Q.B.
. n The visible trade balance, revised and seasonally adjusted . 
vt-i;
Statistical Abstract, Table 19; thereafter B.E.Q.B.
/ v The spread between the local authority short-term rate 
and the rate charged on bank overdrafts. The later is 
estimated as being Bank rate plus |- per cent up to 
October 1972. Thereafter it is Base rate plus |- per cent. 
Statistical Abstract. Table 29; thereafter B.E.Q.B.
FR, v A dummy variable for the effect of foreign currency borrow- 
ing from 1973. Takes a value of 1 for 1973(1), 1973(11), 
and 1973(111); and a value of zero in all other quarters.
LA Net lending to local authorities by the Merchant, Overseas 
and Foreign Banks. Statistical Abstract, Table 10; thereafter 
B.E.Q.B.
OFC8, Foreign currency transactions of U.K. banks. Excludes it/
U. K residents' foreign currency borrowing from London 
banks for investment overseas, and trade credit transactions 
Statistical Abstract, Table 19; thereafter B.E.Q.B.
D A dummy variable for periods of speculation against
sterling. Takes a value of -2 in 1964(IV) 1 in 1965(1); 
-1 in 1966(11), 1966(111) and 1967(1V); 1 in 1968(1); -1 in 
1969(111) and 1970(11); 1 in 1970(1V), 1971(11) and 1971(111); 
3 in 1971(1V); and -2 in 1972(11). A value of zero in all 
other quarters.
R U.K. three months Treasury Bill rate. Quarterly average 
tb(t)
of mid-month observations. Statistical Abstract, Table 28,
thereafter B.E.Q.B.
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Rg. The rate of interest on British government long-dated 
stocks. Quarterly average of mid-month observations, 
Statistical Abstract, Table 30, thereafter B.E.Q.B.
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER TWO
1. The Public Works Loan Board, its history and the extent of its power 
are described in A General Note On The Constitution, Powers, And 
Duties Of The Commissioners And Other Matters issued by the Board, 
September, 1971.
2. Op. cit., PP. 1-5, for a much fuller account,
3. In fact the Public Works Loans Act, 1975 consolidated all previous 
legislation regulating the operations of the Commissioners.
4. The actual arrangements were a little more complex. Parliament
annually passed an Act which set limits on the sum which the P.W.L.B. 
could lend. From 1887 the Board's funds were provided by the National 
Debt Commissioners who managed the Local Loans Fund. The 
requirements of this fund were met by issues of stocks, bonds and 
temporary borrowings. The Fund was taken out of the National budget 
because it was not financed by the Exchequer with the intention that 
it charge for loans so as to be self-financing. The responsibility 
for fixing interest rates was passed to the Treasury in 1897 with a 
consequent loss of independence. This arrangement between 1887 and 
1897 has similarities, in many respects, t© the sort of central borrowing 
agency advocated in more recent times, c.p. Yannopoulos (1972).
5. See I.G. Gibson (1928, 1936) W. Riley (1930), J. E. Jarratt (1930) 
M. E. A. Bowley (1941-42)
6. The Local Government Act, 1933, c.p. J. Mitchell (1935)
Superceded by the 1972 Act, the financial provisions of which took 
effect from April 1974.
8. See J. D. Imrie (1940), Midland Bank Review (1950)
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9. There were, in fact, some exceptions. Local authorities could borrow 
from internal funds and also from outside sources within the limit 
of the highest figure of mortgage and bond debt outstanding at any- 
time between 1939 and 1945. All this meant in practice was that 
when existing debt came up for redemption it could be replaced in 
the same form without the authority having to go to the P.W.L.B.
10. Bank Rate had been set at 2 per cent in October 1939 and was kept
at that level when the war finished, c.p. R. S. Sayers (1956). 
lOa. See I.M.T.A. (1957) ch.XV. for more details.
11. J. C. R. Dow (1964), p. 227.
12. Quoted in The Economist: February 16th, 1952.
13. For a discussion of why monetary policy was revived: c.p. Report 
of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System (Radcliffe 
Report) CMND 827, para. 399-405.
14. The Economist: o.p. cit.
14a See the Radcliffe Report, para.429 for an explanation.
15. The Economist, August 2nd, 1952.
16. For a detailed discussion of these points see Hansard, 12 November 
1952, for the Debate on the P.W.L.B. Bill.
17. The Economist, November 8th, 1952.
18. The Financial Times, 10 November "The Critics (of the government)... 
hint that if local authorities were forced to go to the market for loans 
they require they would be constrained to reduce their capital 
expenditure". "...the first step has been taken towards bringing 
housing under the compulsion of the capital market along with all 
other schemes of capital development".
19. The Times, November 7th. "It is always open to the Treasury,
however, to keep the rate at such a level relative to open market 
rates, that an incentive exists, and also to redirect applicants to the 
open market if suitable cases and suitable circumstances arise". 
Financial Times., o.p. cit., "The speed of transfer will depend upon 
the rate of interest charged on P.W.L.B. loans, and this is, no doubt, 
the instrument the Treasury will use to control the diversion of local 
government borrowing into new channels".
20. Local Authority Stock is a negotiable instrument ana is issued through 
and quoted on the stock exchange. It is secured formally on the rates 
and revenues, of the local authority. Because it is -negotiable and 
competes with gilt-edged stock, the terms and timing of any issue 
are controlled by the Bank of England.
21. The mortgage is a particularly antediluvian mode of borrowing little 
favoured by the more go-ahead authority. In the 1950's, however, 
it was one of the few means by which local authorities were empowered 
to borrow. Originally specific properties were mortgaged, now it is 
the rates and revenues. C.p. Hepworth (1970) pp. 144-147.
22. Under the 1933 Act local authorities may borrow by way of temporary 
loan or overdraft to defray expenditure pending the receipt of revenue, 
or in anticipation of raising a long-term loan.
23. A loan sanction is a consent granted by a Ministry (it was usually
that of Housing and Local Government) to raise a loan over and above 
borrowing powers conferred by Statute. It is used now primarily as 
a means of regulating local authority capital expenditure. Originally 
it was a way of scrutinising the purpose of certain programmes and the 
financial resources of local authorities, For a fuller account, c.p. 
Hepworth (1970), pp..134-138.
24. The Economist, September, 1954, p.178.
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25. This followed from the pledge which the Financial Secretary made not
to set P.W.L.B. rates at a level which would drive the local authorities
into the open market, c.p. Midland Bank Review (1953).
26. See R. F. Harrod (1956)
27. Quoted in the Radcliffe Report., para. 409.
28. See R. Bird (1956)
29. A figure quoted, in Rose (1957), p.410
30. The Economist, September 1, 1956, p.732
31. H. R. Page (1962), p.15
3ia For some notes on this see Appendix B.
32. It is possible that because local authorities considered interest rates
to be too high, they felt that the P.W.L.B. should not have 'confirmed 1 
any rise in market rates by raising its rates, while when market rates 
were falling it should have led the market down farther by reducing 
its rates ahead of the fall. For some comment on P.W.L.B. rates 
during 1960 see 
33. Treasury Minute dated 3rd May 1957, quoted in introduction to the 
Report.
34. Committee On The Of The Monetary System, CMND 827 
H.M.S.O. 1959.
35. O.p cit., para. 596-600.
36. The Economist (August 22nd 1959 p.557) in its comment on the Radcliffe 
Report claimed that the Committee's idea, that local authorities' reliance 
on short-term debt was a reversal of funding policy, was a ''mechanistic 
absurdity"
Local authority short-term borrowings "...are not technical liquid 
assets... and do not expand the credit base". But if the monetary 
authorities are obliged to sell more treasury bills to banks because 
either fewer treasury bills can be sold to the non-bank public who 
prefer local authority short-term deposits or less can be raised by 
sales of gilt-edged stock to investors who prefer to hold more local 
authority mortgages, then the credit base can expand. Only if it is 
assumed that the forms of debt sold by local authorities are not 
substitutes for the forms of debt sold by the central government can 
the Economist's arguments hold.
37. Hansard, 26 November 1959, Debate on the Monetary System.
38. ibid, col.698.
39. This precise difficulty was to reappear when local authorities were
granted limited access to the Board in 1964. See section 2.6 below.
40. Memoranda of Evidence, Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System, 1960. pp.167-177
41. ibid., p.177
42. This was paralleled in the Minutes of Evidence, Qs ,8211-8569.
43. D. S. Lees (1961) p.34
44. For a survey of the period before the Radcliffe Report and the
Local Government Finance. Jan.I960
45. The first survey was as a result of a Treasur Circular dated the 27th 
August 1958. This attempt to . monitor the composition of local authority- 
loan debt was at first regarded as ominous. Cp. Local Gov ernment 
Finance (1958), pp.237-240
46. H. Cowen (1960) pp. 18-33
47. The Economist, October 20th 1362 p. 286
48. ibid, October 13th 1962, p.285
49. "Local Authority Borrowing" A Paper, CMND 2162 October 1963.
50. Before the White Paper was published there had been some confusion 
over the definition of temporary debt. The broadest definition would 
cover all debt repayable within one year irrespective of its original 
maturity, its source or the purpose it was issued for. The narrower 
definition, 'which was adopted for the purposes of the White Paper, 
only included debt with an original maturity of one year or less, and 
excluded borrowing in anticipation of revenue and from internal 'sources. 
The figures which were reported at the beginning of Section 2.5 are for 
the broader definition. This in part can explain the rapid growth of 
this form of borrowing before 1963. Mortgages issued for a period of 
two years, within one year become classified as temporary borrowing. 
The large volume of short-term mortgages issued in the late 1950's 
swelled the figures for temporary borrowing in the early 1960's.
51. White Paper, pp.4-5
52. In a speech to the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants. 
Reported in The Economist, November 17th 1962, p.710.
53. ibid, p.710
54. See H. Page (1966), p.31
55. These bonds could be for one to five years, but soon they were
nicknames 'yearlings' by the stock-market because of the possibility 
that those issued for 365 days would be just outside the limits imposec 
on temporary borrowing. See _The Economist, February 29th 1964 p.819, 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (B.E.Q.B.) 1964 p.90.
56. B.E.Q.B. op.cit., p.178.
56a See The Economist, July llth, 1964, pp.175-176.
57. The first bills were issued by Manchester in 1965 to the tune of £3mn. 
Although Manchester, along with some other local authorities, had had 
powers to issue both revenue and capital bills since 1S33, they were 
without the necessary Treasury permission until 1965.
58. Announced in a letter to the Local Authority Association, 31st January 
1969.
59. They have also been called 'secondary 1 and'complementary'. For a 
survey see K. McRae (1970).. and Midland. Bank Review (1969)
60- The Economist, September 1st, 1956, pp. 731-733
61 This lack of concensus is reflected in the conflicting views of 
Friedman (1969) and Swoboda (1968).
62. See the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (B.E.Q.B.) (1961, 1968).
63. This was to change further after September 1971 when 'Competition and 
Credit Control' was introduced.
64. The Economist, June 30th, 1962, p.1331.
65. B.E.Q.B., 1964, p.175.
66. Clendenning (1970) ch.6, 7, 8.
67. The theoretical basis of this proposition was first worked out by
Mundell (1960, 1961, 1962) and developed by Swoboda (1972, 1974). 
Its detailed consideration is left to chapter 5.
68. Under exchange control regulations banks are obliged to cover most of 
their switching into sterling by the purchase of forward exchange so
that the cost of this cover has to be taken into account when 
comparing yields in the Euro-dollar market and in the U.K. money 
markets.
69. See the Midland Bank Review (August 1973).
70. See B.E.Q.B. (1972) p.487.
71. See McRae (1970) p.36.
72. Ninetieth Annual Report of the Public Works Loan Board, 1964-65, 
H.M.S.O. , pp.3-5. will be referrred to as the P.W.L.B. Annual 
Report. This section draws heavily on these reports.
73. See H. Page (1966) p.29.
74. For a discussion of the ramifications of the sterling crisis for the
"...whole interlocking pattern of sector finance, and not least on the 
local authority markets". See B.E.Q.B. (1965), pp.20-21.
75. Actually only the interest rates on loans within the quotas remained 
unchanged. The rates ruling on non-quota loans were increased. 
Non-quota loans, however, are a very small proportion of total loans 
and can be safely ignored.
76. Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5.
77. CMND 2162, op. cit., para.17.
78. The 'less prosperous areas' were Scotland. Wales, Cheshire, Cornwall, 
(and Isles of Scilly), Cumberland, Devon, Durham, Lancashire, 
Northumberland, Westmorland; and parts of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire 
and Yorkshire. In 1970 the intermediate areas were included which were 
comprised of the rest of Notts and Derbyshire, and the East and West 
Ridings of Yorkshire.
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79. B.E.Q.B. (1965), p.216.
80. P.W.L.B. Annual Report, 1965-66, p.4.
81 CMND 2162, op.cit., para. 18.
82. Local authorities were granted a quota based on how much funding of
temporary debt they carried out as progress towards the level prescribed 
by the Treasury. They were all supposed to have reached this level 
by April 1968. The modified arrangements governing loans from the 
P.W.L.B, meant, however, that local authorities would not be allowed 
a quota of 50 per cent by this time it was therefore decided to extend 
the deadline by one year to April 1969. Some 300 local authorities 
by April 1968 were still above the limits. See The Economist, January 
25th 1969, p.80.
83. Many of these mortgages containing break clauses were held by the 
Building Societies who had a statutory obligation to ensure that their 
assets were almost immediately realisable in cash.
84. Annual Report, op.cit., 1966-67, p.4.
85. These quota was 4Qper cent of funding for .local authorities in less 
prosperous areas and 30 per cent for all others.
86.- The 1966-67 Annual Report, p. 5., is not completely clear whether this 
is really what is implied. It may well be that it was to include all 
borrowings, perhaps in the last few weeks of the financial year, not 
just those which had not previously been anticipated.
87. Annual Report, 1968-69, p.4.
88. Unless the loan sanction granted was for a shorter period the minimum 
period for which the Board could make loans was ten years.
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89. The Economist, May 15th 1971, 'Banking Supplement', p.XXVI-XXIX. 
89a. 'Risk 1 in this context refers solely to the possibility of insolvency.
90. This part draws heavily on L.Boyle (1973) Long, Till and Colvin (1972) 
and I.M.T.A, (1971),
91. Moreover, in 1970, because of the high demand for funds in the German 
money market the German banking authorities ruled that loans by foreign 
local authorities would require in future a guarantee by the respective 
government of the loan and not just a guarantee against the risk of 
exchange rate fluctuation as was the British Government's policy. 
See Long, Till and Colvin (1972), section 7.
92. See The Times, March 6, 1973, p.4.
93. As from October 1973 the relevant date is 31 March 1973. In addition 
because smaller local authorities couJct borrow in foreign currencies 
though without exchange cover a considerable number attempted to take 
advantage of this facility. To avoid saturation of the market it was 
decided that henceforth foreign borrowing covered or uncovered will be 
restricted to those authorities with tdal loan debt exceeding £100 million. 
See Boyle, op.cit., p. 57.
94. This was soon after extended to other currencies. See Boyle, op.cit., 
p. 53.
95. See the speech by the Governor of the Bank of England to the
International Banking Conference, 28th May, 1971, reported in B.E.Q.B. 
(September 1971).
96. The new arrangements were foreshadowed in the budget speech of March 
1971. Outside of official circles, however, the banking cartel and the 
lack of competition had been criticised by the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes (see N.B.P.I., 1967) in The Monopolies Commission Report 
(1968); by B. Griffiths, (1970a, 1970b) Pressnell (1970). For a criticism
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which was published after the announcement of C.C.C. see 
Hodgman (1971). See also Griffiths (1973), Rowan (1973), 
Nobay (1973), Morgan and Harrington (1973), and Harrington 
(1974).
97. The other eligible reserve assets are (i) tax reserve certificates, 
(ii) government stocks with one year or less to run to maturity, 
(iii) commercial bills eligible for rediscount at the Bank of 
England up to a maximum of two per cent of eligible liabilities.
98. For a careful analysis of this policy, see Goodhart (1974).
99. See Long, Till and Colvin (1972), Section 6.
CHAPTER THREE
1. Tobin and Hester (1967) introduction, p.vi.
2. ibid, they also point to the problem of defining optimal 
behaviour in situations involving market imperfections, 
transactions costs and other frictions; and in particular the 
inventory theoretic approach developed by Tobin (1956) and 
Banmol (1952). From one point of view temporary borrowing of 
local authorities can be interpreted in this way. Although 
strictly local authorities distinguish between capital and current 
accounts, modern techniques of accounting mean that temporary 
borrowing is used as a residual or balancing item. Nevertheless 
in what follows no explicit allowance will be made for the 
'transactionary 1 features of short-term borrowing; something which 
may be a serious shortcoming.
3. Up to now this anthropomorphism has gone uncommented on. 
Decisions about which forms of debt to incur and for which 
maturities are actually made in the Treasurers Department of the
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local authority. While general borrowing policy is the 
responsibility of the Treasurer himself day to day contact with 
both the money brokers and the P.W.L.B. is left in the hands 
of a few individuals within the Department. Probably because 
of its esoteric nature rarely is borrowing policy the subject of 
debate in Council.
4. Again this is not quite correct since local authorities, or rather 
the Treasurer's Department, manage the superannuation rights 
of local government employees. The investment of these funds 
will either be in the consolidated loans funds of the local 
authority itself or in other securities or property. Notwithstand- 
ing this qualification, there is no actual overlap in the sense 
that the assets of the superannuation fund have to bear any 
relationship to the external liabilities of the authority incurred 
by borrowing to finance capital expenditure. See Hep worth 
(1971), ch.x.
5. This is perhaps a controversial assumption. As was recorded
in chapter section 2:7, there was some suggestion that local 
authorities considered the possibility of curtailing capital 
spending as a result of high interest rates. The only empirical 
work for the U.K. is that of Nicolson and Topham (1971). Some 
evidence for the U.S.A. is considered in Appendix A.
6. Radcliffe Report, para.93.
7. Keynes (1936) pp. 201-204. Keynes never actually spoke of a
normal-rate but he refers to the 'safe' level of the interest rate.
8. See Ackley (1961), pp. 6-8. for a discussion of the differences 
between stocks and flows.
9. The use of a compound interest formula is, of course, a
simplification. The actual cost of a sum borrowed over 'n '
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periods will vary with the different ways in which provision
is made for repayment of principal and payment of interest. 
The formula used implies that both principal and compounded 
interest are paid in full after 'n ! periods. Even so because 
a local authority usually uses a Sinking Fund or a Consoli- 
dated Loans Fund as a convenient means of managing debt, 
sums which are put aside regularly so as to build up enough 
to repay the loan at maturity will be used to defer other 
borrowings. Nevertheless little is likely to be lost by using 
the simple formula.
9. a Strictly, local authorities are only empowered to borrow
short-term pending the receipt of revenue or to defray capital 
expenditure pending the raising of a longer terra loan.
10. Nerlove attributes this distinction to Arrow and Enthosen(1956),
11. Rutledge (1974) p.47.
12. Muth (1961) p.316.
13. This view has been disputed by Leijonhufund (1968), Ch.V,
section 3. There is also a discussion of Tobin's contribution., 
See also Crouch (1971).
14. These assumptions are really just an enlargement of those 
made at the beginning of section 3:1.
15. Because most of local authority temporary debt is actually 
on a seven day basis the amount of gross borrowing this 
gives rise to within a financial quarter is very large. This 
difficulty has been avoided by making the period for which 
a short-term deposit is taken equal to the 'decision-period 1 
of the model,
16. This deliberate omission can only be excused by stating 
that there appears to be no way in which one of the basic 
premises of the Liquidity Premium Theory can be reconciled 
with the apparent behaviour of local authorities. The basic 
premise is that while lenders have a preference for lending 
short-term, borrowers prefer to borrow on a long-term basis. 
This according to Hicks (1945), p.146, means that "..the 
forward market for loans, .may be expected to have a 
constitutional weakness on one side. . ". The readiness with 
which, however, local authorities choose to borrow short- 
term belies the assumption.
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17. Cmnd 2162, p.3.
18. The aim of national debt management is usually directed towards 
the task of funding as much as is possible because of the role 
that short-term government debt plays as reserve assets for the 
banking system.
19. Dodds and Ford (1974), p.171, footnote 17, refer to the existence 
of a paper by Malkiel published in 1967 in which he attempts to 
rectify the omission of borrowers from his theory. They were, 
however, unable to find any trace of it,
20. It seems that for the equalisation theorem to hold it is a
sufficient condition for investors to behave according to the 
tenets of the expectations hypothesis but it is. not necessary 
 borrowing behaviour will do equally as well.
21. See Hickman (1943), Walker (1954), and Culbertson (1957).
All three contributions are discussed in Dodds and Ford, pp. 51-57
22. Johnson (1971) p.91.
23. Meiseiman (1962) p.19.
24. Some of the technical and methodological issues that this raises 
are discussed by Dodds and Ford, pp.82-87. See also Buse 
(1967), Grant (1964) and Fisher (1966).
25. Malkiel pointed out that the hypothesis could be formulated 
equally as well by using short-term interest rates.
26. Malkiel (1962), p.216.
27. op.cit., pp.166-168.
295
28. ibid., p.167.
29. Goodhart (1972), p. 4 58.
30. Malkiel (1966) pp. 129-35.
31. The evidence he cites for municipal bond being issued this way 
refers to that produced by Morris (1960) and Phelps (1960). 
More recent evidence is discussed in Appendix A.
32. Malkiel. op.cit. ,p,135.
33. Ibid p. 154.
34. This is in fact an approximation. For a discussion of this point 
see Modigliani and Sutch (1966) p. 18 5, footnote 4.
35. There were nine variables of the form:
11
RL(t) ^L(t-i)
where took on the values 0.15, 0.25, ....0.95,
36. Their purpose in drawing upon De Leeuw's work was to
investigate the success or lack of it, of 'Operation Twist 1 . See 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966,67) and Rowan (1974).
37. See Almon (1965).
38. The problem was that if there was any autocorrelation in the error 
term the estimates of the coefficients would be biased and this 
would tend to mask the actual effectiveness of 'Operation Twist 1
39. op.cit. ,1966, p. 188.
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40. The concept of extrapolative expectations may have some
bearing en the discussion of section 3:1 of Rational Expectations. 
The possibility that market participants are aware a rise in 
interest rates may presage a further rise suggests that they are 
aware of the cyclical movement of interest rates and of the 
underlying economic processes that generate cycles,
41. Rowan and O'Brien's work also attempts to incorporate the
effects of supplies of government debt, transactions costs and 
the variances and covariances of expected interest income and 
expected capital gains. The variation actually reported here is 
that which they call a truncated linear approximation, op.cit., 
pp.293-297.
42. Again the model he tested was the truncated linear approximation 
of Rowan and O'Brie'n. It is possible that the exclusion of the 
other variables may be a sufficient mis-specification to render 
his conclusions invalid.
43. It is of interest to note that Hamburger explored the possibility 
that the negative performance of the expectations hypothesis was 
owing to the use of the treasury bill rate as the short-term rate 
instead of some other rate such as the rate on local authority 
three months deposits. He found, however, that its inclusion 
made no significant difference to the results. It might well be 
argued that the consol rate should have been replaced by the 
long-term rate on local authority debt. This issue is pursued in 
chapter 5.
44. This model is considered more fully in chapter 5.
45. The variables that have been dropped were generally insignificant
46. It is an assumption of 2.S.L.S. that the specification is correct.
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47. Under 'Competition and Credit Control' the monetary authorities 
have retained their control over stock and negotiable bonds 
because they play a part in the new system as reserve assets 
of the baiking system.
48. This condition is due to Tobin and Brainard (IS68).
49. See Parkin (1970), Parkin, Gray, and Barett (1970). Parkin 
and Ghosh (1972).
50. Parkin (1970), op.cit., p.469.
51. This was due mainly to the fact that the estimation period 
was up to 1968. It was only later that local authority 
securities began to pfey a greater role in the portfolios of 
clearing banks and discount houses,
52. Parkin and. Ghosh, op.cit.,Ghosh (1974).
53. Ghosh (1974), ch.5., tables 5.1., 5.3., 5.5.
54. Clayton, Dodds, Ford, Ghosh (1974).
55. See ch.6. section 5.
CHAPTER FOUR
1. The models are named in this way for convenience and to 
identify the basic source. All the results that follow are 
for linear equations; some logarithmic transformations were 
tried but they were no improvement over the linearised forms.
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2. Its precise nature is described in appendix B.
3. If we take just the second term in eq.[3.8"| , since none of 
the other terms are affected, and carry out a Koyck trans- 
formation we are left with:
RL(t) " XQ 1 RL(t-l) " S l (1 " X) RL(t-i)
which when the last term is expanded reduces to
a iLRL(t) ' RL(t-i)]
This transformation amounts to the application of generalised 
least squares (G.L.S.) to a single equation. More 
sophisticated ways of assigning a value to A have been 
suggested by Zellner and Geisel (IS68).
5. Because the coefficient b is equal to a of equation 13 .8 j 
and since/\ does not appear transformation is unnecessary.
6. The argument of Modigliani and Sutch that whichever interest 
rate is used is purely a pragmatic and empirical issue has 
already been mentioned in chapter two, section (3.3.c).
7. The technique for estimating the parameters of lagged
exogenous variables proposed by Almon (1965) is now widely- 
used in empirical work. The original general Almon scheme 
is computationally cumbersome so a simplified version is 
used here. This simplification is explained in Johnston(1972), 
pp.289-293.
8. No longer lags were used because of some difficulties in
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obtaining sufficient data for the early part of the period on
long-term rates.
8.a. See figure (4.1)
3. These difficulties sprang from the reluctance on the part of 
some local authorities (estimated to be about 300 in number, 
see The Economist , January 25th IS69, p. 80} to fund while 
interest rates were high.
10. The term slack refers to the difference between the maximum 
permitted ratio of temporary debt to total loan debt and the 
ratio that a local authority actually maintains over time. 
Since net borrowing is rarely more than a small percentage 
of total loan debt, in the same way that investment is only 
a small addition to the total capital stock, if a local authority 
maintains at any one time slack amounting to 5% of total loan 
debt this may well be more than equal to the total net 
borrowing in any quarter.
11. A simple numerical example may help to make this point
clearer. It will be assumed that no debt is retired during 
the two periods and that total loan debt in the first period 
amounts to 1000. 150 is held on a temporary basis and 850 
on a long-term basis.
Case (a) 1st Period 2nd Period
Total loan debt 1000 1050
Short-term debt 150 200
Long-term debt 850 850
Net borrowing require. 50 50
Rate of interest 9% 7%
It is assumed also that the interest rate in the first period 
is above the 'normal' interest rate and that this normal rate
is 7% and is expected to prevail in the second period. The 
slack amounts to five per cent of total loan debt and is just 
sufficient to cover the net borrowing requirement of 50. In 
the next period this is funded along with the second period 
net borrowing requirement of 50.
Case (b) 1st Period 2nd Period
Total loan debt 1000 1050
Short-term debt 150 170
Long-term debt 850 880
Net borrowing require. 50 50
Rate of interest 9% 10%
In the second case expectations are extrapolative and the 
rate of interest is expected to rise to 10% in the second 
period. In this case only 20 of net borrowing requirement 
in the first period is met on a temporary basis even though 
the rate of interest is above the normal level. In the second 
period, at the even higher rate of interest, all the net borrow- 
ing requirement can be met on a temporary basis bringing the 
ratio of temporary to total loan debt up to twenty per cent. 
This does of course beg the question why so much temporary 
debt is held in the first place.
12. See Chow (1960). This method involves the application
of an T'' test to the two sub-periods and to the complete 
period and a comparison of the residual variation.
13. These took into account the gradual raising of the quota en- 
titlement from twenty per cent to forty per cent.
14. See appendix B for details, 
14 - a See figure (4.1)
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15. There are number of definitional problems that have been 
glossed over. See appendix B. for details.
16. The rate charged by theb.anks to local authorities was taken 
as Bank Rate plus 0,5 per cent up to the last quarter IS72. 
For September IS71 Bank Rate was replaced by Base Rate. The 
information that this 'blue-chip' rate has been charged to local 
authorities was obtained from National Board For Prices and 
Incomes (1967).
17. SP, . has been transformer as before. Thus:
QP*   /n _ p _i_ n q\ \ /n _ n j_ n O b? (t) " 'S(t) RB(t) °'^ ~ MRS(t-l) R B(t-l) ' °«° j
where R^, , is Bank Rate. 3(t)
18. Switching by local authorities between the money markets
and the Clearing Banks, something which has been described 
as 'soft arbitrage 1 , became of considerable importance during 
1973. To prevent this the clearing banks announced in 
December 1973 that advances to local authorities, along 
with those to finance houses, companies and other banks, 
were to be related in future to market rates instead of to 
base rates. See B.E.Q.B. (1974), March, p.21.
19. Or rather that category of debt with the shortest term to 
maturity for which data is available. In practice local 
authorities also borrow on an overnight basis.
19.a See figure (4.2)
20. In particular the work of Hutton (1972) have been drawn on 
to obtain the equation eventually estimated.
21. See Dodds and Ford (1974), p.167, and the discussion of
chapter three. This hypothesis will be approached from a 
different angle in chapter five.
22. It should be noticed that the beta-coefficients differ from 
those of Modigliani and Sutch in that they imposed the 
restriction that the lag structure should assume a zero value 
at a finite lag.
23. For the formal proof, see Johnston (1972), pp. 61-62.
































